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ABSTRACT 
Health is a basic and fundamental requirement of all societies. Medicinal products have the 
purpose to serve this requirement by “treating or preventing disease”, enabling “a medical 
diagnosis” or by “restoring, correcting or modifying physiological functions”. [1]1  Over the last 
century, healthcare systems have rapidly evolved with respect to advanced medical 
treatment. Moreover, the scope of today’s healthcare systems is not limited to medicinal 
products only, but it also includes medical devices, diagnostics and diagnostic technologies. 
The healthcare systems shall guarantee the sustenance of the population with medicinal 
products of highest standard, quality and safety, as needed. In contrast, medicinal products 
which do not uphold the quality measures, set forth by health authorities worldwide, present 
a serious risk to patients. This includes counterfeit medicinal products, in particular. Criminals 
try to make a profit out of putting other people’s health at risk by manufacturing products of 
bad quality or even toxic nature and selling them under the pretense of being authorized 
medicinal products. 
One of the first modern medicines regulations, addressing the problem of counterfeit 
medicines, is the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906 in the United States (US) that 
prohibited interstate transportation of adulterated and misbranded food and drugs. [2]2 Before 
the passage of drug regulations regarding the accurate labeling of medicinal products, 
especially proprietary medicinal products3, it may have been easier to market unauthorized 
medicines without raising any suspicion or doubts regarding their quality, effectiveness and 
safety. In contrast, with respect to present drug regulations, the most effective way to put 
unauthorized medicinal products on the (white) market is to offer them under the name of an 
approved medicinal product of a licensed pharmaceutical company. Unfortunately, the 
number of counterfeit medicinal products on the market has dramatically increased over the 
past 10 years. [3]4 The internet is considered as one of the major sources for counterfeit 
                                                          
1 "Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001," (OJ L 311, 
28.11.2001, p. 67). [Online]. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-
1/dir_2001_83_consol_2012/dir_2001_83_cons_2012_en.pdf. [Accessed 16 January 2015]. 
2 "The 1906 Food and Drugs Act and Its Enforcement," [Online]. Available: 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054819.htm. [Accessed 11 November 2013]. 
3 Proprietary medicinal product: any ready-prepared medicinal product placed on the market under a special 
name and in a special pack. [88] "Council Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of 
provisions laid down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action relating to proprietary medicinal products," 
(OJ L 22, 9.2.1965, p. 369). [Online]. Available: 
http://www.echamp.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/Regulation/Directive_65-65-EEC__-
__Consolidated_Version.pdf. [Accessed 11 November 2013]. 
4 "PSI - Counterfeits - Trend Data," [Online]. Available: http://www.psi-inc.org/incidentTrends.cfm. [Accessed 
31 January 2015]. 
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drugs, especially in the developed countries. [4]5 Counterfeit medicines can cause serious 
injuries, resistances and even death [5]6 and thus, pose a serious threat to patient safety and 
welfare. 
In this dissertation the current regulatory framework and recent changes of the legislation 
regarding counterfeit medicines are presented, with specific focus on the situation in the 
European Union. Examples of international initiatives and actions that have already been 
done to combat the counterfeiting of medicines are outlined, as well. 
Moreover, the purpose and the development of pharmacovigilance (PV) and its regulatory 
framework are explained and the respective obligations of a marketing authorization holder 
(MAH) are outlined. A marketing authorization holder is held responsible for the standard of 
its pharmaceutical products. It is the MAH’s obligation to prove the quality, safety and 
efficacy of its medicinal products by means of conducting clinical studies before receipt of the 
marketing authorization and thus, the market release of the respective medicinal product. [1]7 
Additionally, all authorized medicines have to be monitored after their market release using 
an appropriate pharmacovigilance system. The process includes the collection and 
evaluation of all relevant information for the surveillance of medicinal products, with particular 
reference to adverse reactions and information on misuse or abuse of medicinal products to 
continuously evaluate the benefit-risk profile of the pharmaceutical products [1]8 and to 
identify product-related safety signals, posing a risk to the patient. Hence, required changes 
with respect to e.g. the product’s label and information leaflet or, if necessary, safety 
restrictions regarding the respective product can be initiated. 
However, it is not sufficient for the pharmaceutical industry to accept responsibility for its own 
original products, only. The pharmaceutical industry holds also responsibility to protect its 
patients against the health risk that is caused by counterfeits of its genuine medicinal 
products. As mentioned above, such counterfeit medicines can pose a serious threat to 
patient safety. Some examples with respect to the consequences caused by counterfeit 
medicines are given in the dissertation to illustrate the health risk which counterfeit drugs 
                                                          
5 IMPACT, "Counterfeit Drugs Kill!," May 2008. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.who.int/impact/FinalBrochureWHA2008a.pdf. [Accessed 7 November 2013]. 
6 "WHO Fact sheet N° 275," May 2012. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs275/en/index.html. [Accessed 29 October 2013]. 
7 "Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001," (OJ L 311, 
28.11.2001, p. 67). [Online]. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-
1/dir_2001_83_consol_2012/dir_2001_83_cons_2012_en.pdf. [Accessed 16 January 2015]. 
8 "Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001," (OJ L 311, 
28.11.2001, p. 67). [Online]. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-
1/dir_2001_83_consol_2012/dir_2001_83_cons_2012_en.pdf. [Accessed 16 January 2015]. 
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pose. In addition, the large amounts of seized counterfeit medicinal products e.g. at border 
controls and exposed manufacturing places of counterfeiters also hint at an expanding 
presence of counterfeit medicines on the market and therefore, to a growing threat to 
patients. Thus, it is the pharmaceutical industry’s obligation to adopt respective anti-
counterfeiting (ACF) measures to fight against the counterfeit problem and thereby, to protect 
its patients’ welfare. There are several approaches with respect to the protection against 
counterfeiting of medicines that should be considered by the pharmaceutical industry with the 
objective to establish effective anti-counterfeiting strategies. Therefore, a variety of options 
for the pharmaceutical industry to adopt anti-counterfeiting measures is outlined in the 
dissertation, including data monitoring and evaluation, collaboration with authorities, 
investigative, legal and technological measures, measures with the purpose to raise 
awareness of the counterfeit problem and measures to examine company-internal 
procedures regarding the counterfeit topic. The options and their limitations, which have to 
be put into consideration, are explained and discussed, giving examples. In this context, 
measures with the purpose to monitor and evaluate data, to raise awareness of the 
counterfeit issue and to review company-internal procedures are in special focus. Hence, 
these measures are outlined in more detail using practical examples. 
It is a marketing authorization holder’s obligation to collect, to document and to evaluate all 
information, potentially related to its products, which is brought to its attention. This includes 
reports related to adverse events, as well as suspected counterfeit incidents. Based on the 
fact that many counterfeit drugs are visually very close to the originals they mimic, they are 
hard to distinguish. The high quantities of counterfeit medicinal products on the market and 
the comparatively low amounts of suspected counterfeit incidents, reported by patients and 
healthcare professionals (HCP), give reason to presume that the majority of counterfeit 
medicines is consumed without questioning their authenticity. This leads to the assumption 
that marketing authorization holders receive adverse event reports concerning their original 
products that are actually not related to the genuine products, but to their counterfeits. As all 
received adverse event-related data has to be included in the evaluation of the benefit-risk 
profiles of the respective medicinal products, it can be assumed that counterfeit medicines 
influence the benefit-risk profile of the genuine medicinal products which they mimic. In this 
context, one purpose of this dissertation is to analyze data from the company’s global 
pharmacovigilance database and the company’s global technical complaint database to 
examine if a correlation between adverse event data and counterfeit incident data can be 
identified. The data analysis and evaluation are described and the outcomes discussed in the 
dissertation. 
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The data basis for monitoring and evaluation activities depends a lot on the behavior in which 
e.g. authorities, healthcare professionals or patients report relevant information to the MAH. 
The reporting behavior can be influenced by several factors, which are discussed in the 
thesis. For example, one means to influence the reporting behavior of the public regarding 
suspected counterfeit incidents in a positive way is to adopt measures with the purpose to 
raise awareness of the counterfeit medicines problem, e.g. the conduct of a public anti-
counterfeiting education campaign. Two options with regard to the setup of an anti-
counterfeiting education campaign are outlined in detail in the dissertation and their 
advantages and disadvantages are discussed. One option is to conduct a general (product-
unspecific) education campaign in one or multiple countries to warn the public against the 
threat that counterfeit drugs pose to their health and to educate them about what they should 
be aware of in order to protect themselves, and whom to contact in case a suspicious 
product is detected. To implement such a campaign successfully, several information 
regarding present knowledge and awareness among the public, often-used and seen-as-
reliable media regarding health issues, and reporting and purchasing behavior has to be 
gained beforehand the planning of the campaign and the selection of its contents. An 
applicable means to collect the required information is to survey a representative population 
of the public of the country or countries in scope. Another option is to conduct a product-
specific education campaign in one country. The implementation of such a campaign would 
be conducted as a pilot project and would serve as an orientation for the implementation of 
further campaigns concerning the same or other products in other countries. In the 
dissertation both possible approaches are outlined and compared for their advantages, 
limitations and opportunities. In addition, a product-specific education campaign was 
conducted and its preparation, organization (including the approval process), contents and 
developed materials are described, including an assessment of its effectiveness. 
The third and last anti-counterfeiting measure, examined in detail and based on practical 
examples, is the review of (company-internal) procedures with regard to the counterfeit 
medicines topic. The correct internal handling of counterfeit incident data and the cross-
functional collaboration within one country and across countries is essential for an effective 
anti-counterfeiting concept of a global pharmaceutical company. Such a company has 
affiliates in multiple countries all over the world and has to ensure to implement its anti-
counterfeiting concept consistently in all its affiliates. With regard to required adaptations to 
local circumstances, the implementation can be quite a challenge. For that reason, an 
analysis of the current state of company-internal procedures and measures with regard to 
anti-counterfeiting was done. A company-wide internal affiliate survey has been conducted to 
gain the relevant information. The preparation and the conduct of the global company-
  ABSTRACT 
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internal affiliate survey is described, its results presented and conclusions regarding the 
current state and further desirable actions outlined. In order to further and in more detail 
explore the country-specific framework (e.g. regulatory or cultural circumstances), gained 
experiences in anti-counterfeiting activities and local needs with regard to the global ACF 
concept interviews have been carried out with a selection of countries which participated in 
the affiliate survey and showed high interest in the counterfeit topic. The selected countries 
are representative for all regions of the world (Asia Pacific, Latin America, Northern America, 
Europe and Africa/Middle East). Again, the preparation and the conduct of the interviews are 
outlined in the dissertation and the outcomes and possible response actions discussed. 
All results from the data analysis, the education campaign pilot project, the affiliate survey 
and the interviews are summed up in the thesis. The drawn conclusions regarding the results 
of the examined anti-counterfeiting measures and the outlined points to be considered 
implementing such measures shall serve as an orientation on the variety of ACF measures 
that the pharmaceutical industry should take into consideration in order to establish effective 
anti-counterfeiting concepts. The gained information and experiences, outlined in this 
dissertation, reflect the importance of adopting anti-counterfeiting measures. Thereby, more 
pharmaceutical companies shall be encouraged to take action in the fight against counterfeit 
drugs. 
 
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Framework of counterfeit medicines 
1.1.1 Definition of counterfeit medicines 
It is difficult to find a globally harmonized definition on counterfeit drugs, since each country 
has its own understanding what counterfeit drugs may be [6]9 with regard to the broad 
spectrum of types of counterfeiting of medicinal products, e.g. patent infringement, fraudulent 
generics, diversion of genuine products, as well as tampering of original product’s packaging 
materials up to the complete imitation of licensed branded or generic pharmaceutical 
products. For these various types the potential risk on patient safety and the stakeholders’ 
interest in anti-counterfeiting activities may differ significantly. The World Health Organization 
(WHO) developed the following definition for counterfeit medicines: 
"А counterfeit medicine is one which is deliberately and fraudulently mislabeled with respect 
to identity and/or source. Counterfeiting can apply to both branded and generic products and 
counterfeit products may include products with the correct ingredients or with the wrong 
ingredients, without active ingredients, with insufficient active ingredients or with fake 
packaging.” [6]10 
This definition equals the definition of spurious / falsely-labeled / falsified / counterfeit (SFFC) 
medicines which is a more comprehensive term for counterfeit medicines [5]11, as it tries to 
cover various types of counterfeit medicinal products. 
1.1.2 Classification and definitions of counterfeit incidents 
The following overview, given in figure 1, represents the suggestion of a possible 
classification of the types of counterfeit medicines. The respective definitions are provided 
below.  
                                                          
9 "WHO - Counterfeit medicines: General information," [Online]. Available: 
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/overview/en/. [Accessed 25 October 2013]. 
10 "WHO - Counterfeit medicines: General information," [Online]. Available: 
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/overview/en/. [Accessed 25 October 2013]. 
11 "WHO Fact sheet N° 275," May 2012. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs275/en/index.html. [Accessed 29 October 2013]. 
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Figure 1: Classification overview of counterfeit incidents 
The counterfeit-relevant types are condensed under the term “counterfeit incidents”. The 
definitions used for the different counterfeit incidents are based on the Pharmaceutical 
Security Institute’s (PSI) definitions of “counterfeit medicines”, “illegal diversion”, 
“pharmaceutical theft”, and “incident”. 
An “incident” is defined by the PSI as follows: 
“An incident is a discrete event triggered by the discovery of counterfeit, illegally diverted or 
stolen pharmaceuticals. PSI considers an incident to be a unique occurrence. It must have 
adequate factual information such as a particular date, time, place and type of 
pharmaceutical product involved in order for it to be considered a unique incident.” [7]12 
Hence, all occurrences related to suspected counterfeit drugs are denoted as “counterfeit 
incidents”. As indicated above, an incident must be related to factual information. Depending 
on the specific characteristics of each incident, the counterfeit incidents are assigned to one 
of the three incident types “falsification”, “diversion” or “fraud”, which are defined below.  
1.1.2.1 Falsification 
The incident type “falsification” is defined based on the WHO’s definition of counterfeit 
medicines as mentioned above which the PSI also refers to: 
                                                          
12 "PSI - Counterfeits - Definitions," [Online]. Available: http://www.psi-inc.org/counterfeitSituation.cfm. 
[Accessed 5 November 2013]. 
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"Counterfeit medicines are products deliberately and fraudulently produced and/or 
mislabeled with respect to identity and/or source to make it appear to be a genuine product. 
This definition applies to both branded and generic products.” [7]13 
The term “falsification” is used in accordance to the “Falsified Medicines Directive” (Directive 
2011/62/EU), which refers to the term to distinguish the products in scope from products that 
are related to intellectual property violations. [8]14 Incidents related to intellectual property 
violations are assigned to the incident type “fraud” (see paragraph 1.1.2.4). 
The incident type “falsification” comprises the incident subtypes “imitation” and 
“manipulation”. According to the PSI definition of “counterfeit medicines” two main types are 
mentioned. 
“Counterfeit products appear with a wide range of deficiencies. For example, counterfeit 
medicines have been found to contain less than or more than the required amount of active 
pharmaceutical ingredients (API) used in the authentic version or even contain the correct 
amount of API but have been manufactured in unsanitary, unsafe conditions.” [7]15 
This description meets the incident subtype “imitation”. The key point is that the dosage form, 
e.g. tablets, capsules or solution, itself, is not genuine i.e. it was not manufactured by the 
declared marketing authorization holder or one of its licensed manufacturers. In this case, 
the packaging materials, too, can be counterfeited, imitating the visual characteristics of the 
genuine packaging materials, or can be genuine, e.g. stolen or illicitly recycled.  
The other incident subtype of the incident type “falsification” is the “manipulation”, which 
meets the PSI description: 
“Genuine medicines can also be counterfeited. For example, cases have been discovered 
where genuine medicines have been placed in counterfeited packaging to extend the expiry 
date or to commit a fraud against various government programs.” [7]16 
In this case, the dosage form, itself, is genuine, e.g. stolen or illicitly recycled. However, the 
packaging materials are either manufactured by a third party without authorization, imitating 
                                                          
13 "PSI - Counterfeits - Definitions," [Online]. Available: http://www.psi-inc.org/counterfeitSituation.cfm. 
[Accessed 5 November 2013]. 
14 "European Commission - Medicinal Products for Human Use," [Online]. Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/human-use/falsified_medicines/index_en.htm. [Accessed 5 November 2013]. 
15 "PSI - Counterfeits - Definitions," [Online]. Available: http://www.psi-inc.org/counterfeitSituation.cfm. 
[Accessed 5 November 2013]. 
16 "PSI - Counterfeits - Definitions," [Online]. Available: http://www.psi-inc.org/counterfeitSituation.cfm. 
[Accessed 5 November 2013]. 
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the genuine packaging materials, or they are genuine but adulterated, including the change 
(reprinting) of the variable data and / or the product name, the insertion of a genuine primary 
packaging, containing the genuine dosage form, in a genuine but non-matching secondary 
packaging, and the erasing of labels e.g. “medical sample – not for sale”. 
1.1.2.2 Diversion 
The incident type “diversion” comprises the incident subtypes “smuggling” and “theft”, which 
are based on the PSI definitions of “illegal diversion” and “pharmaceutical theft”. 
“Illegal diversion occurs when a genuine pharmaceutical product is approved and intended 
for sale in one country, but is then illegally intercepted and sold in another country. […] At 
times, drug regulators in the second country have not approved the use of the diverted drug. 
Illegal diversion may also occur within the same geographic area, within the same country or 
city. This type involves diverting discounted medicines from one intended group of 
consumers to another group buying medicines in an unregulated open market.” [7]17 
“Pharmaceutical theft is defined as an illegal taking of medicines. Thefts include burglary, 
robbery, or an embezzlement of goods. The responsible individuals may be insiders such as 
employees, or outsiders such as professional thieves. The theft may occur anywhere in the 
distribution chain such as at the site of manufacture, freight forwarder, distribution centers, 
warehouses, pharmacies, or hospitals.” [7]18. 
1.1.2.3 Falsified medicine incidents 
Falsifications and diversions are aggregated to “falsified medicine incidents” as these 
incidents potentially have a major safety relevance. Wrong, potentially allergenic or toxic 
ingredients, the wrong amount of active pharmaceutical ingredients (API), impurities of the 
API or any other ingredients can cause adverse drug reactions and thereby harm the patient. 
Counterfeit medicines without any API, at all, can also put the health of patients at risk e.g. 
with respect to life-saving drugs. The quality of manipulated, smuggled or stolen genuine 
medicinal products can be reduced e.g. because of improper storage conditions. Depending 
on the characteristics of the respective product, e.g. regarding the drug formulation or the 
stability of the API, improper storage conditions can have a major effect on the quality of the 
medicinal product e.g. on solutions for parenteral administration or tablets with a 
temperature-sensitive, hygroscopic or instable active pharmaceutical ingredient. Such 
                                                          
17 "PSI - Counterfeits - Definitions," [Online]. Available: http://www.psi-inc.org/counterfeitSituation.cfm. 
[Accessed 5 November 2013]. 
18 "PSI - Counterfeits - Definitions," [Online]. Available: http://www.psi-inc.org/counterfeitSituation.cfm. 
[Accessed 5 November 2013]. 
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products are no longer guaranteed to meet their standard of quality, effectiveness and safety. 
Expired genuine medicinal products can be substandard, too, e.g. due to a reduced amount 
of the API. Furthermore, the patient is endangered if the medicinal products’ labeling and 
their patient information leaflets (PIL) are in a foreign language (e.g. in case of smuggled 
pharmaceutical goods). The patient or the treating healthcare professional would not be able 
to read the PIL and thus, to attend to the safety instructions. The occurrence of medication 
errors or handling errors would be a possible consequence. 
1.1.2.4 Fraud 
The third incident type is “fraud” and comprises the types of counterfeit incidents that do not 
classify for the incident types “falsification” and “diversion”. According to the Oxford 
Dictionary the word fraud is described as a: 
“Wrongful or criminal deception intended to result in financial or personal gain” [9]19. 
Counterfeit incidents classified as “fraud” mainly have legal relevance rather than safety 
relevance. Such incidents comprise cases of intellectual property (IP) violation e.g. the 
unauthorized use of another MAH’s brand name or trademark, patent-protected product or 
API by a third, probably licensed, pharmaceutical company. In these cases, the medicinal 
products may be of high quality (meeting all specifications), which means there is no risk for 
the patient. However, IP rights have been infringed, which makes the respective medicinal 
product a counterfeit medicine. 
Incidents referring to pharmaceutical products, manufactured by a non-licensed third party, 
which do not refer to a licensed MAH, a brand name or a trademark but to a registered active 
pharmaceutical ingredient, that is not or no more patent-protected, are also classified under 
the incident type “fraud”. Such products do not contain the declared API or the correct 
amount of the declared API. Therefore, they are mislabeled with respect to their content, not 
with respect to their identity or source. Such products are denoted as fraudulent generics.  
In the majority of cases a genuine medicinal product tampered with is intended to deceive 
the stakeholders of the supply chain and, in the end, the patient. However, it also occurs that 
the patient tampers with the medicinal product in order to claim reimbursement or 
compensatory from the marketing authorization holder. If the investigation of the respective 
incident confirms a product manipulation done by the patient, the incident is also classified as 
“fraud”. Such incidents are denoted as “attempted fraud”. 
                                                          
19 "Oxford Dictionaries - Fraud," [Online]. Available: 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english/fraud. [Accessed 5 November 2013]. 
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1.1.3 Development over previous years and impact on patient safety 
1.1.3.1 Extent of the problem 
The necessity to combat the problem of counterfeit medicines becomes more obvious 
regarding the upstream of incidents on the market during the last 29 years20, and with it, the 
increasing threat to patient safety and health. 
The globalization and the explosion of free trade, as well as the ascending availability of 
medicines via the internet, call for a widening of the scope of market surveillance. New 
hazards to public health emerged in connection with the changing situation regarding the 
drug market. Some examples for these alarming developments are increasing self-
medication practices, illegal sale of medicines over the internet, including drugs of abuse and 
prescription-only medicines without prescription, and, especially in the focus of this thesis, 
widespread manufacture and sale of counterfeit medicines. [10]21 The Pharmaceutical 
Security Institute collects data on confirmed incidents related to counterfeit medicines, illegal 
diversion of medicinal products and pharmaceutical theft, worldwide. The collected 
information comes from various sources, including open media reports, PSI member 
company submissions and public-private sector partnerships. [7]22 The following figure shows 
the total number of confirmed incidents by year over the last decade, published by the PSI. 
                                                          
20 The appearance of counterfeit medicines in international commerce was first mentioned as а problem at the 
WHO Conference of Experts on Rational Drug Use in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1985. [6] "WHO - Counterfeit medicines: 
General information," [Online]. Available: http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/overview/en/. 
[Accessed 25 October 2013]. 
21 "The Importance of Pharmacovigilance - Safety Monitoring of medicinal products, WHO 2002," [Online]. 
Available: http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4893e/s4893e.pdf. [Accessed 29 October 2013]. 
22 "PSI - Counterfeits - Definitions," [Online]. Available: http://www.psi-inc.org/counterfeitSituation.cfm. 
[Accessed 5 November 2013]. 
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Figure 2: Pharmaceutical Security Institute data: Total number of confirmed incidents by year 2002 – 2013 
[3]23 
As the figures show, the number of confirmed incidents distinctly increased since 2002 
presenting only a minor decrease in the years of 2011 and 2012. As the PSI data are 
dependent on the data brought to the attention of the PSI sources, e.g. the PSI member 
companies, the figures do not represent the total extent of the counterfeit problem but can 
provide a tendency. Data provided by the European Commission Taxation and Customs 
Union show clearly that the problem of counterfeit medicines is still increasing. While the 
category of medicinal products made “only” 3% of the total amount of confiscated articles at 
European borders in 2010, the percentage increased dramatically to 24% of the total number 
of confiscated articles in 2011. [11]24 [12]25 According to the International Medical Products 
Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT), launched by the WHO in February 2006, the extent 
of the problem of counterfeit medicines is impossible to quantify. [4]26 Nevertheless, the 
                                                          
23 "PSI - Counterfeits - Trend Data," [Online]. Available: http://www.psi-inc.org/incidentTrends.cfm. [Accessed 
31 January 2015]. 
24 "Report on EU customs enforcment of intellectual property rights - Results at the EU borders - 2010," 2011. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/customs/customs_controls/counterfeit_piracy/s
tatistics/statistics_2010.pdf. [Accessed 13 November 2013]. 
25 "Report on EU customs enforcment of intellectual property rights - Results at the EU borders - 2011," 2012. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/customs/customs_controls/counterfeit_piracy/s
tatistics/2012_ipr_statistics_en.pdf. [Accessed 13 November 2013]. 
26 IMPACT, "Counterfeit Drugs Kill!," May 2008. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.who.int/impact/FinalBrochureWHA2008a.pdf. [Accessed 7 November 2013]. 
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IMPACT estimates the proportion of counterfeit medicines at less than 1% of the market 
value in most of the industrialized countries, having established effective regulatory systems 
and market control (e.g. USA, most of the EU, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand), at 
above 20% in many countries of the former Soviet Union and at around 30% in many 
countries of Africa and parts of Asia and Latin America. [4]27 However, there are countries 
where even 90% of the medicines on sale are considered to be counterfeit. [13]28 Although 
the incidence of counterfeit drugs in the legal supply chain in the industrialized countries is 
less than 1% of market value [5]29, it is estimated to reach an extent of around 50% in the 
illegal supply chain. [13]30 These percentages demonstrate the magnitude of the illegal trade 
of counterfeit drugs with an estimated turnover of 75 billion dollars [14]31 to 200 billion dollars 
a year [15]32. 
1.1.3.2 Impact on patient safety 
The extent of the problem and its impact on public health becomes apparent, looking at 
examples of past incidents related to counterfeit medicines. In 1990, more than 100 children 
died in Nigeria because of a cough mixture that was diluted with a poisonous solvent. [16]33 
In 2002, the Nigerian National Agency for Food and Drug Control (NAFDAC) asserted that 
60% of their medicines are falsified, substandard or with exhausted expiry date. [16]34 
However, counterfeit drugs are not only a problem of the developing countries, anymore. The 
developed countries are concerned as well. [6]35 In 2003, there was a recall of almost 20 
million doses of Lipitor®, a cholesterol-lowering medication, in the USA. Again, concerning 
                                                          
27 IMPACT, "Counterfeit Drugs Kill!," May 2008. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.who.int/impact/FinalBrochureWHA2008a.pdf. [Accessed 7 November 2013]. 
28 H. G. Schweim, "Arzneimittelkauf im Ausland - das kann gefährlich sein!," Deutsche Apotheker Zeitung, no. 
21, pp. 48-51, 2010. 
29 "WHO Fact sheet N° 275," May 2012. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs275/en/index.html. [Accessed 29 October 2013]. 
30 H. G. Schweim, "Arzneimittelkauf im Ausland - das kann gefährlich sein!," Deutsche Apotheker Zeitung, no. 
21, pp. 48-51, 2010. 
31 B. Moran, "Cracking Down on Counterfeit Drugs," 20 August 2013. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/body/uncovering-counterfeit-medicines/. [Accessed 19 November 
2013]. 
32 S. Kannan, "BBC News: Counterfeit drugs targeted by technology in India," 11 October 2011. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15208595. [Accessed 19 November 2013]. 
33 "GPHF homepage," [Online]. Available: 
http://www.gphf.org/web/en/minilab/hintergrund_arzneimittelfaelschungen.htm. [Accessed 29 October 
2013]. 
34 "GPHF homepage," [Online]. Available: 
http://www.gphf.org/web/en/minilab/hintergrund_arzneimittelfaelschungen.htm. [Accessed 29 October 
2013]. 
35 "WHO - Counterfeit medicines: General information," [Online]. Available: 
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/overview/en/. [Accessed 25 October 2013]. 
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counterfeit Lipitor® a whole batch had to be recalled in the UK in 2005. [17]36 Likewise in 
2005, some illegal trading of counterfeit lifestyle drugs via the internet, including the anti-
obesity medicines Reductil® and Xenical®, the smoking cessation drug Zyban®, the hair 
restorer Propecia® and the erectile dysfunction medicines Cialis® and Viagra®, was 
uncovered and the main responsible person identified. [18]37 Patients may be lucky if the 
dosage form itself is not falsified, but only the packaging. However, the impact on the product 
quality of the tampered product remains uncertain, and thus, poses potential risk to the 
patient. One example for such a criminal activity is the illegal selling of HIV-medicines on the 
German market, revealed in 2009. The genuine HIV-medicines, intended to be sold on the 
African market and therefore less priced by the pharmaceutical manufacturer, were 
repackaged and brought back to Germany illegally. It is said that this is about more than 
10,000 packages of the HIV drugs valued at about 6 Million Euro or more. [19]38 The danger 
to health becomes even more obvious considering the following two incidents which are 
related to counterfeit life-saving medicines. In 2011, antimalarial drugs, which contained the 
analgesic agent acetaminophen and the Viagra® API sildenafil instead of the declared active 
ingredient, were found in 11 African countries. [20]39 In 2012, the United States Food and 
Drug Administration (US FDA) advised the public against counterfeit Avastin®, an 
angiogenesis inhibitor for the treatment of various types of cancers. The counterfeit product 
did not contain the declared active ingredient. [21]40 Another case of counterfeit cancer drugs 
was discovered in 2013. US Homeland Security agents investigated confiscated batches of 
Sutent® and found them to be completely without any active ingredient. [22]41 
The presented examples show that the problem of counterfeit drugs is not limited to certain 
product groups, life style drugs for instance, but can be found across a broad range of 
therapeutic categories. Reports about counterfeit drugs, received by the WHO, relate to the 
medicinal drug categories antibiotics, hormones, analgesics, steroids and antihistamines. 
                                                          
36 K. Monson and A. Schoenstadt, "MedTV homepage - Lipitor Recall," 6 January 2009. [Online]. Available: 
http://cholesterol.emedtv.com/lipitor/lipitor-recall.html. [Accessed 29 October 2013]. 
37 H. G. Schweim, "DAZ Online Arzneimittelfälschungen global und in," 11 August 2005. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.deutsche-apotheker-zeitung.de/daz-ausgabe/artikel/articlesingle/2005/32/14414.html. [Accessed 
29 October 2013]. 
38 H. Korzilius, "Deutsches Ärzteblatt Gefälschte HIV-Medikamente: Schäbiges Geschäft," 4 March 2011. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.aerzteblatt.de/archiv/81141. [Accessed 29 October 2013]. 
39 K. Bachmann, "Vorsicht, Fälschung!," GEO, no. 11, pp. 56-64, 2012. 
40 "FDA sends letters to 19 medical practices about counterfeit product and other unapproved cancer 
medicines," 14 February 2012. [Online]. Available: http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/ucm291960.htm. 
[Accessed 21 November 2013]. 
41 "SafeMedicines.org - Counterfeit Cancer Drugs Are A Big Money Maker for Fake Drug Criminals," [Online]. 
Available: http://www.safemedicines.org/counterfeit-cancer-drugs-are-a-big-money-maker-for-fake-drug-
criminals.html. [Accessed 6 January 2015]. 
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[6]42 Regarding therapeutic categories the PSI specifies medicinal products in the 
genitourinary, anti-infective and central nervous system therapeutic categories as mostly in 
the scope of counterfeiters. Furthermore, the PSI data show an increase in the percentage of 
incidents with respect to six therapeutic categories on a year to year basis. [23]43 
 
Figure 3: Pharmaceutical Security Institute data: Percentage change of counterfeit incidents by therapeutic 
categories 2013 [23]44 
Different types of counterfeit medicines were found in the context of anti-counterfeiting 
activities e.g. the international anti-counterfeiting initiative called PANGEA which is 
coordinated by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) (see paragraph 
1.2 for more detailed information). The majority of the detected counterfeit drugs contained 
no active ingredients, at all. Some products contained false ingredients or the wrong amount 
of the correct active ingredients as the following figure shows. 
                                                          
42 "WHO - Counterfeit medicines: General information," [Online]. Available: 
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/overview/en/. [Accessed 25 October 2013]. 
43 "PSI - Counterfeits - Therapeutic Categories," [Online]. Available: http://www.psi-
inc.org/therapeuticCategories.cfm. [Accessed 31 January 2015]. 
44 "PSI - Counterfeits - Therapeutic Categories," [Online]. Available: http://www.psi-
inc.org/therapeuticCategories.cfm. [Accessed 31 January 2015]. 
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Figure 4: What exactly is in counterfeit medicines? [24]45 
Depending on the therapeutic category counterfeit drugs can have various effects. A 
counterfeit medicinal product without the correct active ingredient will lead very likely to a 
failure of the therapeutic effect. With regard to lifestyle drugs the failure of the therapeutic 
effect may be annoying but not life-threatening. In contrast, counterfeit life-saving medicines, 
e.g. of the therapeutic categories cardiovascular, cytostatic or anti-infective, which do not 
contain the correct API can cause serious injuries, relapse or exacerbation of the respective 
disease with hospitalization or death as possible consequences. [25]46 Also the false amount 
of ingredients in counterfeit medicinal products can lead to a failure of the therapeutic effect. 
With respect to anti-infective medicines counterfeit drugs containing too little active ingredient 
can cause the development of resistant organisms against the respective API. This would 
consequently even affect patients being treated with a genuine product due to the decreased 
effect of the API on the resistant bacteria strain. [25]47 Too high amounts of active ingredients 
can cause an increase in adverse drug reactions (ADR) of the respective medicinal product, 
e.g. hormones. Counterfeit medicinal products containing wrong ingredients may cause 
allergic reactions as false active ingredients are not declared and thus, cannot be avoided by 
allergy sufferers. Wrong ingredients with toxic potential can lead to intoxications that can be 
                                                          
45 ABDA, Pfizer and Bayer, "03 Warning Fake – What exactly is in counterfeit medicines? EN," 2013. [Online]. 
Available: http://vimeo.com/74366006. [Accessed 19 November 2013]. 
46 World Health Organization, "General information on counterfeit medicines: Factors encouraging 
counterfeiting of drugs," 2014. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/overview/en/index1.html. [Accessed 29 October 2013]. 
47 World Health Organization, "General information on counterfeit medicines: Factors encouraging 
counterfeiting of drugs," 2014. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/overview/en/index1.html. [Accessed 29 October 2013]. 
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lethal, in the worst case. Even if counterfeit medicinal products contain the correct API in the 
correct amount the products can still fail the desired therapeutic effect or cause adverse drug 
reaction as the efficacy of drugs also depends on further aspects, including the formulation of 
the dosage form or the modification of the API. Regarding the safety of medicinal products 
aspects, including particle size and sterility, have to be considered and ensured. For that 
reason, the manufacturing of medicinal products has to comply with the GMP (Good 
Manufacturing Practice) guidelines, which counterfeiters do not follow. Therefore, the risk of 
counterfeit medicines causing harm to public health is huge. 
1.1.3.3 Encouraging factors for counterfeiting medicines 
There is a variety of factors encouraging counterfeiters to infiltrate the medicine market. The 
demand for medicines is infinite. The expenses for the production of counterfeit medicines 
are low, since one can use cheap substitutes or no active ingredient, at all. Furthermore, 
expenses for the manufacture are low when the production takes place in e.g. some kind of a 
dirty backyard or a small cottage industry. Since counterfeiters do not maintain cost-intensive 
systems for quality assurance and Good Manufacturing Practices, their expenses are 
reduced additionally. All in all, considering the low costs for the manufacture of counterfeit 
medicines in comparison to their high value on the market, the profit to be made is huge. 
[25]48 According to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) “drug trafficking is 
the most lucrative form of business for criminals”. [26]49 And while the profit in illegal trade of 
counterfeit medicines is extremely high, the risk to be apprehended and prosecuted is rather 
low. Moreover, the penalties are not of such scale to deter counterfeiters. [25]50 
If there is a competent national drug regulatory authority established in a country to control 
the manufacture, importation, distribution and sale of medicines, it is more difficult for 
counterfeiters to infiltrate the national distribution channels. However, at present, this is the 
case in only about 20% of the WHO member states. The remaining member states have a 
less developed drug regulation or none at all. For that reason, the amount of illegal or 
                                                          
48 World Health Organization, "General information on counterfeit medicines: Factors encouraging 
counterfeiting of drugs," 2014. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/overview/en/index1.html. [Accessed 29 October 2013]. 
49 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "New UNODC campaign highlights transnational organized crime 
as a US$870 billion a year business," 16 July 2012. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/July/new-unodc-campaign-highlights-transnational-
organized-crime-as-an-us-870-billion-a-year-business.html. [Accessed 9 March 2014]. 
50 World Health Organization, "General information on counterfeit medicines: Factors encouraging 
counterfeiting of drugs," 2014. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/overview/en/index1.html. [Accessed 29 October 2013]. 
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counterfeit medicinal products on the market is higher in these countries. [25]51 Other 
reasons for a greater amount of counterfeit medicines on the market, especially in the 
developing countries, are a huge demand of medicines that already exceeds the available 
genuine product supply or the fact that many people are not able to afford expensive 
medicines and thus, use any option to purchase less expensive drugs. In the developed 
countries the reason for purchasing medicines from dubious sources may rather be driven by 
a lack of knowledge and awareness or by the intention to bypass prescription. [25]52 Any 
purchase behavior which does not question the reliability of the sources of medicinal 
products is welcomed by the counterfeiters. 
1.1.4 Distribution of medicinal products and access points for counterfeiters 
1.1.4.1 Legal and illegal supply chain 
Unfortunately, the presence of counterfeit medicinal products is not limited to illegitimate 
distribution ways. Even the legal supply chain is affected in both developing and developed 
countries. In Germany, for example, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) documented 49 
cases of counterfeit drugs in the legal supply chain. [27]53 For reasons, including the 
globalization of the supply chains, the high number of participants and the great variety of 
rules in different countries, the complexity and with it the vulnerability of the legal supply 
chain increased. [28]54 The access points for counterfeiters are not limited to the distribution 
chain after the finished medicinal products were manufactured but during the steps of 
manufacturing, as well, as Figure 5 illustrates. The pharmaceutical products’ ingredients, 
active or inactive, or the raw materials needed to produce the active pharmaceutical 
ingredients can be falsified as incidents like the deaths in Panama caused by toxic cough 
syrup or the heparin scandal show. 
In late 2007 and the beginning of 2008, US health authorities documented an increase in 
adverse event reports, which were found to be related to the widely used blood thinner 
heparin made by Baxter International Inc. Analysis results revealed that the medicinal 
                                                          
51 World Health Organization, "General information on counterfeit medicines: Factors encouraging 
counterfeiting of drugs," 2014. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/overview/en/index1.html. [Accessed 29 October 2013]. 
52 World Health Organization, "General information on counterfeit medicines: Factors encouraging 
counterfeiting of drugs," 2014. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/overview/en/index1.html. [Accessed 29 October 2013]. 
53 ABDA, "Factsheet Counterfeit Medicines," October 2013. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.abda.de/fileadmin/assets/Faktenblaetter/Faktenblatt_Arzneimittelfaelschungen_Oktober_2013_fi
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product was adulterated with oversulfated chondroitin sulfate (OSCS) that could not be 
detected by the standard assays the pharmaceutical company used to check the raw 
materials. The exact source of the adulteration could not be identified but OSCS was also 
detected in the basic heparin material (heparin crude) that was produced in China. As the 
synthetic material OSCS is almost 100 times less cost-intensive to produce, it is assumed 
that the heparin crude was diluted with OSCS to cut costs. [29]55  
According to official numbers, 78 people died because of a toxic cough medicine distributed 
to patients in Panama in 2006. The toxic ingredient, diethylene glycol, was falsely labeled 
and sold as glycerin by a Chinese factory. The counterfeit product reached Panama after 
passing through brokers in China and Spain. The Panamanian government unknowingly 
purchased the falsified inactive ingredient to use it for the manufacture of cough medicines. 
[29]56 
 
Figure 5: The pharmaceutical supply chain with examples of vulnerabilities [29]57 
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To prevent the entry of falsified or substandard active ingredients into the legal supply chain 
the European Union, for instance, demands by law that active substances for medicinal 
products for human use shall only be imported into the EU from third countries if they are 
accompanied by a “written confirmation”, provided by the competent authority of the 
respective exporting third country. [30]58 (See paragraph 1.3 for more detailed information.) 
Counterfeiters more often use access points in the legal supply chain which are located 
subsequent to the manufacturing steps as the high amounts of counterfeit medicines, 
confiscated by customs or seized during police raids, show. Mainly the products are 
packaged according to the original products or at least the finalized bulk products. As the 
following figure displays, the complex legal supply chain presents multiple access points for 
counterfeiters besides the illegitimate supply chain, which is considered as the possible main 
flow for counterfeit medicinal products. 
 
Figure 6: Possible inflow of counterfeits to the legitimate distribution channel [31]59 [32]60 
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1.1.4.2 Pharmaceutical parallel trade 
One aspect of the distribution chain with respect to medicinal products which is seen very 
critical with regard to safety issues is the concept of pharmaceutical parallel trade. 
Pharmaceutical parallel imports are defined as “products marketed by the patent owner (or 
trademark- or copyright-owner, etc.) or with the patent owner’s permission in one country and 
imported into another country without the approval of the patent owner.” by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). [33]61 The basis for pharmaceutical parallel trade is provided by 
differences in regulatory practices across countries and resulting price differences of 
medicinal products. [34]62 One purpose of pharmaceutical parallel trade is to enhance the 
affordability and availability of medicinal products. Due to the consequent price competition 
patent holders are withheld to charge excessively high prices in a particular market. [35]63 
The concept of parallel importation of medicinal products is compatible with the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) as it is one of the provisions, 
known as TRIPS public health safeguards, with the purpose to enhance the affordability and 
availability of medicines. [36]64 
In the European Union, for instance, the concept of parallel trade of medicines is legitimate. 
The principle of parallel importation applies to medicinal products which are authorized to be 
marketed in EU countries, based on national or decentralized, national approvals. Parallel 
importers are allowed to import such medicines in parallel in the respective EU countries if 
they have a respective authorization. For each medicinal product an application for approval 
has to be submitted to the competent authority of the respective country where the product 
shall be distributed. [37]65 [38]66 Receiving approval for marketing the parallel importer 
becomes the marketing authorization holder of the respective imported medicinal product, 
including all obligations and responsibilities. With respect to medicinal products for which a 
centralized marketing authorization was approved by the EMA the principle of parallel 
distribution applies. A national authorization for the importer is not required. Instead, the 
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http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm02_e.htm. [Accessed 25 November 2013]. 
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requirements of the European Medicines Agency notification procedure for parallel 
distribution have to be followed. [39]67 
The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) has 
concerns about potential safety risks related to pharmaceutical parallel trade. According to 
the EFPIA the rise in parallel importing within the EU has led to increased difficulty in tracking 
medicines. Therefore, the supply chain of parallel traders presents a potential access point to 
traders of medicinal products from dubious sources or counterfeit medicines. The required 
re-packaging procedures in terms of parallel importation of medicinal products are also 
considered as a risk factor promoting the introduction of substandard or counterfeit 
medicines into the legal supply chain. [40]68 Pharmaceutical parallel trade as a potential 
access point is displayed in Figure 6, as well. 
The risk of counterfeit medicines being introduced into the legal supply chain through parallel 
trade is demonstrated by cases like the theft of multiple pharmaceutical products in Italy and 
their illegal diversion to other European countries, discovered in 2014. [41]69 According to the 
Italian Medicines Agency (AIFA) more than 80 medicinal products of Italian origin are 
affected. Via bogus operators in Eastern Europe the stolen medicines were sold to 
authorized wholesalers in Italy. [42]70 In this way they entered the legal supply chain and 
were distributed to multiple European countries, mainly Germany. [43]71 The AIFA published 
lists of the bogus operators, involved authorized operators as well as the affected medicinal 
products and recommends the recall of all packages affected by the illegitimate trade. [42]72 
In July 2014, the Italian police stated to have arrested the most important suspects and have  
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identified two of them as persons responsible. [41]73 As a consequence of this illegal 
diversion which affected the legal supply chain through parallel distribution ways, the 
German Federal Ministry of Health (BMG) issued a request to the European Commission to 
reconsider the legal framework on pharmaceutical parallel trade in the EU. Since effectively 
all medicinal products, affected by the illegal diversion, have a centralized authorization, the 
request especially relates to the notification procedure for parallel distribution and the 
required documentation regarding the distribution. [43]74 
1.1.4.3 The internet and online sale of medicines 
The internet has become the criminal pusher’s best friend with respect to counterfeit 
medicines. In over 50% of cases, medicines purchased over the internet from illicit online 
pharmacies that conceal their physical address have been found to be counterfeit. [5]75 
Moreover, they are available to everyone, even to teenagers and children, since these illegal 
websites have no mechanisms to block children to access or purchase prescription drugs as 
the CASA-Study “You’ve Got Drugs!” on the diversion and abuse of prescription drugs 
revealed. Even when the identification of the patient’s age is required to access the website, 
it is just as easy to key in a fake age to the form. [44]76 Facts like that make it much more 
complicated, e.g. for parents, to comply to the warning “keep out of the reach of children”, let 
alone the potential adverse effects in children or adult patients caused by illegally sold and 
likely counterfeit medicines. 
According to the OpSec Security, Inc. study “Risk Assessment: Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals 
in the Online Marketplace” of 2010, the percentage of illegitimate online pharmacies offering 
prescription-only medicines without demanding a prescription increased significantly from 
51% in 2007 to 89% in 2010. [45]77 The results of the “The Counterfeiting Superhighway” 
research, conducted by the European Alliance for Access to Safe Medicines (EAASM) and 
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published in 2008, revealed similar disturbing data. It was found that 62% of the medicines 
purchased online were falsified or substandard, 96% of the examined internet pharmacies 
were operating illegally and 90% of the researched online pharmacies offered prescription-
only medicines without demanding a prescription. [46]78 And the results of Pfizer’s “Cracking 
Counterfeits” survey, involving 14,000 respondents in 14 European countries revealed that 
21% of the Europeans at least once purchased prescription-only medicine without having a 
prescription. Furthermore, less than 50% of the respondents have concerns about the 
authenticity of the medicinal products purchased via the internet. The survey also shows that 
some people are not even aware which medicines are prescription-only medicines to be able 
to question online pharmacies offering the respective pharmaceutical products without 
demanding a prescription. For example, 32% of the respondents thought Viagra® was a 
medicine which does not require a prescription. In fact, 14% of the surveyed Europeans 
stated that even if they knew that the purchased drugs may be counterfeits, they still would 
order prescription-only medicines without having a prescription via the internet. [47]79 
Low prices, convenience and the anonymity given in the internet keep many people stick to 
internet pharmacies to save money or to avoid the physician’s consultation on sensitive 
topics such as erectile dysfunction or incontinence, etc. Other reasons may be to reach out 
to drugs for misuse or abuse, e.g. anabolic drugs or narcotics. In these cases most of the 
patients most likely will not report the occurrence of an adverse effect or a lack of drug effect 
after using the medicines. [48]80 Due to the minor reporting of adverse events related to 
suspected counterfeits thorough signal detection is hardly possible. Altogether, patients are 
not sufficiently aware of the risk to receive counterfeit drugs when purchasing medicines over 
the internet. Thus, the majority would not raise suspicions against the authenticity of the 
medicines they purchased, which could be reported. Hence, the slight amount of data on the 
presence of counterfeit medicines makes it harder to implement appropriate actions, e.g. to 
warn other patients, in a timely manner. For that reason, it is indispensable to raise people’s 
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awareness of the hazard counterfeit medicines pose to patients’ welfare and public health 
and of the risks of purchasing medicinal products from dubious or illegal sources. [49]81 
For example, in Germany the online sale of medicinal products was legalized in 2004 in 
accordance to the 12th amendment of the German Medicinal Products Act (AMG). In the 
course of this, the occurrence of counterfeit medicinal products in Germany increased swiftly. 
[50]82 The German customs seized 500,000 falsified tablets and capsules in 2005 and with 
about 5 million counterfeit drugs in 2009, already the tenfold. [48]83 The EU-Committee 
reports an amount of more than 11 million falsified medicinal products seized in the EU, in 
2009. [50]84 Furthermore, it has to be considered that the estimated number of unknown 
cases is huge. The internet is the main source of supply with regard to counterfeit medicinal 
products. [48]85 Round about 95 percent of all online pharmacies are illegal as the German 
Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices (BfArM) reports. [49]86 Today, it is no longer 
difficult to create your own website, therefore persons or organizations with sufficient criminal 
incentive can easily set up a website undermining security features, and thus, pretending to 
be an authorized online pharmacy. [51]87 Unfortunately, when the online sale of medicines 
was legalized, the German Government did not implement a specialized competent authority 
which constantly observes internet pharmacies and checks their legality. [52]88 At present, 
institutions such as the German Institute of Medical Documentation and Information (DIMDI), 
the BKA and the Central Laboratory of German Pharmacists (ZL) are involved in observing 
and checking online pharmacies [48]89 but such efforts remain limited whereby the risk for 
patients to purchase counterfeit medicinal products from non-authorized internet pharmacies 
maintains rather high. Mystery shopping, as the German ZL performs, shows that patients 
can purchase any prescription drugs via the internet without having a prescription, but none 
of the delivered products were genuine or with authorization for Germany. 50 to 60 percent of 
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the lifestyle drugs were falsified or substandard. [48]90 On top of this, many patients are not 
aware enough of the risk concerning counterfeit medicines. 
The AMG § 43 [53]91, combined with the German Pharmacies Act (ApoG) § 11a [54]92, 
stipulates that only community pharmacies, holding permission of the competent authority, 
are allowed to run an internet pharmacy which has to be reported to the DIMDI that lists all 
authorized online pharmacies in Germany. Such an authorized pharmacy can implement a 
security symbol, licensed by the DIMDI, which identifies it as legal. Unfortunately, most of the 
population just knows that licensed internet pharmacies have a security symbol to be 
identified as licensed, but they often do not know how it looks like. Thus, a fake symbol can 
easily be used to deceive patients and to make them feel safe about the authenticity of the – 
in this case – non-authorized internet pharmacy. [50]93  
                                                   
Figure 7: DIMDI security symbol, Copyright 1995-2013 DIMDI [55]94 
There is a similar verification system for online pharmacies used in the US. The Verified 
Internet Pharmacy Practice Sites (VIPPS) program was initiated by the National Association 
of Boards of Pharmacy (NABP), in 1999. Pharmacies have to meet several criteria, e.g. 
compliance with licensing and inspection requirements, to be VIPPS accredited. Then they 
are allowed to display the VIPPS hyperlink seal on their website. [56]95 
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Figure 8: VIPPS security symbol, Copyright 2013 NABP [57]96 
A comparable security symbol is also planned to be implemented in the European Union. In 
the Directive 2011/62/EU the symbol is referred to as the “common logo” and shall be 
displayed on the websites of legally-operating online pharmacies. It is intended that the 
common logo contains a hyperlink to a list of all national legally-operating online pharmacies 
and retailers of the respective Member State, where they are established. It is the obligation 
of each Member State to provide such a list by means of a dedicated website. Each entry of 
the list shall be connected to the website of the respective online pharmacy or retailer using a 
hyperlink. A concept paper on the implementing act of the common logo was submitted for 
public consultation, in 2012. Among others, it comprises two different options with regard to 
the design of the logo. Moreover, it was under discussion if the design options should, in the 
end, include a national element and text or not. [58]97 On June 24, 2014 the European 
Commission adopted the Implementing Regulation 699/2014 and with it the common logo. 
The Member States have a timeframe of one year from this date to accomplish the 
provisions with respect to the common logo. [59]98 The following figure shows a model of the 
common logo of the selected design (design option 2 including a national element and text). 
In the displayed model a white rectangle replaces the national flag of the respective Member 
State. [60]99 Further information on the EU rules concerning the common logo and the online 
sale of medicinal products are presented in paragraph 1.3. 
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Figure 9: Common logo, Copyright 2012 European Commission [60]100 
The problem of patients not being able to differentiate authorized internet pharmacies from 
non-authorized internet pharmacies remains unless the drug regulatory authorities, with the 
aid of physicians and pharmacists, will not enhance people’s knowledge and awareness with 
respect to this issue. The hazard to patients’ welfare is not to be underestimated. 
In this context, a campaign, mainly targeted to demonstrate how easy it can be to setup a 
fake online pharmacy and attract customers and to educate patients and consumers about 
the dangers of purchasing medicines from dubious internet pharmacies, was conducted by 
the European Alliance for Access to Safe Medicines (EAASM) in Germany, in 2011. The 
campaign is called “Counterfeiting the Counterfeiter”. During the project the EAASM 
collaborated with the DIMDI, several pharmaceutical companies, patients groups, health 
information providers, internet search engines and credit card processors. The core tool of 
the campaign was an online pharmacy website, setup by the initiators of the project, with the 
purpose to appeal like a legitimate internet pharmacy, but actually being illicit, and therefore 
attract potential purchasers of counterfeit medicinal products, particularly prescription-only 
medicines. The visitors of this particular website were not provided with fake medicines but 
with helpful information about and warnings against the threat of counterfeit medicinal 
products to patients’ health and the risks of purchasing such via the internet. This was done 
by linking the EAASM’s fake online pharmacy landing page to websites which contained the 
mentioned warnings and information, to the DIMDI website providing information about 
legitimate online and offline pharmacies, and to websites of further organizations and 
associations e.g. the WHO or pan-European patient groups which also provide topic-specific 
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information. All in all, the website was online and heavily promoted in Germany for 9 weeks 
in 2011 and therewith attracted over 182,000 individual visitors, from which over 142,000 
viewed the warning messages and over 12,000 accessed the DIMDI website about the 
legitimate online pharmacies. [61]101 Hence, the EAASM’s education campaign 
“Counterfeiting the Counterfeiter” was a very successful contribution to one of the basic 
requirements in the fight against counterfeit medicines, which is to raise awareness among 
patients and consumers. 
1.2 International anti-counterfeiting initiatives 
The WHO reacted to the enhancing hazard caused by counterfeit medicines by launching the 
International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT), in 2006, which is a 
partnership, including international organizations, drug regulatory authorities and 
pharmaceutical manufacturer associations. It is the IMPACT’s aim to combat the production 
and distribution of counterfeit medicinal products by building coordinated global networks 
between countries. [62]102 Together with INTERPOL and the WHO, the IMPACT was 
involved in the, at present, seven international operations against the illegal trade of 
medicines over the internet, called Pangea I - VII. Each Pangea operation is about a week of 
international collaboration of customs, health regulators, national police and the private 
sector actively combatting the online sale of counterfeit and illicit medicines. [63]103 Each 
time, the participants worked together to inspect internet pharmacies and their websites, 
internet service providers and mail services. A huge amount of illegally distributed and 
falsified medicinal products could be seized, many non-authorized internet pharmacies 
identified and many websites closed down. The Pangea operations additionally serve the 
purpose to sensitize the public to the problem of counterfeit medicines and the extensive risk 
to patients’ health that they constitute. [64]104 [65]105 The first operation, carried out in 2008, 
counted 10 countries that took part. The number of participating countries continuously 
                                                          
101 European Alliance for Access to Safe Medicines, "Counterfeiting the Counterfeiter," 2012. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.eaasm.eu/cache/downloads/av3r9l87z4wg4ocs8w84gogs0/CtC%20report%202012.pdf. 
[Accessed 29 November 2013]. 
102 "IMPACT homepage," [Online]. Available: http://www.who.int/impact/about/en/. [Accessed 30 October 
2013]. 
103 "INTERPOL - Operation Pangea," 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.interpol.int/Crime-
areas/Pharmaceutical-crime/Operations/Operation-Pangea. [Accessed 2 January 2015]. 
104 K. Sucker-Sket, "DAZ Online Spektrum Operation Pangea II - Weltweite Razzia gegen illegale Internet-
"Apotheken"," 20 November 2009. [Online]. Available: http://www.deutsche-apotheker-
zeitung.de/spektrum/news/2009/11/20/weltweite-razzia-gegen-illegale-internet-apotheken.html. [Accessed 
30 October 2013]. 
105 K. Sucker-Sket, "DAZ Online Spektrum Operation Pangea III - Aktion gegen illegale Internet-Anbieter von 
Arzneimitteln," 14 October 2010. [Online]. Available: http://www.deutsche-apotheker-
zeitung.de/spektrum/news/2010/10/14/aktion-gegen-illegale-internet-anbieter-von-arzneimitteln.html. 
[Accessed 30 October 2013]. 
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
 
34 
 
increased with every operation and reached a number of more than 100 participating 
countries during the week of Pangea VII, in 2014. Pangea VII counted 113 participating 
countries joining the combat against counterfeiting and the illegal trade of medicines. [63]106 
In total, an amount of more than 27 million illicit and counterfeit pills were confiscated, of an 
estimated worth of more than 91 million US dollars. As a consequence of the Pangea 
operations about 57,450 illegitimate websites offering medicinal products were shut down. 
[63]107 
A new global initiative, coordinated by INTERPOL, was announced on March 12th, 2013. It is 
called Pharmaceutical Industry Initiative to Combat Crime (PIICC). 29 global pharmaceutical 
companies will collaborate to combat the growing threat of counterfeit medicinal products 
and thereby protect patient safety. The initiative’s scope covers the fight against 
pharmaceutical crime with respect to both branded and generic medicines. It is the aim to 
support investigative activities to identify and expose organized crime networks involved in 
illegal activities regarding medicinal products, to intensify enforcement operations and to 
raise awareness of the risks related to counterfeit medicines among the public. [66]108 [67]109 
In the EU an international project with the objective to guaranty the reliability of the legal 
supply chain of medicinal products has been started. [68]110 Based on the provision of the 
“Falsified Medicines Directive” (Directive 2011/62/EU) that a safety feature shall be applied to 
medicinal products for human use to enable their identification and a verification of their 
authenticity [69]111, an EU-wide coding and serialization system was set up (see paragraph 
1.3 for details on the legislative framework regarding the safety feature). The project, called 
European Stakeholder Model (ESM), is supported by several stakeholders, including EFPIA, 
EAEPC (European Association of Euro-Pharmaceutical Companies), GIRP (European 
Association of Pharmaceutical Full-line Wholesalers) and PGEU (Pharmaceutical Group of 
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the European Union), representing Europe’s research-based manufacturers, the pan-EU 
licensed parallel distribution companies, wholesalers and pharmacists. It is their aim to 
create and to implement the European Medicines Verification System (EMVS). This system 
shall enable the authenticity check of individual packs of medicines before they are 
dispensed to the patient in order to ensure that the patient receives a genuine product. This 
authenticity check is performed by using individual pack level serial numbers to be applied to 
the packs and to be saved in national data repositories. In the years of 2009 to 2010, the 
technical approach of the verification system was tested in Sweden, where a successful pilot 
project was performed. The EMVS will be also interoperable between various countries to 
ensure that principles like the parallel trade of medicines and multi-country pack 
management stay feasible. This is achieved through the European Hub, which is connected 
to the national data repositories. In order to promote the EMVS implementation the ESM 
partners signed a contract with an IT service provider, in April 2013. In addition, the EFPIA 
has developed guidelines to support the EMVS’s implementation and to ease its 
implementation for affected stakeholders. The ESM partners’ work continues on the national 
interface with the securPharm project, performed in Germany. [68]112 The interface of 
securPharm’s German system to ESM’s European Hub shall demonstrate for the first time 
how European and national components of the EMVS can be linked. It was scheduled to be 
performed in July 2014. [70]113 
The securPharm initiative was launched on January 1, 2013. [71]114 The seven members of 
the securPharm initiative represent all stakeholders of the distribution chain of medicinal 
products in Germany. [72]115 The initiative should serve the purpose of the development, 
implementation and testing of a system that meets the requirements regarding the 
verification of medicinal products laid down in the Directive 2011/62/EU. The securPharm 
project is performed under real-life conditions of the German pharmaceutical market. The 
verification of single packs is based on the principle of serialization and the use of a carrier of 
the relevant serial number to be applied to the packs. A machine-readable data matrix code 
is used as the carrier, containing four data elements which are the product number 
                                                          
112 European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, "Stamping out Falsified Medicines," 
2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.efpia.eu/topics/industry-economy/falsified-medicines. [Accessed 8 
January 2015]. 
113 European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, "Progress towards a European 
Medicines Verification System: the European Stakeholder Model and securPharm link-up," 4 March 2014. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.efpia.eu/mediaroom/147/21/Progress-towards-a-European-Medicines-
Verification-System-the-European-Stakeholder-Model-and-securPharm-link-up. [Accessed 8 January 2015]. 
114 "securPharm – the German shield against counterfeit medicines," 2015. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.securpharm.de/international-sites/english.html. [Accessed 8 January 2015]. 
115 "securPharm - Mitglieder der Initiative," 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.securpharm.de/securpharm-
initiative/mitglieder.html. [Accessed 13 January 2015]. 
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
 
36 
 
(Pharmacy Product Number (PPN) or National Trade Item Number (NTIN)), the lot number, 
the expiration date and the serial number. To ensure that the data matrix code is used in a 
standardized way by all stakeholders of the initiative securPharm has generated a guidance 
document on the coding rules and the labeling on pharmaceutical packaging. During the 
production process the data matrix code containing all relevant information is printed on the 
package. In addition, the respective information, provided by the marketing authorization 
holder, is retained in the manufacturers’ central database. The authenticity check of the 
individual package is performed by the pharmacy staff scanning the data matrix code before 
dispensing the medicinal product to the patient. The scanned information is checked against 
the central database. If the data is correct and was not requested before, the package can be 
dispensed, consequently changing the package’s status to “dispensed”. If the data is not 
correct or the status of the respective pack is “dispensed”, the system causes an alert.  
[73]116 The following figure displays the procedure of the securPharm control system. 
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Figure 10: securPharm end-to-end control system [73]117 
As of the beginning of 2013, 24 pharmaceutical companies and around 400 community 
pharmacies are participating in the securPharm project. Furthermore, the participants include 
parallel importers, generics companies, a wholesaler, including all of its German offices, an 
IT systems integrator and five pharmacy software providers. As of the end of 2013, 110 
medicinal products had been coded, comprising more than 7.5 million serialized packages on 
the German market. The project revealed highly satisfactory results regarding the system’s 
usability, resilience, performance and availability. securPharm is considered a success and 
represents the German component for the security network of the European Stakeholder 
Model for the protection against falsified medicines. [73]118 
1.3 Regulatory framework in the EU 
Because of the increasing numbers with respect to counterfeit drugs, among other things, the 
EU initiated changes in the drug legislation and issued the so called “Pharmaceutical 
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Package” containing three legislative proposals, adopted by the European Commission (EC) 
on December 10th, 2008. The first proposal aims to “ensure that EU citizens have access to 
reliable information on medicines”. For this purpose, harmonized rules with regard to 
information about prescription-only medicines provided by pharmaceutical companies shall 
be established. [74]119 
The second proposal of the Pharmaceutical Package focuses on “strengthening the EU’s 
system for the safety monitoring of medicines (pharmacovigilance)”. It is the aim to 
consolidate and to simplify the complex pharmacovigilance system of the European Union. 
[74]120 The EU’s international pharmacovigilance database “EudraVigilance”, managed by 
the European Medicines Agency (EMA) was launched in December 2001. It serves as a data 
processing network and management system for reporting and evaluating suspected 
adverse reactions regarding medicinal products authorized in the European Economic Area 
(EEA). [75]121 Hence, an international surveillance and exchange of information about 
suspected adverse drug reactions is available. In 2012, the EMA launched a website which 
provides public access to the information on reports related to suspected adverse events, 
collected in the EudraVigilance database. [76]122 
The third and last proposal specifically addresses the issue of counterfeit medicinal products. 
Its purpose is to “protect the legal distribution chain from the infiltration of fake medicines”. 
[74]123 In December of 2010 the European Parliament agreed on a draft according to the 
amendments of the EU Directive 2001/83/EC which were adopted on February 16, 2011. 
These amendments had to be transferred into national law within two years. [77]124 On June 
8, 2011, the EU Directive 2011/62/EU, also known as the “Falsified Medicines Directive” 
came into effect. [69]125 
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The directive contains statutory provisions based on the proposals comprised in the 
Pharmaceutical Package. It includes the criteria of a falsified medicinal product and thereby 
gives a definition of such. Furthermore, it stipulates enhanced controls of the legal 
distribution chain including the verification of manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers, 
importers and brokers of medicinal products, active ingredients or excipients to comply with 
the guidelines of good manufacturing practice (GMP) and good distribution practice (GDP), 
each as applicable. The verification is to be done by the means of audits, e.g. by the 
marketing authorization holder in the case of a contract manufacturer or by the competent 
authorities of the Member States. Manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers, importers and 
brokers have to be registered with the competent authority of the Member State in which they 
are established. The Member States have to enter the information received in relation to the 
registration in a Union database to be managed by the EMA. [69]126 The respective database 
is the EudraGMDP database that was first launched in April 2007 and is available as a public 
version since 2011. The database comprises all EU-relevant information on manufacturing, 
import and wholesale-distribution authorizations, and good manufacturing practice and good 
distribution practice certificates. [78]127 In addition, EU-wide rules for the importation of active 
substances for medicinal products for human use from third countries have been introduced. 
[30]128 Since July 02, 2013 [79]129 active substances shall only be imported if they are 
accompanied by a “written confirmation” according to Article 46b(2) of Directive 2001/83/EC. 
The “written confirmation” has to be given by the competent authority of the exporting third 
country. In doing so the competent authority confirms that the site manufacturing the 
exported active substance is in compliance with EU GMP for active substances and that the 
control of the manufacturer is equivalent to the standards in the EU. [80]130 If a third country’s 
regulatory framework applicable to active substances exported to the EU, as well as 
respective control and enforcement measures safeguard a level of protection of public health 
that is equivalent to that of the EU, the country can export active substances to the EU 
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without enclosing a “written confirmation”. [81]131 All third countries for which this rule applies 
are recorded in the European Commission’s “Listing of third countries” after their application, 
to be submitted to the EC, was checked and approved. Several documents regarding the 
national legislation have to be enclosed to the application, for example the English translation 
of all national legislation relevant to the manufacture of APIs and documents on good 
manufacturing practices for APIs applicable in the respective country. At present, the 
applications of Switzerland, Australia, Japan and the USA were approved. Concerning API 
manufacturing sites which are found to be non-compliant with EU GMP for active 
substances, a statement of non-compliance is issued and publicly available in the Union 
database EudraGMDP. The regulation regarding the “written confirmation” supports the 
purpose of preventing falsified medicinal products to enter the legal distribution chain. [30]132 
About 80% of all active substances which are used for the manufacture of medicinal products 
in the EU are imported from third countries, such as India, China, Japan and the USA. As 
mentioned above the applications of the USA and Japan to be added to the “Listing of third 
countries” already are approved. However, it is a debatable point whether the competent 
authorities of the other exporting countries are able to fulfill the provisions imposed to them 
by the European Union. The two most important exporting countries, China and India, are of 
special interest in this regard. It is doubted that India and China can provide the required 
organizational conditions. As a first step the Indian Central Drugs Standard Control 
Organization (CDSCO) published a list of “written confirmations” already given to national 
manufacturers on its website. European authorities and importers can use this list for 
orientation. With respect to China, for instance, it is doubted that the China Food and Drug 
Administration (CFDA) is able to check and evaluate the conformity with European GMP 
standards of all required manufacturers, i.e. manufacturers which are not already under 
supervision of European authorities. The present capacities and resources, as well as the 
limited knowledge and experience with regard to European GMP standards are considered 
to be the reasons. The fact that there is no distinction between manufacturers of active 
substances and chemicals in China represents an additional problem regarding the 
inspection and control of the manufacturers’ GMP conformity. Meanwhile, it is uncertain to 
which extent European importers can purchase the required active substances from 
manufacturers which are already controlled through routine audits by European authorities. 
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[82]133 In order to minimize the risk of drug shortages the EC relies on the collaboration 
between the pharmaceutical industry and the competent authorities. The pharmaceutical 
industry is asked to immediately inform all relevant authorities on problems concerning the 
lack of active substances. [83]134 
Another measure for the protection against counterfeit medicines is the extension of the 
opportunities to retrace medicinal products by the provision to affix safety features on the 
packaging. The safety features have the purpose to enable the verification of authenticity and 
the identification of medicinal products, even individual packs, and to provide evidence of 
tampering of medicinal products. These safety features shall not be removed or covered. The 
exception concerning re-packaging processes requires the manufacturing authorization 
holder to verify the respective medicinal product’s authenticity and that the product has not 
been tampered with, prior to removing or covering the safety features. The manufacturing 
authorization holder is further obliged to conduct the re-packaging process without opening 
the immediate packaging and to apply equivalent safety features and tamper-evident 
features to the medicinal product. [69]135 The detailed rules for the unique identifier, to be 
applied to medicinal products for human use, and its verification will be laid down in a 
respective delegated act issued by the European Commission. After its publication the 
Member States have a timeframe of three years for implementation. In November 2011, the 
EC submitted a concept paper for public consultation on the respective delegated act. It 
stipulates that a randomized serialization number shall be applied to the medicinal products 
to ensure the uniquely identification of individual packs. With respect to the technical 
characteristics of the serialization number carrier the concept paper refers to three options, 
namely linear barcode, 2D barcode and radio-frequency identification. [84]136 Most certainly 
the 2D barcode will be used to display the serialization number on the packs. [85]137 The 
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concept of using a 2D barcode (data matrix) allows a unique serialization of each single 
pack. The code can be read by a scanner so that the encrypted information about e.g. the 
serial number, pharmaceutical manufacturer product code, batch number and expiry date, 
i.e. the authenticity of the product, can be verified. The scanned barcode data is compared 
automatically to the registered codes in a database so that any unregistered, double or 
adulterated package would be identified by causing an alert. [86]138 To adhere to the cost-
benefit ratio the unique identifier will not be applied to all medicines. Only prescription 
medicines, with a few exceptions, and some non-prescription medicines, assessed to be at 
risk of falsification, will be provided with this safety feature. [69]139 The prescription medicines 
that shall not bear the unique identifier will be listed on the so-called “white list”. The “black 
list” will comprise all non-prescription medicines the unique identifier shall be applied to. 
[85]140 The general distinction of the medicinal products to which the safety feature shall be 
applied is based on their classification being a subject to medical prescription or not. The 
Directive 2001/83/EC includes aspects to be considered regarding the classification of 
medicinal products into prescription medicines and non-prescription medicines. However, the 
final decision resides with the competent authorities of the Member States leading to 
differences regarding the prescription classification across the Member States. [1]141 This fact 
differentiates the medicines’ classification with respect to the “black list” and “white list”. All 
members of the distribution chain are obliged to inform the respective competent authority 
immediately when a falsified medicinal product or a product, suspected to be falsified, has 
been found. All Member States are constrained to have a system in place to collect and 
handle all notifications of suspected counterfeit medicines as well as suspected quality 
defects to prevent potentially dangerous medicinal products from reaching the patient. The 
information about medicines under suspicion to present a serious risk to public health must 
be transmitted from the Member State of occurrence to all other Member States without any 
delay. [69]142 
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Concerning natural or legal persons offering medicinal products for sale at a distance the 
directive comprises new regulations, as well. All suppliers, intending to offer medicines for 
sale at a distance, need to have an authorization according to national legislation of the 
Member State where the supplier is established. The supplier has to inform the Member 
State about certain data, including name and address of the place of activity, address of the 
website and the starting date of activity. All medicinal products to be offered for sale at a 
distance must comply with the national legislation of the Member State of destination. The 
websites of the suppliers have to contain certain information, including the contact details of 
the respective competent authority and a hyperlink to the respective Member State’s website, 
mentioned below. Moreover, every licensed website has to contain the common logo that 
shall be recognizable throughout the EU. [69]143 It was introduced by the European 
Commission adopting the Implementing Regulation 699/2014, on June 24, 2014. [59]144 Each 
Member State is obliged to set up a website including information on the national legislation 
regarding the sale at a distance of medicines, the purpose of the common logo, a national list 
of legally-operating online pharmacies and retailers, the risks with regard to illegally supplied 
medicinal products, and a hyperlink to the website of the EMA. The EMA’s website also has 
to contain information about the common logo and the risks related to illegally supplied 
medicines. Furthermore, it should provide information on the respective EU legislation and it 
should refer to the Member States’ websites and the information that is provided there. The 
Member State authorities and the EMA will promote information campaigns on the function of 
the common logo and in general on the dangers of counterfeit medicines supplied illegally via 
the internet. These campaigns shall enhance consumer awareness of the hazard related to 
counterfeit medicinal products. In addition, the Member States shall ensure that effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive penalties to punish counterfeiters are implemented. [69]145  
1.3.1 Pharmacovigilance framework 
1.3.1.1 Definition of pharmacovigilance 
Medicinal products have to meet highest standards with respect to safety, quality, and 
efficacy, as the basis for the receipt and the preservation of the marketing authorization. 
                                                          
143 "Directive 2011/62/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011," (OJ L 174, 1.7.2011, 
p. 74). [Online]. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-1/dir_2011_62/dir_2011_62_en.pdf. 
[Accessed 31 January 2015]. 
144 European Commission, "EU logo for online sale of medicines," 27 June 2014. [Online]. Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/human-use/eu-logo/index_en.htm. [Accessed 6 January 2015]. 
145 "Directive 2011/62/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011," (OJ L 174, 1.7.2011, 
p. 74). [Online]. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-1/dir_2011_62/dir_2011_62_en.pdf. 
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[1]146 In the European Union (EU), former European Economic Commission (EEC) 
established in 1957, the submission of data regarding the safety, efficacy and quality of a 
medicinal product to at least one competent authority within the EEC for approval, prior 
marketing, became mandatory by law with the passage of the directive 65/65/EEC, in 1965. 
[87]147 [88]148 
In addition to the accomplishment of clinical studies prior to the marketing authorization of a 
medicinal product, it is the marketing authorization holder’s duty to implement a post-
marketing surveillance system, also denoted as pharmacovigilance system, to examine if the 
authorized product remains within its established benefit-risk balance. [1]149 This examination 
is based on the evaluation of collected data with regard to suspected adverse reactions of 
medicinal products. Therefore, pharmacovigilance has been defined by the World Health 
Organization as “the science and activities relating to the detection, assessment, 
understanding and prevention of adverse effects or any other medicine-related problem”. 
[89]150 
1.3.1.2 Purpose of pharmacovigilance 
In 1968 the WHO promoted a pilot research project for International Drug Monitoring. At the 
end of 2010, already 134 countries were part of it. The initial reason why the WHO 
established the program for International Drug Monitoring was the thalidomide disaster 
detected in 1961. [10]151 At that time, the documentation of and investigation in adverse 
events concerning medicinal products, as well as the communication of potential safety 
signals across countries were insufficient. The quick implementation of corrective and 
preventive actions, based on an appropriate evaluation of the adverse event reports 
                                                          
146 "Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001," (OJ L 311, 
28.11.2001, p. 67). [Online]. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-
1/dir_2001_83_consol_2012/dir_2001_83_cons_2012_en.pdf. [Accessed 16 January 2015]. 
147 H. Rahalkar, "Historical Overview of Pharmaceutical Industry and Drug Regulatory," 29 September 2012. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.omicsgroup.org/journals/historical-overview-of-pharmaceutical-industry-and-
drug-regulatory-affairs-2167-7689.S11-002.pdf. [Accessed 11 November 2013]. 
148 "Council Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of provisions laid down by Law, 
Regulation or Administrative Action relating to proprietary medicinal products," (OJ L 22, 9.2.1965, p. 369). 
[Online]. Available: http://www.echamp.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/Regulation/Directive_65-65-EEC__-
__Consolidated_Version.pdf. [Accessed 11 November 2013]. 
149 "Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001," (OJ L 311, 
28.11.2001, p. 67). [Online]. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-
1/dir_2001_83_consol_2012/dir_2001_83_cons_2012_en.pdf. [Accessed 16 January 2015]. 
150 "Volume 9A of The Rules Governing Medicinal Products in the European Union - Guidelines on 
Pharmacovigilance for Medicinal Products for Human Use," September 2008. [Online]. Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-9/pdf/vol9a_09-2008_en.pdf. [Accessed 30 October 2013]. 
151 "The Importance of Pharmacovigilance - Safety Monitoring of medicinal products, WHO 2002," [Online]. 
Available: http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4893e/s4893e.pdf. [Accessed 29 October 2013]. 
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concerning thalidomide, could have saved thousands [90]152 of children of being malformed. 
For that reason, the need for an internationally applicable detection system for evaluation of 
information about adverse effects of medicines was reaffirmed on the Sixteenth World Health 
Assembly in 1963. [10]153 As a result, the WHO pharmacovigilance program came into effect. 
In 1971 the WHO held a consultation meeting where it was decided to advocate the 
establishment of national centers for drug monitoring, to provide guidelines and to identify 
potential contribution by national centers to the international system. [10]154 
Today, the WHO Collaborating Center for International Drug Monitoring, set in Uppsala, 
Sweden, coordinates the membership of the WHO program for International Drug Monitoring 
and provides essential resources for regulatory agencies, health professionals, researchers 
and the pharmaceutical industry. [91]155 It is also known as the Uppsala Monitoring Center 
(UMC). Requirements on pharmaceutical systems have been included into drug regulations 
worldwide. 
At present, every competent authority of the WHO Member States as well as every marketing 
authorization holder for medicinal products have implemented systems [10]156 wherein data 
of adverse event reports concerning pharmaceutical products is collected and evaluated. 
Hence, national drug regulatory authorities are informed immediately if a report points to a 
serious safety signal of adverse effects that demand rapid corrective actions to ensure public 
health. Due to negative historical examples, it is the aim of today’s pharmacovigilance to 
enhance patient safety in relation to the use of medicines and to support public health by 
providing reliable, balanced information for the effective assessment of the benefit-risk 
balance of medicines. [92]157 
1.3.1.3 MAH’s obligations 
In the Directive 2001/83/EC, articles 101 to 108, the EU gives instructions how to handle the 
surveillance of authorized medicinal products. According to this Directive all Member States 
                                                          
152 J. H. Kim and A. R. Scialli, "Thalidomide: The Tragedy of Birth Defects and the Effective Treatment of Disease 
(Oxford Journals; Toxicological Sciences Volume 122, Issue 1, pp. 1-6)," 2 April 2011. [Online]. Available: 
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of the European Union and marketing authorization holders of medicinal products have to 
establish a pharmacovigilance system in order to collect and to evaluate all information about 
potential risks regarding medicinal products, with particular reference to adverse reactions 
and interactions. [1]158 However, not only information about adverse drug reactions under 
normal conditions of use shall be in scope of the pharmacovigilance system, but also any 
data on misuse and abuse of the drugs that may have an impact on the benefit-risk balance 
of the products. [1]159 Such information is summarized in a risk management plan including 
the safety risk assessment and defined risk minimization measures. The marketing 
authorization holders are expected to provide a succinct update of the worldwide safety 
experience of a medicinal product together with a critical evaluation of its benefit-risk balance 
considering new or changing information to the competent authorities at defined time points 
post-authorization. These reports are called periodic safety update reports (PSURs) [89]160, 
nowadays also denoted as periodic benefit-risk evaluation reports (PBRERs) since the 
reports provide a greater emphasize on the benefit of medicinal products. [93]161 
Every marketing authorization holder is obliged to appoint a qualified person for 
pharmacovigilance (QPPV) who is responsible for the permanently and continuously post 
authorization surveillance. [1]162 The duties and responsibilities of the QPPV are clarified in 
the Directive 2001/83/EC, as well. Beyond the territory of the EU the Directive affects also all 
other countries. Marketing authorization holders located in non-EU countries have reporting 
requirements towards the competent authorities within the EU with respect to medicinal 
products that are authorized in at least one EU country. The marketing authorization holder is 
required to record and report suspected serious adverse reactions promptly to the competent 
                                                          
158 "Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001," (OJ L 311, 
28.11.2001, p. 67). [Online]. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-
1/dir_2001_83_consol_2012/dir_2001_83_cons_2012_en.pdf. [Accessed 16 January 2015]. 
159 "Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001," (OJ L 311, 
28.11.2001, p. 67). [Online]. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-
1/dir_2001_83_consol_2012/dir_2001_83_cons_2012_en.pdf. [Accessed 16 January 2015]. 
160 "Volume 9A of The Rules Governing Medicinal Products in the European Union - Guidelines on 
Pharmacovigilance for Medicinal Products for Human Use," September 2008. [Online]. Available: 
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161 European Medicines Agency, "ICH guideline E2C (R2) on periodic benefit-risk evaluation report (PBRER)," 
January 2013. [Online]. Available: 
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WC500136402.pdf. [Accessed 27 January 2014]. 
162 "Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001," (OJ L 311, 
28.11.2001, p. 67). [Online]. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-
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authority, latest within 15 calendar days163, regardless whether the incident occurred within 
the territory of an EU Member State or in a country outside of the EU. [1]164 
In the context of the already mentioned Pharmaceutical Package the new pharmacovigilance 
legislation, comprising a directive (Directive 2010/84/EU) and a regulation (Regulation EU No 
1235/2010), was adopted by the European Parliament and the European Council in 
December 2010. The new legislation serves the purpose to strengthen and to simplify the 
European pharmacovigilance system and to provide the public with helpful information about 
the benefit-risk aspects of medicinal products. In October 2012, the new pharmacovigilance 
legislation was amended again by Directive 2012/26/EU and Regulation EU No 1027/2012. 
The amendment’s purpose is to further support the protection of patient health. It refers e.g. 
to the marketing authorization holder’s obligation to notify the EMA immediately in case of 
the withdrawal of a medicinal product. The notification also has to include the reasons for the 
withdrawal of the respective product from the market. [94]165 To provide specific guidelines 
regarding the provisions related to the EU safety monitoring system and the requirements 
with respect to pharmacovigilance procedures, the EMA released the good 
pharmacovigilance practice (GVP) guidelines which comprise multiple modules. 12 modules 
(I – X, XV and XVI) are already effective. 3 modules (XI, XII and XIV) are still in development, 
while the development of module XIII was stopped. Its contents will be included in module 
XII. [95]166 Thus, the document Volume 9A of "The rules governing medicinal products in the 
European Union - Pharmacovigilance" is being replaced by the 15 GVP modules. [96]167 
In Germany the handling of pharmacovigilance is settled in the AMG, §§ 62-63c. The 
German competent authorities such as the BfArM and the Paul-Ehrlich-Institute (PEI) 
collaborate closely and interact with the WHO, the EMA and FDAs of other countries, 
amongst others. [53]168 Every health facility, e.g. pharmacies and medical practices, is 
                                                          
163 15 calendar days for serious cases, 90 calendar days for non-serious cases 
164 "Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001," (OJ L 311, 
28.11.2001, p. 67). [Online]. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-
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167 European Commission, "The EU Phamacovigilance System," 2013. [Online]. Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/human-use/pharmacovigilance/index_en.htm. [Accessed 3 December 2013]. 
168 "German Medicinal Products Act; Gesetz über den Verkehr mit Arzneimitteln (Arzneimittelgesetz - AMG)," 
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obliged to report any adverse drug reaction, which is brought to their attention, pursuant to 
the graduated scheme which is given by governance as a guide so that everyone knows to 
whom the information has to be provided. [53]169 
The law includes special regulations with respect to pharmaceutical companies. According to 
§ 63a every company must implement and continuously run a pharmacovigilance system. A 
named qualified person, responsible for pharmacovigilance, has to account for the required 
qualification and to ensure the pharmacovigilance system is managed according to the 
legislative regulations. Furthermore, the qualified person is the interface to the competent 
authorities. [53]170 
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CHAPTER TWO – PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANYS’ ANTI-COUNTERFEITING 
MEASURES 
As counterfeit medicines pose a major risk to the safety of patients, and thus to public health, 
pharmaceutical companies should endeavor to contribute to the combat against 
counterfeiting of medicinal products, far beyond the obligations that are laid down in statutory 
provisions. There are several options for pharmaceutical companies to implement anti-
counterfeiting measures. Some examples of these measures are explained below including 
data monitoring and evaluation, collaboration with authorities, investigative measures, legal 
measures, technological measures, awareness-raising, review of established anti-
counterfeiting procedures and activities. 
2.1 Monitoring and data evaluation 
Besides the monitoring and reporting obligation of marketing authorization holders regarding 
suspected counterfeit reports towards the competent authorities, the MAH should also 
establish a monitoring system for the purpose of internal decision-making with respect to the 
implementation of required anti-counterfeiting actions. The monitoring and evaluation of 
counterfeit-relevant data provide basic information about affected products of the company’s 
portfolio and about the countries in which the market is definitely affected by the counterfeit 
problem. Based on this information, respective needs for the implementation of anti-
counterfeiting measures can be identified and a better decision made with regard to the 
focus and the markets in scope of the anti-counterfeiting activities to be conducted. 
2.1.1 Monitoring concept 
Various concepts regarding the monitoring and evaluation of counterfeit-related data are 
possible. One suggestion for an appropriate concept would be the combination of an ad-hoc 
monitoring with a long-term monitoring of counterfeit incidents. The ad-hoc monitoring should 
be conducted within short time intervals, e.g. on a weekly basis. Its purpose would be the 
identification of counterfeit incidents related to serious consequences, e.g. serious injury of a 
patient, which would require immediate investigative measures or respective actions. The 
long-term monitoring should be conducted within greater time intervals, e.g. on a monthly or 
quarterly basis, to serve the purpose of identifying counterfeit incidents which may be 
connected to one or multiple aspects, and therefore could point to an increase in counterfeit 
occurrences. The respective aspects to be considered include the following: 
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• Affected products 
• Affected countries 
• Batch numbers 
• Incident types 
• Reporter types 
The monitoring concept should further comprise a notification concept in case of the 
identification of respective counterfeit incidents or clusters of linked counterfeit incidents. The 
notification concept should include standards, detailing the required information to be 
contained in the notification and the named recipient of the notification. 
2.2 Collaboration with authorities  
Besides the reporting obligations the marketing authorization holders have towards the 
competent health authorities, other collaborative activities with regard to the topic of 
counterfeit medicines can be carried out by pharmaceutical companies. Such activities serve 
the purpose of supporting the authorities with the exchange of knowledge, information and 
experience. The collaboration is not just limited to health authorities only. Customs, criminal 
investigation offices and the police can also be included. A pharmaceutical company can 
support authorities with regard to case-related requests. In case the authorities examine a 
cargo of medicinal products and become suspicious, they can contact the respective 
marketing authorization holder for information regarding the cargo e.g. valid batch numbers 
or designated distribution routes. If the authorities discover medicinal products of which the 
authenticity is in doubt, the respective marketing authorization holder can dispatch a 
representative. The representative can carry out a first assessment by comparing the visual 
characteristics of the suspected product with a retention sample or he can check if required 
anti-counterfeiting safety features have been applied to the suspected product. Another 
possibility is chemical analysis of the suspected product by the pharmaceutical company with 
the results being forwarded to the authorities. Furthermore, possible case-related actions can 
be discussed and agreed upon with the authorities in this context. 
In general, marketing authorization holders can also provide the authorities with informative 
literature about their products. This information could contain details about product-specific 
visual properties, e.g. tablet dimensions, pictures of the single product parts including 
primary and secondary packaging as well as the dosage form and pictures of overt (visible) 
anti-counterfeiting security features applied to the respective product. Through these means, 
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the authorities are able to conduct a first assessment. Moreover, pharmaceutical companies 
can provide topic-specific training about counterfeit medicines to the authorities and they can 
communicate topic-specific contact persons within their companies which further improves 
the collaboration and the exchange of information. In addition, when authorities conduct raids 
pharmaceutical companies can support them by providing required informative literature or 
by dispatching an expert in that field to participate. 
Pharmaceutical companies can also collaborate by joining forces and thus, support 
authorities substantially and financially in conducting anti-counterfeiting campaigns e.g. 
education campaigns which inform patients about the risks counterfeit medicinal products 
can cause. The Pharmaceutical Industry Initiative to Combat Crime, coordinated by 
INTERPOL, is one current example for such a public private partnership between the 
authorities and the pharmaceutical industry. 
Moreover, marketing authorization holders can approach the customs and fill in an 
application for action. As a result, the customs are requested to take action if they detect 
medicinal products that are suspected to be falsified or are suspected to infringe on the 
intellectual property rights of the marketing authorization holder. The applications for action 
to be submitted to the customs have to contain product-specific information provided by the 
respective pharmaceutical companies. The collaboration of the private sector and the 
customs has gained in importance. Over the years from 2000 to 2010, the number 
applications of action, submitted to the EU Customs by holders of intellectual property rights, 
increased from about 1000 to over 18.000. [11]171 
2.3 Investigative measures 
Pharmaceutical companies can collect information about suspicious sources of counterfeit 
medicinal products which can be based on the information of a case report or a cluster of 
case reports with respect to counterfeit incidents related to a specific source. Another 
possibility to detect suspicious sources of counterfeit drugs is the targeted search for dubious 
online providers of medicinal products using search engines. The marketing authorization 
holder may look for internet pharmacies offering products from its portfolio and check if the 
respective online pharmacies show characteristics that would raise the suspicion that they 
are acting illicitly e.g. hiding a physical address or offering prescription-only medicines 
without demanding a prescription. Additionally, the pharmaceutical companies can conduct 
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“active online listening” reading comments in public internet forums in the search for 
references to potential providers of counterfeit medicines. After suspicious sources have 
been identified, the marketing authorization holders can then try to compile more detailed 
information about the respective providers using publicly accessible data or by hiring a 
specialized consultant agency to conduct the investigation. 
In collaboration with the authorities test purchases can be initiated. Consequently, the 
purchased products are analyzed visually and chemically to investigate if the identified 
suspicious sources in fact offer and provide counterfeit medicines. 
This information can be compared with data from other known cases of a suspected or even 
confirmed criminal activity regarding counterfeit medicines. The compiled and edited data 
can be provided to the respective authorities for further investigation or if the information is 
sufficient, the pharmaceutical company can press charges. 
2.4 Legal measures 
As mentioned before a marketing authorization holder can press charges against persons or 
potentially criminal organizations under suspicion of violating its intellectual property rights or 
patents. 
2.5 Technological measures 
The purpose of anti-counterfeiting technologies and security features is to exacerbate the 
access of counterfeit medicinal products to the supply chain without being detected. Security 
features that are applied to the packaging materials of medicinal products or are even 
included in the formulation of a drug, allow a check of authentication of the respective 
product. The characteristics of security features should make their imitation difficult with 
regard to highly sophisticated or very cost-intensive technologies. Hence, anti-counterfeiting 
security features have the purpose to enable the distinction between genuine and counterfeit 
medicinal products. Depending on the type of technology that is used, industrial experts, 
authorities or the public should be able to check the authenticity. [97]172 
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2.5.1 Features for products authentication 
2.5.1.1 Overt security features 
Overt security features are visible markers that are usually applied on the outer packaging 
and the primary packaging of a medicinal product. Such features are meant to be used by 
the end-user for the verification of authenticity of the product, comparable to the visible 
security features applied to banknotes. Overt security features require sophisticated 
technologies, or special raw materials to be produced, to ensure that the attempt to copy 
them is as difficult as possible. One condition for the correct and successful use of these 
features is the education of the end-user about their visual characteristics and the products 
to which they are applied. Otherwise, there is the risk that barely sophisticated copies of 
overt security features are sufficient to deceive the end-user. 
Examples for overt security features: 
• Holograms (images with some kind of 3-dimensional illusion including a range of colors 
and designs)  
• Optical variable device (similar to holograms, but mostly without the 3D component) 
• Color shifting inks (inks based on metallic components in an opaque layer shifting colors 
depending on the angle of the viewer) 
• Security graphics (fine line color printing incorporating several design elements e.g. 
guilloches, line modulation and line emboss; semi-overt as e.g. a magnifier is required) 
• Sequential product numbering (unique number applied to each single pack in a batch and 
to be checked accessing data in a database; semi-overt) 
• On-product marking (special images or codes placed on solid dosage forms) [97]173 
2.5.1.2 Covert security features 
Covert security features are hidden features usually applied to the packaging materials of a 
medicinal product. The information about the characteristics of these features, their location 
on the packaging and the products on which they are applied is confidential. The purpose of 
covert security features is to allow an in-house verification of the product’s authenticity. The 
verification is done by authorized experts, usually company-internal personnel. In addition to 
                                                          
173 International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce, "Anti-counterfeit Technologies for the 
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the necessary knowledge about the hidden security features, devices including magnifiers or 
UV-light are required to conduct the verification. 
Examples for covert features: 
• Invisible printing (printings not visible to the naked eye but only under special conditions 
e.g. UV illumination) 
• Embedded images (invisible images that require a filter to be viewed) 
• Digital watermarks (digitally encoded data that require the use of a reader and special 
software to be verified) 
• Hidden marks and printing (features require special attention to be detected and 
therefore are dependent on secrecy) 
• Anti-copy or anti-scan design (fine line background patterns, invisible to the naked eye, 
that only show a latent image when scanned or copied) 
• Laser coding (codes can include e.g. variable data and can be applied to different 
materials including metal, plastic and carton) 
• Substrates (markers e.g. chemical reagents, UV fluorescing fibers or metallic threads are 
incorporated within parts of the products’ packaging material) 
• Odor (micro-encapsulated distinctive odors) [97]174 
2.5.1.3 Forensic markers 
Forensic markers may be considered as a sub-group of the covert security features as they 
are as well hidden to the naked eye. But the highly sophisticated technologies that are 
required for the verification of authenticity present the difference. Dedicated field test kits or 
laboratory tests are necessary to conduct the check of authentication based on forensic 
markers. Due to the special technologies in use, this kind of anti-counterfeiting security 
features is cost-intensive; however very secure against duplication. Usually, forensic markers 
are undetectable by normal analytical methods. 
Examples for forensic markers: 
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• Chemical taggants (require the use of highly specific reagent systems to be detected) 
• Biological taggants (detectable at extremely small amounts using highly specific “lock and 
key” reagent kits) 
• DNA taggants (reaction of the DNA taggant with a recombinant strand is detectable with 
a dedicated device) 
• Isotope ratios (laser fluorescence or magnetic resonance techniques are used to 
determine the composition of isotopes which acts as a fingerprint of the compounds of 
the product) 
• Micro-taggants (require the use of a microscope to examine the coded information that 
the microscopic particles contain) [97]175 
2.5.2 Tamper-evident packaging 
“Tamper-evident packaging means packaging that has an indicator or barrier to entry which, 
if breached or missing, can reasonably be expected to provide visible or audible evidence to 
consumers that tampering may have occurred.” [98]176 
Examples for tamper-evident packaging features: 
• Transparent film wrappers (entire product pack is wrapped securely in the transparent 
film, which is of a distinctive design to make sure it cannot be replaced unnoticed) 
• Blister or strip packs (individual doses e.g. tablets are sealed in plastic and / or foil so that 
the access to the single doses is not possible without leaving visible evidence of entry) 
• Heat shrink bands or wrappers (seal the union of the cap and outer packaging of a 
product tightly after being shrunk by heat) 
• Pouches and sachets (have to be broken or ripped to get access to the contained 
product) 
                                                          
175 International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce, "Anti-counterfeit Technologies for the 
Protection of Medicines," [Online]. Available: http://www.who.int/impact/events/IMPACT-
ACTechnologiesv3LIS.pdf. [Accessed 9 January 2014]. 
176 TGA - Therapeutic Goods Administration (Australia), "Code of Practice for Tamper-Evident Packaging (TEP) 
of Therapeutic Goods," June 2003. [Online]. Available: http://www.tga.gov.au/pdf/packaging-tamper-evident-
cop.pdf. [Accessed 10 January 2014]. 
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• Breakable caps and tear-away caps (caps include a component that breaks away on 
opening or has to be torn away in order to gain access to the product) 
• Tape seals (tape with a distinctive design seals all flaps of a folding box or the cap of a 
bottle) 
• Container mouth inner seals and sealed metal tubes (nozzle of the primary packaging is 
sealed which makes gaining access to the product impossible without breaking the seal 
and thus leaving visible evidence) [98]177 
2.5.3 Track and trace technologies 
In the pharmaceutical sector track and trace applications have the purpose of enhancing the 
supply chain control with regard to medicinal products. During the manufacture of a 
pharmaceutical product a unique identity is assigned to each stock unit, which usually 
comprises product-specific information including the product name and strength, and unit-
specific information including batch number and expiry date. The unique identity is meant to 
remain with the stock unit through the entire distribution chain to the final dispenser, e.g. 
pharmacist or physician, and to the end-user. The unique identity may be assigned to the 
product unit in form of a code that can be read using a dedicated device. Then, the 
respective information included in the code can be accessed via a secure database. Using 
track and trace technologies allows the authentication of the coded data at any time. 
Moreover, the application enables the tracking of product units through the supply chain and 
provides the traceability on the history of product units. Therefore, track and trace 
applications present another opportunity to exacerbate counterfeit or diverted medicinal 
products from entering the supply chain without being detected. Some examples for track 
and trace applications are provided below. [97]178 
2.5.3.1 Serialization 
The serialization should be based on non-sequential numbering. The level of security is 
enhanced if the sequence of numbers to be applied, to the product units, is not predictable. 
Random serialization, based on highly secure algorithms, provides the maximum in security. 
The serial number is, in fact, not immune from being copied or adulterated; however by 
means of the data check in the database duplicates or invalid serial numbers can be 
                                                          
177 TGA - Therapeutic Goods Administration (Australia), "Code of Practice for Tamper-Evident Packaging (TEP) 
of Therapeutic Goods," June 2003. [Online]. Available: http://www.tga.gov.au/pdf/packaging-tamper-evident-
cop.pdf. [Accessed 10 January 2014]. 
178 International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce, "Anti-counterfeit Technologies for the 
Protection of Medicines," [Online]. Available: http://www.who.int/impact/events/IMPACT-
ACTechnologiesv3LIS.pdf. [Accessed 9 January 2014]. 
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identified. Units with invalid product details, expired units or those which appear in the wrong 
market will also be detected and raise a system alert. 
2.5.3.2 Bar codes 
Bar codes are security features that are meant to be applied to the packaging material of a 
medicinal product. Their use allows the verification of the product identity down to the unit 
pack level by incorporating the respective information for each unique pack in a high-density 
linear or 2-dimensional bar code, which is applied to the pack and can be read by a 
dedicated scanner. The scanned information is compared to the reference information in a 
central database. One popular example of the bar codes is the 2D data matrix code. [97]179 
As already mentioned in paragraph 1.3, this kind of code shall serve as one of the anti-
counterfeiting security features that are stipulated according to the Falsified Medicines 
Directive to be applied to the most prescription-only medicines and eventually some non-
prescription medicines in the EU. 
2.5.3.3 Unique surface marking or topography 
A unique fingerprint is applied to the surface of each single pack of a batch which is 
registered in a database using a dedicated device. This process is done at batch 
manufacture. Afterwards the fingerprint can be used for the check of authentication of each 
single pack. Another possibility to mark each single pack of a batch for later verification is to 
apply a pseudo-random image to each pack. The image may consist of a specific pattern of 
dots or lines printed on one part of the product packaging e.g. the carton. Then each image 
is scanned into the batch database to serve as a reference for the product identity check. 
[97]180 
2.5.3.4 Radio frequency identification (RFID) 
A radio frequency identification tag is an electronic tag which can be applied to a medicinal 
product and can be read using radio waves emitted by the reader. The tag has a microchip in 
its center which contains product-specific information that allows the identification of a single 
pack. The major advantage of the RFID technology in comparison to the use of bar codes or 
unique surface markings is the readability of the RFID tag at a distance. The tag does not 
need to be in line of sight of the reader considering that the range and sensitivity are 
                                                          
179 International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce, "Anti-counterfeit Technologies for the 
Protection of Medicines," [Online]. Available: http://www.who.int/impact/events/IMPACT-
ACTechnologiesv3LIS.pdf. [Accessed 9 January 2014]. 
180 International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce, "Anti-counterfeit Technologies for the 
Protection of Medicines," [Online]. Available: http://www.who.int/impact/events/IMPACT-
ACTechnologiesv3LIS.pdf. [Accessed 9 January 2014]. 
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dependent on the radio frequency. The disadvantage of the RFID technology is that some 
materials and liquids have the potential to absorb radio signals, thus making it unsuitable for 
certain medicinal products or packaging materials. [99]181 [97]182 
2.5.3.5 Portable devices for the detection of counterfeit medicines 
Portable devices for the detection of counterfeit medicinal products allow the verification of 
authenticity of pharmaceutical products in the field and within a short time of investigation. 
Additionally, such portable technologies are also designed to be used by non-experts as the 
analysis methods save the complex sample preparation. Moreover, samples can be 
analyzed directly at points of the supply chain, e.g. at transit or distribution, or at places of 
detection of suspicious goods without sending the samples to central laboratories for 
investigation. To guarantee that the verified samples remain undamaged, non-destructive 
testing is required. The demand for such portable devices comes particularly from health 
authorities and other law enforcement agencies, as well as security personnel of 
pharmaceutical companies. Many portable devices are based on vibrational spectroscopies 
such as Raman spectroscopy and infrared (IR) spectroscopy. The generated spectra then 
act as fingerprints which can be compared with spectra collected in a reference library to 
verify if the analyzed sample complies with the genuine product. Raman methods use a 
single-frequency laser and are very specific. Therefore, the methods are suitable for the 
detection of specific chemical compounds e.g. the API in a sample. If a broader analysis is 
needed to verify if a sample complies with the genuine product, the IR spectroscopy is more 
suitable. The IR analysis covers the API and non-active ingredients of samples so that fine 
differences of similar formulations can be detected. Many Raman and some near-IR devices 
can measure through packaging materials e.g. clear plastic while the signals from such 
materials often interfere with the signals of the API in the mid-IR spectrum. [100]183 
  
                                                          
181 US Food and Drug Administration, "Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)," 13 August 2013. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.fda.gov/Radiation-
EmittingProducts/RadiationSafety/ElectromagneticCompatibilityEMC/ucm116647.htm. [Accessed 13 January 
2014]. 
182 International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce, "Anti-counterfeit Technologies for the 
Protection of Medicines," [Online]. Available: http://www.who.int/impact/events/IMPACT-
ACTechnologiesv3LIS.pdf. [Accessed 9 January 2014]. 
183 A. M. Thayer, "Chemical & Engineering News "Instrumentation Firms Develop Portable Technology To 
Detect Counterfeit Drugs" Volume 90, Issue 33, pp.11-15," 13 August 2012. [Online]. Available: 
http://cen.acs.org/articles/90/i33/Instrumentation-Firms-Develop-Portable-Technology.html. [Accessed 14 
January 2014]. 
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In the following table some examples for portable devices are given. 
Analytical method / device Device name Company name 
Raman spectroscopy TruScan RM Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. 
Near-IR spectroscopy MicroPhazir Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. 
FTIR spectroscopy Multipurpose analyzer Bruker Optics (Bruker Cooperation) 
FTIR microscope Lumos Bruker Optics (Bruker Cooperation) 
FTIR spectroscopy ExoScan 4100 Agilent Technologies 
IR spectroscopy Spectrum Two portable IR system PerkinElmer Inc. 
Visible / near-IR spectrometer LabSpec ASD Inc. 
Table 1: Examples for portable devices for the detection of counterfeit medicines [100]184 
2.5.4 Recommendation regarding technological ACF measures 
A combination of multiple anti-counterfeiting technological measures may be the best 
approach to minimize the opportunities of counterfeiters to copy medicinal products and 
enter the supply chain unnoticed. Therefore, track and trace technologies should be used to 
control the supply chain by authorities, stakeholders of the supply chain and, at best, also by 
the end-user. Furthermore, security features with the purpose to ascertain the authenticity of 
a product should be applied to medicinal products in combination with tamper-evident 
packaging to make sure that a product tampered with is detected immediately. 
2.6 Awareness-raising 
Awareness-raising is equally as important in the protection against counterfeiting of 
medicines. As already mentioned, overt security features help the patients, healthcare 
professionals, or any other stakeholder of the legal supply chain to distinguish between 
genuine and counterfeit medicinal products. If there is no awareness of the overt security 
features or the visual characteristics of a genuine package, no doubt of authenticity will be 
raised if the respective security features are missing. Therefore, education of the 
stakeholders, especially patients, on what to be aware of and whom to report to, is of utmost 
importance. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to caution patients against the hazard counterfeit medicines 
pose to their health. To this extend, there is the need for public understanding of the major 
differences between counterfeit luxury goods e.g. clothing and accessories and counterfeit 
medicinal products and the impact they can have on health and safety. The difference 
                                                          
184 A. M. Thayer, "Chemical & Engineering News "Instrumentation Firms Develop Portable Technology To 
Detect Counterfeit Drugs" Volume 90, Issue 33, pp.11-15," 13 August 2012. [Online]. Available: 
http://cen.acs.org/articles/90/i33/Instrumentation-Firms-Develop-Portable-Technology.html. [Accessed 14 
January 2014]. 
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between original drugs (non-generic), approved generic drugs and counterfeit drugs also 
needs to be explained. 
2.7 Review of anti-counterfeiting procedures within a pharmaceutical company 
Adopting measures to raise awareness of counterfeit medicines will influence the reporting 
behavior of patients and healthcare professionals in a positive way. This will result in a higher 
number of suspected counterfeit incident reports. A global pharmaceutical company, being 
active in terms of awareness-raising, has to ensure that all these case reports are collected 
and processed with the same due diligence in all its affiliates. Thus, a consistent knowledge 
on the topic, responsible functions and contact persons, required obligations, and 
standardized processes is essential for a gapless case handling, as well as high data 
consistency and quality. This is necessary to ensure that data monitoring and evaluation 
activities lead to results which in turn represent the basis for decision-making on further 
required actions. In order to check if all affiliates comply with the respective requirements a 
pharmaceutical company should carry out appropriate measures to review the current status 
of all implemented anti-counterfeiting procedures and activities. As a result, gaps and needs 
for support can be identified and required measures can be adopted. 
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CHAPTER THREE – DATA MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
3.1 Influence of counterfeit medicines on the benefit-risk profiles of genuine drugs 
The evaluation of the benefit-risk profile of a medicinal product is based on the collection and 
evaluation of all adverse event (AE) reports related to the respective product. Since 
counterfeit medicines mimic genuine medicinal products, it can be assumed that adverse 
drug reactions, caused by undetected counterfeit drugs, can falsely impact the benefit-risk 
profile of the respective genuine medicinal products. 
According to the WHO and the UMC an adverse event is defined as: 
“Any untoward medical occurrence that may present during treatment with a pharmaceutical 
product but which does not necessarily have a causal relationship with this treatment” 
[101]185 
According to the WHO and the UMC an adverse drug reaction is defined as: 
“A response to a drug which is noxious and unintended, and which occurs at doses normally 
used in humans for the prophylaxis, diagnosis, or therapy of disease or for the modification of 
physiological function” [101]186 
Based on the results of counterfeit seizures major quantities of counterfeit medicines can be 
expected to be on the market. Since only rather few suspected counterfeit incidents are 
reported by patients and healthcare professionals, it is assumed that the majority of 
counterfeit medicinal products is consumed without questioning whether the medicines are 
genuine or not.  
Therefore, concerning its portfolio, a marketing authorization holder may receive reports 
about the occurrence of adverse events that were actually caused by counterfeits of the 
respective genuine products. If such an AE report is received in relation to a suspected 
counterfeit incident, the respective complaint sample will be analyzed and its authenticity 
checked. In addition to the authentication check, it is assed if the reported adverse event is 
actually related to the complaint sample. In the case that no sample is available, its 
authenticity cannot be checked. Thus, the MAH is obliged to include the respective report in 
                                                          
185 World Health Organization, Uppsala Monitoring Center, "Glossary of terms used in Pharmacovigilance," 
January 2013. [Online]. Available: http://www.who-umc.org/graphics/27400.pdf. [Accessed 6 February 2014]. 
186 World Health Organization, Uppsala Monitoring Center, "Glossary of terms used in Pharmacovigilance," 
January 2013. [Online]. Available: http://www.who-umc.org/graphics/27400.pdf. [Accessed 6 February 2014]. 
CHAPTER THREE – DATA MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
 
62 
 
the respective genuine product’s benefit-risk evaluation, since the report could not be 
confirmed to be related to a counterfeit product. If the AE report is received without the 
suspicion of a counterfeit incident and also no suspicion is raised after the receipt of the 
complaint sample, the authentication check is omitted, as the authenticity of the reported 
product is not in doubt. Thus, it is possible that a marketing authorization holder collects 
adverse event cases which are actually not related to the genuine medicines, the MAH is 
responsible for, but to their counterfeits. As it remains unknown, that the adverse events 
were actually caused by counterfeits of the genuine medicinal products, the reports are 
included in the evaluation of all AE reports related to the respective genuine products to 
assess the products’ benefit-risk profiles. Hence, the counterfeit products would have an 
influence on the evaluation of the benefit-risk profiles of the genuine medicines. 
Based on this assumption, one aim of this thesis is to examine if a correlation between 
documented AE data and documented counterfeit incidents data can be identified. And, if 
this is the case, if AE data can serve as a basis for the monitoring of the potential counterfeit 
presence on the market. For that reason, an analysis of the AE data and the counterfeit 
incidents data, collected in the company’s global pharmacovigilance data base and the 
company’s global technical complaint database, has been conducted. 
3.2 Framework of data analysis 
3.2.1 Data sources 
The adverse event data represents the basis for the data analysis. The collected data has 
been examined and compared to the collected counterfeit incidents data, serving as 
reference data. 
All case reports, related to the suspicion of a counterfeit incident concerning the company’s 
portfolio, that are brought to the company’s attention are collected and documented in its 
global, company-internal technical complaint database. This database holds all reports that 
are related to technical complaints and suspected counterfeit incidents. In case, a reporter – 
e.g. a patient, a healthcare professional (HCP) or an authority – questions the authenticity of 
a medicinal product and reports the suspicious product to the company, the case report is 
entered as a suspected counterfeit incident in the global technical complaint database and is 
assessed accordingly, i.e. all (available) parts of the suspicious product are investigated to 
confirm or refuse its authenticity. Subsequently, the reporter is informed about the result of 
investigation, except national limitations prohibit the direct contact to the reporter. 
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All adverse event reports, concerning the company’s portfolio, that are brought to its attention 
are collected and documented in its global, company-internal pharmacovigilance database. 
All AE reports are investigated to confirm or refuse the correlation between the reported 
adverse event and the reported medicinal product. Also, the reporter is informed about the 
result of investigation, except national limitations prohibit the direct contact to the reporter. 
The Pharmacovigilance organization is the owner of the global pharmacovigilance database 
and the Quality organization is the owner of the global technical complaint database. 
 
Figure 11: Data sources of AE cases and counterfeit incidents 
Case reports related to both, one or multiple adverse events and a suspected counterfeit 
incident, are entered into both, the global pharmacovigilance database and the global 
technical complaint database and are marked and assed accordingly. 
In the context of this thesis specific data has been selected that was considered suitable to 
serve as the basis for the analysis of a potential correlation between AE reports and 
confirmed counterfeit incidents. With respect to the counterfeit incidents all data related to a 
confirmed falsification has been selected from the global complaint database. Regarding the 
adverse event reports all data related to a lack of drug effect has been selected from the 
global pharmacovigilance database. 
3.2.2 Special focus on falsifications 
As outlined in paragraph 1.1.2.1, this incident type refers to counterfeit medicines which have 
been completely or partly manufactured by an unauthorized third party. The counterfeit part 
can be the dosage form, the packaging materials or both. The dosage form can contain the 
wrong ingredients, the wrong amount of the correct API or no API, at all. Moreover, it could 
CHAPTER THREE – DATA MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
 
64 
 
“have been manufactured in unsanitary, unsafe conditions” [7]187. Even if the dosage form is 
genuine, any manipulation including illegal repackaging and bad storage conditions can have 
a negative impact on the medicinal product’s quality. Therefore, the quality and with it the 
safety and efficacy of such medicines are not or no longer guaranteed. As a result, 
falsifications have the highest potential to impact health in a negative way and thus, to cause 
adverse events, or to lack the desired pharmaceutical effect, when administered. 
3.2.3 Special focus on lack of drug effect reports 
As outlined in paragraph 1.1.3, counterfeit medicines can impact patients in different ways 
depending on the characteristics of the counterfeit medicine and the characteristics and 
indication(s) of the genuine medicinal product that has been counterfeited. Adverse events 
possibly caused by counterfeit medicines show a broad variety and can be very unspecific. 
For instance, impurities, allergenic or toxic ingredients can cause adverse events including 
head ache, nausea or gastrointestinal disorders and (allergic) skin reactions. Such reactions 
can be caused by genuine medicinal products, as well, and are often even listed adverse 
drug reactions for the respective drug.  
According to the International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for 
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) a listed adverse drug reaction is 
defined as: 
“An ADR whose nature, severity, specificity and outcome are consistent with the information 
in the CCSI” [102]188 
  
                                                          
187 "PSI - Counterfeits - Definitions," [Online]. Available: http://www.psi-inc.org/counterfeitSituation.cfm. 
[Accessed 5 November 2013]. 
188 International Conference on Harmonization, "Guidance for Industry E2C Clinical Data Safety Management: 
Periodic Safety Update Reports for Marketed Drugs," November 1996. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm073102.pd
f. [Accessed 12 February 2014]. 
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The ICH defines the Company Core Safety Information (CCSI) as: 
“All relevant safety information contained in the CCDS prepared by the MAH and which the 
MAH requires to be listed in all countries where the company markets the drug, except when 
the local regulatory authority specifically requires a modification. It is the reference 
information by which listed and unlisted are determined for the purpose of periodic reporting 
for marketed products, but not by which expected and unexpected are determined for 
expedited reporting.” [102]189 
The ICH defines the Company Core Data Sheet (CCDS) as: 
“A document prepared by the MAH containing, in addition to safety information, material 
relating to indications, dosing, pharmacology, and other information concerning the product.” 
[102]190 
As already presented in figure 4 “What exactly is in counterfeit medicines?” (paragraph 
1.1.3.2), the majority of identified imitations contain no active ingredients. The results of in-
house analyses of detected and confirmed imitations also revealed that the majority of the 
respective samples contained too little of the declared API or no API, at all. With regard to 
medicines for hormonal contraception also wrong amounts of the declared API have been 
found, e.g. in combined oral contraceptives the content of one of the hormones was too high 
while the content of the other one was too low. The expected adverse event caused by this 
type of counterfeit medicines would be the failure of the desired pharmaceutical effect, also 
denoted as lack of efficacy or lack of drug effect (LODE). 
According to the WHO and the UMC efficacy is defined as: 
“The ability of a drug to produce the intended effect as determined by scientific methods, for 
example in pre-clinical research conditions”. [101]191 Therefore, the lack of efficacy or lack of 
drug effect is the “evidence of less than the expected effect of a product”. [103]192 
                                                          
189 International Conference on Harmonisation, "Guidance for Industry E2C Clinical Data Safety Management: 
Periodic Safety Update Reports for Marketed Drugs," November 1996. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm073102.pd
f. [Accessed 12 February 2014]. 
190 International Conference on Harmonisation, "Guidance for Industry E2C Clinical Data Safety Management: 
Periodic Safety Update Reports for Marketed Drugs," November 1996. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm073102.pd
f. [Accessed 12 February 2014]. 
191 World Health Organization, Uppsala Monitoring Center, "Glossary of terms used in Pharmacovigilance," 
January 2013. [Online]. Available: http://www.who-umc.org/graphics/27400.pdf. [Accessed 6 February 2014]. 
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A failure of the expected drug effect can occur regardless of the indication of the 
pharmaceutical product. Moreover, it is the expected adverse drug reaction of the majority of 
counterfeit medicinal products. For that reason, LODE reports are considered suitable to 
serve as a basis for the analysis of a potential correlation between AE reports and confirmed 
counterfeit incidents. Hence, LODE reports were selected for the data analysis in this 
dissertation. 
To identify AE cases that are related to a LODE, they are coded using respective preferred 
terms (PT) of the Medical Dictionary for Regulatory Activities (MedDRA), when they are 
entered into the company’s pharmacovigilance database. Detailed information regarding 
MedDRA, including MedDRA terms and the MedDRA hierarchy are outlined in paragraph 
3.2.5. Respective preferred terms are listed in the following table. An AE case is coded using 
a LODE PT when the “evidence of less than the expected effect of the product” [103]193 is 
estimated after medical judgment or if the reporter explicitly stated that the drug did not work. 
[104]194 
MedDRA PT for LODE (examples) 
• Drug ineffective 
• No therapeutic response 
• Therapeutic product ineffective 
Table 2: Examples for MedDRA PTs for LODE 
3.2.4 Lack of drug effect type of events 
As defined above, a lack of drug effect is the “evidence of less than the expected effect of a 
product”. [103]195 
Adverse events, occurring under the treatment of a medicinal product, that point to a failure 
of the pharmaceutical effect but do not give the evidence are not defined as a LODE. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
192 National Center for Biomedical Ontology, "Medical Dictionary for Regulatory Activities - Lack of efficacy," 
[Online]. Available: 
http://bioportal.bioontology.org/ontologies/MEDDRA?p=classes&conceptid=http%3A%2F%2Fpurl.bioontology.
org%2Fontology%2FMDR%2F20000032. [Accessed 6 February 2014]. 
193 National Center for Biomedical Ontology, "Medical Dictionary for Regulatory Activities - Lack of efficacy," 
[Online]. Available: 
http://bioportal.bioontology.org/ontologies/MEDDRA?p=classes&conceptid=http%3A%2F%2Fpurl.bioontology.
org%2Fontology%2FMDR%2F20000032. [Accessed 6 February 2014]. 
194 International Conference on Harmonisation, "MedDRA Term Selection: Points to Consider," 1 October 2013. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.meddra.org/sites/default/files/guidance/file/9491-
1610_termselptc_r4.6_sep2013.pdf. [Accessed 24 February 2014]. 
195 National Center for Biomedical Ontology, "Medical Dictionary for Regulatory Activities - Lack of efficacy," 
[Online]. Available: 
http://bioportal.bioontology.org/ontologies/MEDDRA?p=classes&conceptid=http%3A%2F%2Fpurl.bioontology.
org%2Fontology%2FMDR%2F20000032. [Accessed 6 February 2014]. 
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Therefore, case reports related to such an event are not coded with a LODE-specific PT, 
when entered into the database. Hence, such case reports would not be included in the 
results of a retrieval of LODE cases from the database. Nevertheless, cases that have been 
reported in correlation with adverse events pointing to a failure of the desired pharmaceutical 
effect of a medicinal product could hint at a potential counterfeit presence and thus, should 
be included in the analysis of the potential correlation between AE cases and confirmed 
counterfeit incidents. In this dissertation these adverse events are denoted as lack of drug 
effect type of events (LODE TOE). 
LODE type of events are very product-specific and depend on the indication of the respective 
medicinal product. For that reason, LODE TOE were selected separately for each product in 
scope of the analysis. The selection of the respective events was done in the context of this 
thesis using MedDRA preferred terms. 
In the following, some examples for products of different indications and the appropriate 
MedDRA PTs for LODE type of events are given.  
3.2.4.1 Combined oral contraceptives 
Indication / drug effect MedDRA PT (examples) 
Contraception • Pregnancy 
• Pregnancy on contraceptive 
• Unintended pregnancy 
• Unwanted pregnancy 
• Pregnancy test positive 
• Human chorionic gonadotropin increased 
Irregular menstrual bleeding /  
Regulation of menstrual bleeding 
• Bleeding time abnormal 
• Abnormal withdrawal bleeding 
• Dysfunctional uterine bleeding 
• Menstruation irregular 
Anti-androgen effects • Acne 
• Alopecia 
• Hirsutism 
• Seborrhoea 
• Virilism 
Table 3: Lack of drug effect type of events - oral contraceptives 
  
CHAPTER THREE – DATA MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
 
68 
 
3.2.4.2 Anti-diabetics 
Indication / drug effect MedDRA PT (examples) 
Diabetes mellitus (Typ 2) / 
Regulation of blood glucose 
• Diabetes mellitus inadequate control 
• Increased insulin requirement 
• Hyperglycaemia 
• Hyperglycaemic unconsciousness 
• Blood glucose increased 
• Glycosylated haemoglobin increased 
• Diabetic ketoacidosis 
• Diabetic hyperglycaemic coma 
Table 4: Lack of drug effect type of events - anti-diabetics 
3.2.4.3 Erectile dysfunction pharmaceuticals 
Indication / drug effect MedDRA PT (examples) 
Erectile dysfunction • Ejaculation disorder 
• Ejaculation failure 
• Erectile dysfunction 
• Male sexual dysfunction 
Table 5: Lack of drug effect type of events - erectile dysfunction pharmaceuticals 
3.2.4.4 Antibiotics 
Indication / drug effect MedDRA PT (examples, depending on the 
spectrum of the antibiotic API) 
Bacterial infection • Abscess bacterial 
• Bacterial diarrhea 
• Bacterial sepsis 
• Bronchitis bacterial 
• Cystitis bacterial 
• Otitis bacterial 
• Pneumonia bacterial 
• Sinusitis bacterial 
• Urinary tract infection bacterial 
Table 6: Lack of drug effect type of events - antibiotics 
3.2.5 MedDRA 
MedDRA stands for Medical Dictionary for Regulatory Activities. The dictionary was 
developed by the ICH in the late 1990’s with the purpose to provide a standardized medical 
terminology to “facilitate sharing of regulatory information internationally for medical products 
used by humans”. [105]196 All institutions, including regulatory authorities, pharmaceutical 
companies, clinical research organizations and health care professionals, can access 
MedDRA “for use in the registration, documentation and safety monitoring of medical 
                                                          
196 "ICH MedDRA homepage - basics," [Online]. Available: http://www.meddra.org/how-to-use/support-
documentation/english. [Accessed 05 August 2013]. 
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products, both, before and after the product’s marketing authorization”. [105]197 The scope of 
the tool covers pharmaceuticals, biologics, vaccines and drug-device combination products. 
[105]198 
To guarantee the integrity of MedDRA, the ICH has created a governance structure. The ICH 
MedDRA Maintenance and Support Services Organization (MSSO) is responsible for the 
maintenance, development, and distribution of MedDRA and is controlled by the ICH 
MedDRA Management Board, which is appointed by the ICH Steering Committee. MedDRA 
is available in multiple languages: Chinese, Czech, Dutch, English, French, German, 
Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Portuguese and Spanish. Each MedDRA term is associated to 
an 8-digit numerical code, which defines the same term in every language. Thus, it is much 
easier to share safety-relevant information internationally. On a half-year basis an updated 
MedDRA version is provided to the users. [105]199 
All MedDRA terms are arranged in a hierarchical structure of 5 levels from “system organ 
class” (SOC) as the highest level over “high level group term” (HLGT), “high level term” (HLT) 
and “preferred term” (PT) down to “low level term” (LLT) as the lowest and most specific 
level, as illustrated in figure 12. All in all, MedDRA comprises more than 70,000 terms at the 
LLT level aggregated in 26 system organ classes. [106]200 But one low level term is not 
mandatorily allocated under only one system organ class. Branches are possible at several 
levels, e.g. see figure 13. Therefore, the possible paths are classified as primary path and 
secondary path(s). 
                                                          
197 "ICH MedDRA homepage - basics," [Online]. Available: http://www.meddra.org/how-to-use/support-
documentation/english. [Accessed 05 August 2013]. 
198 "ICH MedDRA homepage - basics," [Online]. Available: http://www.meddra.org/how-to-use/support-
documentation/english. [Accessed 05 August 2013]. 
199 "ICH MedDRA homepage - basics," [Online]. Available: http://www.meddra.org/how-to-use/support-
documentation/english. [Accessed 05 August 2013]. 
200 "ICH MedDRA homepage - structure," [Online]. Available: http://www.meddra.org/how-to-
use/basics/hierarchy. [Accessed 21 August 2013]. 
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Figure 12: MedDRA hierarchy [106]201 
 
  
Figure 13: MedDRA hierarchy - branches (MedDRA version 17.1) 
                                                          
201 "ICH MedDRA homepage - structure," [Online]. Available: http://www.meddra.org/how-to-
use/basics/hierarchy. [Accessed 21 August 2013]. 
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3.2.6 Methodology 
The data analysis, including the selection of the products and countries in scope, the 
preparation and retrieval of the required data, the data presentation, as well as the selection 
of a suitable statistical method and the statistical evaluation, including all calculations were 
accomplished in the context of this thesis. 
3.2.6.1 Scope: Products, countries, time frame 
The data analysis was done with respect to a selection of products, for which confirmed 
counterfeit incidents have already been received and thus, a high counterfeit presence in 
specific countries is known. Therefore, the respective data in the company’s global technical 
complaint database served as reference data regarding the confirmed counterfeit incidents, 
particularly confirmed falsifications which are in the focus of the analysis. 
In order to maintain data protection, the 6 selected prescription-only medicines are encrypted 
with the terms “Product A-F”. The dosage forms of the selected products are all solid 
formulations for oral administration. The time period in scope of the data analysis was 
determined on 4 years; from 2009 to 2012. 
3.2.6.2 Data retrieval 
All LODE cases and all LODE type of event cases regarding the products in scope were 
retrieved from the company’s global pharmacovigilance database, based on the entry date of 
the reports, i.e. the reports were entered into the database within the time period in scope. 
The LODE cases were retrieved using LODE-specific preferred terms, which are used to 
code LODE cases in the database, as mentioned above. In order to select appropriate LODE 
type of event terms for each product in scope, an event count query was run in the global 
pharmacovigilance database for each of the products. The results of the event count queries 
contain all preferred terms that have ever been reported with regard to the respective product 
since the beginning of the company’s data collection. The result lists were reviewed for 
preferred terms that would serve the required characteristics of a LODE type of event for the 
respective products. Based on the selected terms the MedDRA browser was examined for 
similar, appropriate terms which also should be included in the LODE type of event lists for 
the respective products in scope. Additionally, the Company Core Safety Information of the 
respective products was used as an orientation for the selection of appropriate preferred 
terms. Finally, the compiled LODE type of event lists were discussed with the responsible 
Global Safety Leader (GSL) of each of the products and were adapted, if necessary. 
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As mentioned above, the lists of the defined product-specific MedDRA terms are not 
presented in the dissertation to guarantee that the evaluated products remain confidential 
according to data protection. 
3.2.6.3 Data presentation 
The LODE + LODE TOE cases of each product in scope were calculated as case counts in a 
long-term view over the 4 years period on a quarterly basis for the respective country of 
known counterfeit presence. As the reference, the confirmed falsifications of each product in 
scope were displayed in the same way for the respective country. Due to country-specific 
circumstances, a data evaluation across countries is not reasonable. Hence, the data 
evaluation was done separately for each of the product-country combinations to exclude 
influencing factors that are based on country-specific circumstances. For each product-
country combination the described AE data and counterfeit incidents data were displayed in 
one joint figure. The statistical method used to calculate if a correlation between the 
respective data can be identified is Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. 
Furthermore, the LODE + LODE TOE cases are calculated in counts per million (CPM) for 
each product-country combination over the time period in scope. The consideration of the 
CPM rates was done to offset increases in the adverse event case counts that were caused 
by increasing sales quantities and, thus, a higher number of patients who have been treated 
with the respective pharmaceutical products. A probable temporal delay between the sale of 
the medicines and the reporting of potentially related adverse events has to be taken into 
account. This has to be considered in particular with respect to medicinal products which are 
subject to a seasonal dependency, e.g. vaccines. However, no seasonal dependency is 
expected for the 6 selected products in scope as the consumption of these products is stable 
during the course of the year. The CPM rates were calculated based on the sales quantities 
documented in the company’s global sales database. 
3.2.6.4 Statistical method: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient 
A company-internal statistician was consulted to gain information about statistical methods, 
possibly applicable to the planned data evaluation. In the context of this dissertation the 
proposed statistical methods were checked with respect to their suitability. As a result, 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, also denoted as Spearman’s rho (rs or ρ), was 
selected to examine if there is a correlation between the confirmed falsification cases and the 
LODE + LODE type of event cases regarding the example products. 
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Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is a non-parametric measure of the statistical 
dependence between two variables. This means that it is examined if there is a monotonic 
relation between the two variables. Spearman’s rho ranges from -1 to +1, with ρ = -1 
describing a perfect negative monotonic relation (one variable increases while the other 
decreases) and ρ = +1 describing a perfect positive monotonic relation (one variable 
increases and the other does, too). ρ = 0 means that there is no monotonic relation between 
the variables. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is derived from Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient. For both, the same formula is used. However, for Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient the data, to be evaluated, does not need to be normally distributed, as it is 
required for Pearson’s correlation coefficient. The main difference between the two methods 
is that Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is based on the ranks of the variables’ values 
to be evaluated, while Pearson’s correlation coefficient is based directly on the variables’ 
values. The values of one variable are sorted in an ascending order. Then each of the values 
is assigned a rank according to its position in the ascending order. If there are identical 
values of one variable, also denoted as rank ties, these values are assigned a rank 
corresponding to the average of the positions which these values have in the ascending 
order. [107]202 [108]203 For the first example product an auxiliary table, containing all data 
required for the calculation, is given. For all other example products only the result of ρ is 
given. 
Levels of absolute results of ρ, describing the relationship between the variables [109]204: 
• 0.00 – 0.19 “very weak” 
• 0.20 – 0.39 “weak” 
• 0.40 – 0.59 “moderate” 
• 0.60 – 0.79 “strong” 
• 0.80 – 1.00 “very strong” 
  
                                                          
202 G. Buttler and K. Oeckler, "Zusammenhang von Rangmerkmalen," in Einführung in die Statistik, Rowohlt-
Verlag GmbH, 2010, pp. 224-233. 
203 D. Rumsey, "Korrelationen mit dem Spearman'schen Rang bestimmen," in Statistik II für Dummies, 
Weinheim, WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, 2013, pp. 327-330. 
204 "Spearman's correlation," [Online]. Available: 
http://www.statstutor.ac.uk/resources/uploaded/spearmans.pdf. [Accessed 30 January 2014]. 
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Formula of Spearman’s rho (ρ) [107]205 [108]206: 
 = 	
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with 
 Number of value pairs 
 Index of the value pair; from 1 to n; n = sample size 
	
 Ranks of the x-values 
	 Mean (arithmetic) of all ranks of the x-values 

 Ranks of the y-values 
 Mean (arithmetic) of all ranks of the y-values 
 Covariance of the ranks of the x-values and y-values 
 Standard deviation of the ranks of the x-values 
 Standard deviation of the ranks of the y-values 
Testing the significance of the results of ρ, the figure “Significance of Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient” was used. The significance level is a measure for the likelihood that 
the null hypothesis is falsely rejected, i.e. the likelihood that the result of rho is only due to 
chance. The power of the test depends on the sample size, in this case the number of value 
pairs. If rho is greater than the 5% significance level corresponding to the sample size (or 
degrees of freedom = number of value pairs – 2) the likelihood that the null hypothesis is 
falsely rejected is too high. Therefore, it should not be rejected. [110]207 
                                                          
205 G. Buttler and K. Oeckler, "Zusammenhang von Rangmerkmalen," in Einführung in die Statistik, Rowohlt-
Verlag GmbH, 2010, pp. 224-233. 
206 D. Rumsey, "Korrelationen mit dem Spearman'schen Rang bestimmen," in Statistik II für Dummies, 
Weinheim, WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, 2013, pp. 327-330. 
207 Barcelona Field Studies Center, "Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient," 12 May 2013. [Online]. Available: 
http://geographyfieldwork.com/SpearmansRank.htm. [Accessed 30 January 2014]. 
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Figure 14: Significance of Spearman's rank correlation coefficient [111]208 
  
                                                          
208 Barcelona Field Studies Center, "Significance of Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient," 11 May 2013. 
[Online]. Available: http://geographyfieldwork.com/SpearmansRankSignificance.htm. [Accessed 30 January 
2014]. 
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3.3 Data analysis and statistical evaluation 
First, the reference data was evaluated in order to identify the product-country combinations 
of known high counterfeit presence concerning the 6 products in scope. For each product in 
scope all confirmed falsifications received in the time period of 2009 to 2012 are displayed as 
case counts with regard to all respective reporting countries. 
3.3.1 Product A 
Confirmed counterfeit presence in Colombia 
 
Figure 15: Confirmed falsifications of Product A by reporting countries 
The data evaluation shows that the country with the highest number of confirmed 
falsifications of Product A is Colombia. 
  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Colombia El Salvador Kenya Malaysia Pakistan
C
a
se
 c
o
u
n
ts
Confirmed falsifications of Product A by reporting countries
2009
2010
2011
2012
                                                                               CHAPTER THREE – DATA MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
 
77 
 
 
Figure 16: Confirmed falsifications vs. LODE + LODE type of events of Product A received from Colombia 
 
Figure 17: CPM rates based on LODE + LODE type of events regarding Product A in Colombia 
To check if the number of received LODE + LODE type of event cases is influenced by the  
sales quantities, the CPM (counts per million) rates were calculated for the respective 
product with respect to the time period in scope. According to the calculation (		 =
	  	!"	#$%&'#$%&	($&	)*+ +,*- +	.*/0
0	(!"	01 	 +2 )0
3 	.*0 ) × 1000000) the CPM rates behave inversely proportional 
to the sales quantities at constant numbers of received LODE + LODE type of event cases, 
i.e. increasing sales quantities lead to decreasing CPM rates, when the number of received 
LODE + LODE type of event cases remains stable and vice versa.  
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In 2010 the CPM rates of Product A slightly decreased while the number of received LODE + 
LODE type of event cases remained stable, i.e. the sales quantities slightly increased. In Q1 
2012 the CPM rates increased, i.e. the sales quantities decreased in comparison to the sales 
quantities in 2010, but the number of received LODE + LODE type of event cases still 
remained stable. No influence of the sales quantities on the number of LODE + LODE type of 
event cases was identified. 
Regarding the example of Product A all necessary data for the calculation of Spearman’s rho 
is given in the table below. 
x Values of the confirmed falsification cases 
y Values of the LODE + LODE type of event cases 
x 678 y 698 678 − 67 698 − 69 (678 − 67)(	698 − 69) (678 − 67): (698 − 69): 
0 3 0 6.5 -5.5 -2 11 30.25 4 
10 16 0 6.5 7.5 -2 -15 56.25 4 
3 12 0 6.5 3.5 -2 -7 12.25 4 
2 10.5 0 6.5 2 -2 -4 4 4 
0 3 1 14.5 -5.5 6 -33 30.25 36 
5 14.5 1 14.5 6 6 36 36 36 
0 3 0 6.5 -5.5 -2 11 30.25 4 
1 7.5 1 14.5 -1 6 -6 1 36 
4 13 0 6.5 4.5 -2 -9 20.25 4 
5 14.5 0 6.5 6 -2 -12 36 4 
0 3 0 6.5 -5.5 -2 11 30.25 4 
0 3 0 6.5 -5.5 -2 11 30.25 4 
1 7.5 1 14.5 -1 6 -6 1 36 
1 7.5 0 6.5 -1 -2 2 1 4 
2 10.5 0 6.5 2 -2 -4 4 4 
1 7.5 0 6.5 -1 -2 2 1 4 
 	 = 8.5 
 
 = 8.5 
  Σ = -12 Σ = 324 Σ = 192 
Table 7: Data for calculation of Spearman's rho for Product A 
 = 	 ∑ (	
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 = 	 −12√324√192 
 = 	−0.048 
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The value of ρ is -0.048, i.e. the relationship between the variables is very weak. 
H0: There is no correlation between the variables (confirmed falsification cases and LODE + 
LODE type of event cases), i.e. ρ = 0. 
For the sample size n = 16, and the respective degrees of freedom df = 14, the absolute 
value of rho is I ρ I = 0.048. The significance level of I ρ I = 0.048 is greater than the 5% 
significance level, i.e. the likelihood that the null hypothesis is falsely rejected is too high. 
Therefore, it is not rejected. 
There is no correlation between the variables regarding Product A. 
3.3.2 Product B 
Confirmed counterfeit presence in Colombia 
 
Figure 18: Confirmed falsifications of Product B by reporting countries 
The data evaluation shows that the country with the highest number of confirmed 
falsifications of Product B is Colombia. 
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Figure 19: Confirmed falsifications vs. LODE + LODE type of events of Product B received from Colombia 
 
Figure 20: CPM rates based on LODE + LODE type of events regarding Product B in Colombia 
The comparison of the curve shapes of the confirmed falsifications and the LODE + LODE 
type of event cases regarding Product B reveals a distinct match of the peaks in 2011. 
Hence, a correlation between the data is assumed. The sales quantities in 2011 remained 
stable as the CPM rates increase according to the increase of the received LODE + LODE 
type of event cases. No influence with respect to the sales quantities was identified. 
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 = 	 271.25√327.5√294.5 
 = 	0.873 
The value of ρ is 0.873, i.e. the relationship between the variables is very strong. 
H0: There is no correlation between the variables (confirmed falsification cases and LODE + 
LODE type of event cases), i.e. ρ = 0. 
For the sample size n = 16 and the respective degrees of freedom df = 14, the absolute 
value of rho is I ρ I = 0.873. The significance level of I ρ I = 0.873 is smaller than the 0.1% 
significance level, i.e. the likelihood that the null hypothesis is correctly rejected is 99.9%. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
There is a correlation between the variables regarding Product B. 
3.3.3 Product C 
Confirmed counterfeit presence in China 
 
Figure 21: Confirmed falsifications of Product C by reporting countries 
The data evaluation shows that the country with the highest number of confirmed 
falsifications of Product C is China. 
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Figure 22: Confirmed falsifications vs. LODE + LODE type of events of Product C received from China 
 
Figure 23: CPM rates based on LODE + LODE type of events regarding Product C in China 
The CPM rates curve is shaped similar to the LODE + LODE type of event cases curve, i.e. 
the sales quantities remained stable, except in 2012. In comparison to the previous years the 
peak in the CPM rates in 2012 is slightly lower, i.e. the sales quantities slightly increased in 
2012 and could have had an influence on the increased number of reported LODE + LODE 
type of event cases in 2012. 
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 = 	−0.139 
The value of ρ is -0.139, i.e. the relationship between the variables is very weak. 
H0: There is no correlation between the variables (confirmed falsification cases and LODE + 
LODE type of event cases), i.e. ρ = 0. 
For the sample size n = 16 and the respective degrees of freedom df = 14, the absolute 
value of rho is I ρ I = 0.139. The significance level of I ρ I = 0.139 is greater than the 5% 
significance level, i.e. the likelihood that the null hypothesis is falsely rejected is too high. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
There is no correlation between the variables regarding Product C. 
3.3.4 Product D 
Confirmed counterfeit presence in Japan, Germany and Israel 
 
Figure 24: Confirmed falsifications of Product D by reporting countries 
Regarding Product D confirmed falsifications were reported by 47 countries. In figure 24 the 
case counts regarding the top 15 reporting countries are displayed. With respect to the 
remaining 32 countries, the case counts of the confirmed falsifications are below 4 cases 
considering the sum of cases reported within the 4 years in scope. The data evaluation 
shows that there is more than one country with a significantly increased number of confirmed 
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falsifications of Product D. A high counterfeit presence is confirmed for Japan, Germany and 
Israel. 
Japan
 
Figure 25: Confirmed falsifications vs. LODE + LODE type of events of Product D received from Japan 
 
Figure 26: CPM rates based on LODE + LODE type of events regarding Product D in Japan 
The CPM rates curve is shaped similar to the LODE + LODE type of event cases curve, i.e. 
the sales quantities remained stable, except in Q4 2012. Then, the CPM rates increased, i.e. 
the sales quantities decreased in Q4 2012. However, the number of reported LODE + LODE 
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type of event cases remained at the same level as in the quarters of the previous years. No 
influence with respect to the sales quantities was identified. 
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 = 	 −28√334√220 
 = 	−0.103 
The value of ρ is -0.103, i.e. the relationship between the variables is very weak. 
H0: There is no correlation between the variables (confirmed falsification cases and LODE + 
LODE type of event cases), i.e. ρ = 0. 
For the sample size n = 16 and the respective degrees of freedom df = 14, the absolute 
value of rho is I ρ I = 0.103. The significance level of I ρ I = 0.103 is greater than the 5% 
significance level, i.e. the likelihood that the null hypothesis is falsely rejected is too high. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
There is no correlation between the variables regarding Product D (cases received from 
Japan). 
Germany
 
Figure 27: Confirmed falsifications vs. LODE + LODE type of events of Product D received from Germany 
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Figure 28: CPM rates based on LODE + LODE type of events regarding Product D in Germany 
In 2009, the sales quantities were lower than in the following 3 years. For that reason, the 
CPM rates are increased in 2009 in comparison to the time period of 2010 – 2012. However, 
the increased sales quantities had no enhancing effect on the number of received LODE + 
LODE type of event cases. 
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 = 	0.576 
The value of ρ is 0.576, i.e. the relationship between the variables is moderate. 
H0: There is no correlation between the variables (confirmed falsification cases and LODE + 
LODE type of event cases), i.e. ρ = 0. 
For the sample size n = 16 and the respective degrees of freedom df = 14, the absolute 
value of rho is I ρ I = 0.576. The significance level of I ρ I = 0.576 is slightly smaller than the 
5% significance level, i.e. the likelihood that the null hypothesis is correctly rejected is 95%. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
There is a correlation between the variables regarding Product D (cases received from 
Germany). 
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This is a special case since the number of confirmed falsifications is biased by a high number 
of test purchases which were carried out in the first two quarters of 2009 with respect to 
Product D. Test purchases are initiated by the company, itself. Moreover, such cases are not 
related to reports of any adverse events. Therefore, the rho was calculated again taking only 
the data into consideration that was received in the time period of Q3 2009 – Q4 2012. 
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 = 	 165√221.5√224 
 = 	0.741 
The value of ρ is 0.741, i.e. the relationship between the variables is strong. 
For the sample size n = 14 and the respective degrees of freedom df = 12, the absolute 
value of rho is I ρ I = 0.741. The significance level of I ρ I = 0.741 is distinctly smaller than the 
5% significance level, i.e. the likelihood that the null hypothesis is correctly rejected is 95%. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
There is a correlation between the variables regarding Product D (cases received from 
Germany). 
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Figure 29: Confirmed falsifications vs. LODE + LODE type of events of Product D received from Israel 
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Figure 30: CPM rates based on LODE + LODE type of events regarding Product D in Israel 
In 2011 and 2012, the CPM rates are lower in comparison to the years 2009 and 2010, i.e. 
the sales quantities were increased in 2011 and 2012. However, the increased sales 
quantities had no enhancing effect on the number of received LODE + LODE type of event 
cases. 
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 = 	0.114 
The value of ρ is 0.114, i.e. the relationship between the variables is very weak. 
For the sample size n = 16 and the respective degrees of freedom df = 14, the absolute 
value of rho is I ρ I = 0.114. The significance level of I ρ I = 0.114 is greater than the 5% 
significance level, i.e. the likelihood that the null hypothesis is falsely rejected is too high. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
There is no correlation between the variables regarding Product D (cases received from 
Israel). 
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3.3.5 Product E 
Confirmed counterfeit presence in Colombia 
 
Figure 31: Confirmed falsifications of Product E by reporting countries 
The data evaluation shows that the country with the highest number of confirmed 
falsifications of Product E is Colombia. 
 
Figure 32: Confirmed falsifications vs. LODE + LODE type of events of Product E received from Colombia 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
C
a
se
 c
o
u
n
ts
Confirmed falsifications of Product E by reporting countries
2009
2010
2011
2012
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Q1
´09
Q2
´09
Q3
´09
Q4
´09
Q1
´10
Q2
´10
Q3
´10
Q4
´10
Q1
´11
Q2
´11
Q3
´11
Q4
´11
Q1
´12
Q2
´12
Q3
´12
Q4
´12
C
a
se
 c
o
u
n
ts
Quarters
Confirmed falsifications vs. LODE + LODE type of events of Product E 
received from Colombia
Confirmed
falsifications
LODE + LODE
type of
events
CHAPTER THREE – DATA MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
 
90 
 
 
Figure 33: CPM rates based on LODE + LODE type of events regarding Product E in Colombia 
The CPM rates curve is shaped similar to the LODE + LODE type of event cases curve, i.e. 
the sales quantities remained stable, except in Q1 2010 and Q2 2011. Then, the CPM rates 
slightly increased, i.e. the sales quantities decreased in these two quarters. However, the 
number of reported LODE + LODE type of event cases remained at almost the same level. 
No influence with respect to the sales quantities was identified. 
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 = 	0.909 
The value of ρ is 0.909, i.e. the relationship between the variables is very strong. 
For the sample size n = 16 and the respective degrees of freedom df = 14, the absolute 
value of rho is I ρ I = 0.909. The significance level of I ρ I = 0.909 is smaller than the 0.1% 
significance level, i.e. the likelihood that the null hypothesis is correctly rejected is 99.9%. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
There is a correlation between the variables regarding Product E. 
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3.3.6 Product F 
Confirmed counterfeit presence in Colombia 
 
Figure 34: Confirmed falsifications of Product F by reporting countries 
The data evaluation shows that the country with the highest number of confirmed 
falsifications of Product F is Colombia. 
 
Figure 35: Confirmed falsifications vs. LODE + LODE type of events of Product F received from Colombia 
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Figure 36: CPM rates based on LODE + LODE type of events regarding Product F in Colombia 
In 2011 and 2012, the CPM rates are increased in comparison to 2009 and 2010, i.e. the 
sales quantities were decreased in 2011 and 2012. However, the decreased sales quantities 
had no weakening effect on the number of received LODE + LODE type of event cases. 
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The value of ρ is 0.027, i.e. the relationship between the variables is very weak. 
For the sample size n = 16 and the respective degrees of freedom df = 14, the absolute 
value of rho is I ρ I = 0.027. The significance level of I ρ I = 0.027 is greater than the 5% 
significance level, i.e. the likelihood that the null hypothesis is falsely rejected is too high. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
There is no correlation between the variables regarding Product F. 
3.4 Results 
Based on the evaluation of the confirmed falsifications regarding the 6 products in scope 8 
product-country combinations of a high counterfeit presence were identified. For each of the 
8 product-country combinations it was examined if a correlation between the confirmed 
falsification cases and the LODE + LODE type of event cases can be identified. A correlation 
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between the respective data could be confirmed for 3 out of the 8 product-country 
combinations. 
Product Country rho H0 rejected Correlation 
confirmed 
A Colombia -0.048 no no 
B Colombia 0.873 yes yes 
C China -0.139 no no 
D Japan -0.103 no no 
D Germany 0.741 yes yes 
D Israel 0.114 no no 
E Colombia 0.909 yes yes 
F Colombia 0.027 no no 
Table 8: Results of the statistical evaluation (overview) 
It can be concluded that an increase in LODE + LODE type of event cases is not mandatorily 
indicative for the presence of counterfeits of the respective drug in the monitored market. 
However, the examples where a correlation between the data could be confirmed revealed 
that the adverse event data can serve as a source for hints at a potential counterfeit 
presence. For that reason, the monitoring of AE data regarding a potential counterfeit 
presence in a specific market can be a helpful measure to complete the assessment of a 
medicinal product’s benefit-risk profile taking all possible influences into consideration. In this 
context, it is also necessary to examine the data, on which the evaluation of a medicinal 
product’s benefit-risk profile is based, regarding all potential influencing factors, as far as 
possible. Furthermore, the analysis results show that a monitoring concept regarding a 
potential counterfeit presence based on adverse event data has to be set up in a very 
detailed and product-specific way to exclude as many errors as possible. 
3.5 Influencing factors 
3.5.1 Reporting behavior 
The conducted data analysis, as well as all monitoring and data evaluation activities, carried 
out by a pharmaceutical company are based on the reports the company collects and 
documents. However, the case reporting regarding both, adverse events and suspected 
counterfeit incidents is influenced by several factors. A pharmaceutical company can only 
collect, process, monitor, and evaluate what is brought to its attention. The collection of case 
reports is rather a passive process, except the follow-up processes to actively collect more 
information with regard to a received case. Only a minor amount of the case collection is - in 
the first place - based on investigative activities conducted by the pharmaceutical company 
to actively collect cases. One example of such an investigative activity with respect to 
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counterfeit incidents is the conduct of test purchases. Another example with regard to 
adverse events is the implementation of patient assistant programs (PAP), also denoted as 
patient support programs (PSP), where patients are guided and actively asked if they have 
any problems with the respective medicinal product. For that reason, the data collection 
depends mainly on the reporting behavior of all reporters, including patients, healthcare 
professionals and authorities, all over the world. Measures like patient support programs and 
trainings provided to healthcare professionals can have a positive influence on the reporting 
behavior with respect to AE cases in a country or region. A close collaboration with health 
authorities, enforcement bodies and customs and the conduct of public education campaigns 
regarding counterfeit medicines can also cause an increase in the reporting of suspected 
counterfeit incidents. Such an increase is described as “stimulated reporting”. Cultural 
differences, the knowledge about the possibility to report cases and about the respective 
contacts, awareness of potential risks regarding medicinal products and the circumstances 
with respect to the established medical and medial infrastructure can influence the reporting 
behavior. 
High-income countries 
Patients or consumers report mainly lifestyle or high price (private fee) medicines directly to 
the MAH in order to claim reimbursement. Adverse events regarding other prescription or 
non-prescription medicines are usually discussed with the respective HCP (physician, 
pharmacist, nurse, etc.) who in turn decides whether the AE will be reported or not. A certain 
proportion may not be aware of having the possibility to address their adverse event directly 
to the MAH. Regarding the reporting of suspected counterfeit incidents, the public may have 
the opinion that counterfeiting of medicines is a problem affecting only low-income countries. 
Therefore, they may not question the authenticity of their medicines and check them for any 
suspicious characteristics. 
Low-income countries 
A major amount of the population has limited access to medicines, at all. The poor population 
is lucky when they receive any treatment. Limited access to media, including telephone and 
internet or great distances to HCPs because of a narrow medical infrastructure regarding 
secluded places would constrain the reporting of adverse events or suspected counterfeit 
incidents. Based on the counterfeit incidents known from literature and the narrow regulatory 
system regarding the distribution of pharmaceutical products, a higher number of suspected 
counterfeit incident reports would be expected to be received from this region. However, the 
reporting regarding these countries is mainly rather low. 
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CHAPTER FOUR – AWARENESS-RAISING 
4.1 Influence of awareness-raising measures on the reporting behavior regarding 
suspected counterfeit incidents 
In the context of this dissertation the company-internal data concerning suspected counterfeit 
incidents was assessed to examine the influence of awareness-raising measures on the 
reporting behavior with regard to such cases. The graphical evaluation of the received 
suspected counterfeit incidents in the years 2009 to 2012 with regard to the reporters of the 
received cases shows that there is a high amount of cases reported by authorities (health 
authorities, enforcement bodies and customs) and company-internal staff. The number of 
reports received from patients and healthcare professionals is rather low taking their high 
ratio of contact with medicines into consideration (see figure 37). Moreover, 90% of the 
reports received from patients, all over the world, are related to only 7 countries: Colombia, 
the US, Germany, China, Brazil, Russia and the UK. Of all the received suspected 
counterfeit incident reports from patients, those from Colombia alone account for 47% (see 
figure 38). 
 
Figure 37: Suspected counterfeit incidents in 2009-2012 by reporter type 
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Figure 38: Suspected counterfeit incidents reported by patients in 2009 to 2012 
Having a closer look on the situation in Colombia, the local affiliate goes to great efforts to 
raise awareness of the counterfeit problem among the public. Furthermore, the local affiliate 
collaborates closely with the local authorities and routinely provides its internal staff with 
counterfeit-specific training. When a counterfeit incident report concerning a falsification is 
received and could be confirmed after investigation the local competent authority is informed 
immediately. In accordance with the competent authority an “awareness note” is published in 
the main newspapers of the country containing relevant information including the name and 
the batch number of the affected product. Additionally, the “awareness note” contains the 
web address of the local anti-counterfeiting website where more information (e.g. about the 
overt security features applied to the product) is available. The effect of the public 
“awareness notes” is exhibited by the increased reporting of suspected counterfeit incidents 
by patients after the release of the “awareness notes” in the newspapers (see figure 39). 
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Figure 39: Effect of awareness notes on patient reports of counterfeit incidents in Colombia 
Taking the given example into consideration, it becomes clear that anti-counterfeiting 
measures conducted with the purpose to raise awareness are very effective to inform and 
educate the public about the counterfeit problem in general and about current issues. 
Thereby, patients are able to protect themselves, as they know what to be aware of. 
Additionally, by reporting suspected counterfeit incidents, patients can help the 
pharmaceutical company to collect more valuable information that can be used for the 
decision about further required actions. Therefore, a pharmaceutical company should take 
action to raise awareness of the risks related to counterfeit medicines among the public, e.g. 
by conducting public education campaigns. The successful conduct of such a campaign 
depends very much on a good preparation, planning and consideration of potential 
influencing or limiting aspects. Based on the detailed consideration of these aspects two 
options to prepare an education campaign, including their comparison against each other, 
have been elaborated in the context of the thesis and are outlined in the following 
paragraphs. 
4.2 Education campaign as an example for ACF measures with regard to awareness-
raising 
Conducting a public education campaign is one major option for a pharmaceutical company 
to raise awareness of counterfeit medicines and the risks that are related to the problem. But, 
as mentioned above, it requires a good preparation and a lot of preliminary considerations 
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with respect to contents, structure, used media and potential limitations to develop and 
conduct a successful campaign. 
The contents of the campaign depend on the current state of knowledge the public already 
has and which should be extended by means of the campaign. Furthermore, it is necessary 
to consider if the information to be communicated should be general or product-specific 
information regarding the counterfeit issue. The choice of the target group or groups of the 
campaign also influences the selection of its contents. Additionally, the pharmaceutical 
company has to decide whether to conduct the campaign under its own name or rather 
neutrally in collaboration with authorities, associations or other pharmaceutical companies 
under the name of the respective entity or the group of companies. This again affects the 
selection of the campaign’s contents. 
There are various kinds of media which can be used for the conduct of a public education 
campaign, including print media e.g. newspapers, brochures and posters, broadcast media 
e.g. TV and radio, and web-based media e.g. websites and social media. However, it has to 
be examined if the use of such media with regard to a health-related topic is in accordance 
with valid regulatory requirements. Hence, an education campaign regarding counterfeit 
medicines has to be adapted according to country-specific limitations, e.g. national legislation 
concerning the publication of health-related information. Moreover, the selection of 
appropriate media and its successful use also depends on the public’s view what kind of 
media is reliable. This opinion probably differs from country to country and requires further 
country-specific adaptation of the campaign’s concept. 
Economic aspects also have to be taken into consideration to assess the practicability of this 
kind of anti-counterfeiting measure. 
4.2.1 Option #1: Determination of suitable campaign contents by means of a patient 
survey 
One means to prepare an education campaign is to conduct a survey to gain information 
about several facts, as mentioned above, that are relevant with respect to the concept and 
the contents of the campaign. The characteristics of such a survey and the different options 
of realization have been elaborated and are outlined in the following. 
Contents 
The information gained by means of the survey should provide an idea about the present 
extend of awareness of the counterfeit problem among the respondents of the survey. For 
that reason, questions about the awareness of the existence of counterfeit drugs, about the 
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risks they pose to safety and health and about previous contact with counterfeit medicines 
should be included in the survey. 
The survey should also contain questions with regard to the current extend of knowledge 
about the counterfeit issue, including questions with regard to the purpose of anti-
counterfeiting security features, known anti-counterfeiting security features, known affected 
product groups and questions about suspicious providers of counterfeit medicines (e.g. illicit 
online pharmacies and street vendors). 
Moreover, it is valuable to know to what extend patients purchase medicines via the internet, 
what kind of medicines they purchase, how often and for what reasons they use this 
distribution way. The question about the respective product groups should be a multiple 
choice question containing, among others, all product groups relevant with respect to the 
pharmaceutical company’s portfolio. 
Another aspect that should be addressed in the survey is the reporting attitude. Therefore, 
the respondents should be asked if they ever reported a complaint - a suspected counterfeit 
incident or an adverse event - to the respective marketing authorization holder, a healthcare 
professional or an authority. Additionally, they should be asked for the motivation for 
reporting the complaint, in case they have ever reported one, and if not, they should be 
asked for reasons why they never reported a complaint. Again, possible answers can be 
provided in the form of a multiple choice question, e.g.:  
• I never experienced an adverse event or had a suspected counterfeit product 
• I never thought about or doubted the authenticity of the medicines I used and therefore 
never checked it 
• I did not know that I could report a complaint 
• I did not know whom to contact 
• There are no appropriate tools in use to report a complaint 
In this context, the survey should include questions about whom patients would first 
approach in case of an adverse event or a suspected counterfeit product and where they 
would get the contact information from. In addition, the respondents should be asked if - in 
their view - the existent reporting tools (e.g. hotline and e-mail contact) are sufficient or if 
better reporting tools are needed and what kind of tools the respondents would prefer (e.g. 
reporting app via mobile phone). 
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The last topic that should be included in the survey is the use of media with regard to 
counterfeit-specific and, in general, health-related information. It should be asked if the 
respondents have ever used the websites provided by the authorities and by pharmaceutical 
companies to inform themselves about the counterfeit issue. If the answer is no, a question 
about the reasons why they did not access the available information should be posed, 
providing multiple choice answers, e.g.: 
• I have no interest in the topic 
• I was not aware of the problem 
• I did not know that such information is available 
Additionally, the respondents should be asked about what kind of media they judge as 
reliable with regard to health-related matters and how often they use these media. 
Setup 
With regard to a proper setup of the patient survey the company-internal “Global Market 
Research” function has been asked for experiences and advice. 
Usually, a consultant agency is assigned by the pharmaceutical company to conduct the 
survey. The respondents of the survey should be representative for the population of the 
region or country in scope with regard to socio-demographic criteria, including number of 
respondents, gender, age group, region (in the country), salary, household size and 
education. Appropriate correction factors for the respective population should be included for 
the result evaluation. In terms of a proper practicability it was suggested to conduct a web-
based survey. This implies that only the online population of the respective country or region 
is represented. The acquisition of respondents is done off-line via phone calls or face-to-face. 
Usually, consultant agencies have participant databases and do acquisition to extend them. 
Conduct options and duration 
The preliminary phase covers the consultation with the consultant agency, the desk 
research, the preliminary considerations regarding the contents of the survey and the 
resulting development of an appropriate questionnaire. There are two main options to 
conduct such a survey. One option is to interview a focus group first to check if the 
developed questionnaire is well understood by the respondents and therefore is suitable to 
gain the required information. Otherwise, the questionnaire can be reviewed and adapted 
before it is used for the main survey. The other option is to carry out the main survey without 
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the previous suitability check of the questionnaire. Another aspect to be considered is the 
decision if the main survey should be conducted in only one or in multiple countries. In case 
of a multiple countries-survey, there is also the option to interview a focus group in each of 
the countries in scope to check the comprehensibility of the questions before the main study 
is carried out. 
The previous survey of the focus group would comprise 10 respondents, each country, and 
would be of 120 min duration to provide enough time for queries. This survey type would be 
conducted face-to-face. The main survey would comprise 1000 respondents, each country, 
and would be of 30 min duration. The questionnaire would be web-based. In figure 40 the 
sequence of the different steps is shown if both, the main survey and the previous survey are 
conducted, including the required time of the different steps (according to the estimations 
and experiences of the Global Market Research function). 
 
Figure 40: Survey types of the patient survey and duration of the conduct 
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The advantages and disadvantages of the different survey types are summed up in table 9. 
Survey 
type 
Advantages Disadvantages 
A* • Suitability check of the questionnaire is carried 
out 
• The probability to receive a comprehensive 
result of the main survey is enhanced 
• Suitability check only with regard to a single 
country 
B* • Suitability check of the questionnaire is carried 
out in multiple countries 
• Check if the questionnaire has to be adapted 
with regard to the different countries to 
achieve maximum result quality  
• Additional costs in comparison to survey A 
C** • Minor expenses in comparison to conduct the 
main survey in several countries 
• No information about the country specific 
differences 
D** • Results from multiple countries, better 
overview, 
• Possibility to compare between regions and 
countries  
• Additional costs in comparison to survey C 
 * 10 respondents each country 
** 1000 respondents each country 
Table 9: Advantages and disadvantages of the different survey types 
Based on the information gained in the patient survey the education campaign can be 
planned and structured aligned to the situation in the country or countries in scope. 
4.2.2 Option #2: Determination of suitable campaign contents by the means of 
preliminary considerations and the conduct of a pilot project 
Another option with respect to gaining experience about an appropriate setup and conduct of 
a successful education campaign would be the trial and error principal by implementing a 
product-specific pilot project within one country in scope to serve as an orientation for further 
education campaigns regarding other products and countries. The selection of the medicinal 
product for the anti-counterfeiting education campaign pilot project depends on several 
aspects. First of all, the potential safety hazard to the patient if the product was counterfeited 
is relevant for the decision. Secondly, there should be an indication of the counterfeit 
presence or planned counterfeit activities regarding the respective product, e.g. case reports 
concerning the diversion or the falsification of the product. Thirdly, economic aspects have to 
be considered since the price of the product has an impact on the profitable appeal for 
counterfeiters and on the economic loss of the MAH if counterfeits of the respective 
medicinal product are on the market. The selection of the country, where the campaign 
should take place, mainly depends on the fact if reports regarding the counterfeit presence or 
planned counterfeit activities have already been received from this country. Another aspect 
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that should be considered is the number of patients potentially affected by counterfeits of the 
selected product. 
4.2.3 Comparison of advantages and disadvantages of option #1 and #2 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
Option #1: 
Patient survey 
• Gaining profound information about: 
− The current state of knowledge and 
awareness of the counterfeit topic among 
the public 
− Patient reporting behavior and their use 
habits of media regarding health-related 
issues 
− Purchasing behavior with respect to 
medicinal product groups via the internet 
• Option to gain information comparable 
across countries 
• Additional (high) expenses prior to the 
conduct of the education campaign 
• Major time effort  delayed 
implementation of the education campaign, 
itself 
• No gain of product-specific information 
(only product groups) 
Option #2: 
Pilot project 
• Immediate gaining of information and 
experiences regarding: 
− Planning and scheduling required steps 
− Net-working and collaborating with 
several functions of different areas 
− Country-specific requirements (e.g. 
national legislation, cultural aspects) 
• Possibility to use product-specific 
programs as a means for the education 
campaign (e.g. patients assistant 
programs, if permitted) 
• Implementation of the campaign in a timely 
manner 
• Saving additional expenses 
• Contents and setup of the campaign are 
based on assumptions, not on gained facts 
 minor risk a of less successful campaign 
• Gained experiences are not all suitable for 
other country and product combinations  
need to adapt further campaigns 
Table 10: Advantages and disadvantages of option #1 and #2 
Based on the comparison of the advantages and disadvantages the conduct of a product- 
and country-specific pilot project was selected as the preferred option at choice. 
4.2.4 Approval process 
In the context of this dissertation a presentation for the required approval process in the 
pharmaceutical company was created. Such a presentation has to comprise information 
about the background of the problem, an analysis of the current state of knowledge based on 
literature and company-internal data, the framework of the necessity of the project which is 
asked approval for and a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of the different 
options at choice as given in the previous paragraphs, including a proposal of the preferred 
option and its scope. This business case was presented to the different function heads 
whose areas would be affected by the project: Head of Counterfeit Protection Management, 
Head of Global Pharmacovigilance, Head of Global Medical Affairs & Pharmacovigilance, 
Head of Quality Assurance and Head of Product Supply Pharma (including necessary 
management levels). 
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All function heads gave approval to conduct the preferred option of the project, the product- 
and country-specific education campaign, including the proposal of the selected product and 
country in scope. 
4.3 Pilot project: Product- and country-specific education campaign 
4.3.1 Preparation of the pilot project 
The selected medicinal product in scope of the education campaign is the oral multikinase 
inhibitor Nexavar® which is indicated for the treatment of patients with advanced renal cell 
carcinoma (RCC) and patients with hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC). [112]209 Moreover, the 
US FDA approved Nexavar® for the treatment of patients with differentiated thyroid 
carcinoma (DTC) in the US, in 2013. [113]210 In 2014, Nexavar® was approved for this 
indication also by the EC in the EU [114]211 and by the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour 
and Welfare (MHLW) in Japan [115]212. According to studies that compared the efficacy of 
Nexavar® to placebo in patients with HCC and RCC, the results show that statistically 
Nexavar® significantly prolonged the progression-free survival. [116]213 [117]214 Thus, 
counterfeits of this medicinal product could shorten patients’ already shortened lifespan. 
The country in scope of the campaign is China. Nexavar® was approved in China for RCC in 
2007 and for HCC in 2008. [118]215 In 2012, more than 7500 RCC and HCC patients were 
treated with Nexavar® in China. In 2010 and 2011, 2 confirmed counterfeit incidents were 
received from China with respect to Nexavar®. Both incidents were related to the imitation of 
product-specific packaging materials in a larger scale. Imitations of the complete medicinal 
product, including the dosage form, have not yet been identified. However, the confirmed 
                                                          
209 Bayer AG, "Nexavar.com," October 2011. [Online]. Available: http://www.nexavar-
international.com/home/index.php. [Accessed 19 February 2014]. 
210 Bayer AG, "Nexavar zur Behandlung von differenziertem Schilddrüsenkrebs in den USA zugelassen," 
February 2014. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.nexavar.de/de/fachkreise/rcc/aktuelles/news/news.php/15303. [Accessed 19 February 2014]. 
211 Bayer AG, "Bayer erhält EU-Zulassung für Nexavar zur Behandlung des differenzierten 
Schilddrüsenkarzinoms," 30 May 2014. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.nexavar.de/de/fachkreise/rcc/aktuelles/news/news.php/15517. [Accessed 13 June 2014]. 
212 Bayer AG, "Bayer erhält in Japan die Zulassung für Nexavar® (Sorafenib) zur Behandlung von differenzierten 
Schilddrüsenkarzinomen," 20 June 2014. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.nexavar.de/de/fachkreise/rcc/aktuelles/news/news.php/15543. [Accessed 4 July 2014]. 
213 Bayer AG, "Nexavar — Demonstrated a Statistically Significant Advantage in Overall Survival (OS) vs Placebo 
in HCC," [Online]. Available: http://www.nexavar-international.com/home/hcp_nexavar_hcc/index.php. 
[Accessed 19 February 2014]. 
214 Bayer AG, "Nexavar — A Multikinase Inhibitor Approved for the Treatment of Patients With Advanced RCC," 
[Online]. Available: http://www.nexavar-international.com/home/nexavar_for_advanced_rcc/index.php. 
[Accessed 19 February 2014]. 
215 Bayer AG, "Nexavar Approved for Liver Cancer in China," 28 July 2008. [Online]. Available: 
http://pharma.bayer.com/scripts/pages/en/news_room/news_room/news_room64.php. [Accessed 19 
February 2014]. 
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counterfeit incidents regarding the packaging materials indicated the presence of counterfeit 
activities with respect to Nexavar® on the Chinese market. For that reason, this product-
country combination was selected for the pilot project. 
Such a project requires the collaboration of several functions, including Quality, 
Pharmacovigilance, Medical Affairs, Legal, Communications and Marketing. The respective 
global and local responsible colleagues have to be asked for their support. Most of the 
involved functions were already introduced to the project during the approval process. 
Therefore, a telephone conference was scheduled with the responsible colleagues of Global 
Marketing Oncology to introduce them to the planned project, too, and to ask for their support 
and the respective local responsible contacts. Subsequently, a telephone conference was 
held with the local responsible colleagues in China. The project contents were presented with 
respect to the selected product and the information to be published. The local colleagues 
agreed to the proposed suggestion and offered their support with regard to the further 
preparation of the required informative literature and the realization of the project. In the 
subsequent follow-up meetings, via telephone conference, the following aspects have been 
discussed: 
• The target groups of the campaign 
• Suitable media 
• The distribution way(s) to be used for print media 
• The contents regarding the different types of media 
4.3.2 Implementation of the pilot project 
Based on the groundwork done in the context of the dissertation the project was carried out 
in collaboration with the local colleagues in China. It was decided to distribute the informative 
literature to local drug distribution points (hospitals, pharmacies and charity federations) to 
reach out to patients and healthcare professionals. In this context, it was decided to include 
general information regarding the counterfeit problem, specific information regarding overt 
anti-counterfeiting security features applied to the packaging material of the Chinese 
Nexavar® presentation and contact information regarding the company hotline and the SFDA 
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respectively CFDA hotline. In March 2013, the SFDA (State Food and Drug Administration) 
became the CFDA (China Food and Drug Administration). [119]216 
As a result, a hand-out (2-pages, front and back) and a poster (one-page), containing the 
mentioned information including pictorial material, were created in English (see annex 1-3). 
Afterwards the local colleagues translated the hand-out and the poster into Chinese and 
initiated the reproduction of the informative literature for its distribution to 39 drug distribution 
points all over China. It was scheduled that each distribution point would be provided with 
minimum 100 copies of the hand-out and minimum one poster. Larger cities e.g. Beijing and 
Shanghai would receive a higher number of materials. 
Furthermore, a “floating icon” was added to the local website of the Nexavar® patient support 
program in China (see figure 41). By clicking on the icon, the user was forwarded to a digital 
version of the described hand-out. The icon was active from January 11, 2013 to June 20, 
2013. 
 
Figure 41: Floating icon applied to local PAP website 
Moreover, it was decided to train the local marketing staff regarding the purpose and 
contents of the education campaign. 180 sales representatives were trained in January 2013. 
After the review of the informative literature by the Quality, Medical Affairs and Legal 
functions at the beginning of 2013, the distribution of the materials started on March 1, 2013. 
4.3.3 Results 
The Nexavar®-specific education campaign in China was very successful. The target groups 
of the campaign showed very high interest in the information which was provided to them. 
Only three month after the beginning of the distribution of the Nexavar® informative literature 
the first printing was already exhausted and it was ordered to print and distribute a second 
printing. Furthermore, the traffic on the Nexavar® patient assistant program website reached 
4306 clicks on the floating icon in the time period of January 11, 2013 to June 20, 2013. The 
                                                          
216 A. Gaffney, "RF Regulatory Focus," 25 March 2013. [Online]. Available: http://www.raps.org/focus-
online/news/news-article-view/article/3073/chinas-sfda-becomes-cfda-amidst-consolidation-of-power-and-
new-leadership.aspx. [Accessed 26 August 2013]. 
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number of clicks exceeds the number of Nexavar® PAP patients in China in 2013. Thus, it 
can be assumed that the majority of the respective patients accessed the provided 
information. 
Moreover, the project which was initiated in the framework of the thesis lead to a raised 
awareness of the anti-counterfeiting topic among the different involved functions due to the 
broad collaboration between Global Pharmacovigilance, the global Quality Assurance 
responsible for anti-counterfeiting and multiple responsible persons of the local functions, 
including Medical Affairs, PV, Quality Assurance, Legal and Marketing. Additionally, the 
public education campaign was reason to provide the local personnel with counterfeit-
specific training to enhance their knowledge about the topic. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – REVIEW OF INTERNAL ANTI-COUNTERFEITING 
PROCEDURES 
5.1 Company-wide affiliate survey 
As mentioned in paragraph 2.7, a global pharmaceutical company has to ensure that all 
procedures required with respect to its established anti-counterfeiting concept are consistent 
in all its affiliates, all over the world. This includes knowledge about the counterfeit topic, 
responsible functions and contact persons, required obligations and established processes 
and activities. Consistent procedures are the basis for the effective implementation of the 
company’s anti-counterfeiting concept. However, country-specific circumstances have to be 
attended and, as a consequence, local adaptations of the required procedures have to be 
established. 
Therefore, a survey was planned and a respective questionnaire was developed, in the 
context of the dissertation, to gain information about the current state of the mentioned 
aspects in the company’s affiliates. To this extent further questions, e.g. regarding locally 
implemented anti-counterfeiting activities need to be answered. If a pharmaceutical company 
plans to carry out anti-counterfeiting measures regarding awareness-raising, e.g. an 
education campaign in a specific country, it is valuable to know if a public campaign has ever 
been done to address this issue. The information, if the public has ever been confronted with 
the topic before or not, has an impact on the decision on the contents of the planned 
campaign. In this context, it should be clarified if the local affiliate was ever involved in such 
anti-counterfeiting activities or if it collaborates otherwise with local authorities or 
associations with regard to the problem of counterfeit medicines. 
Furthermore, the survey should provide the surveyed employees the opportunity to address 
support needs with respect to the topic. Thus, the central functions are better informed about 
the needs of the local employees and can better respond to these needs with appropriate 
supportive measures. 
5.1.1 Preparation, contents and conduct of the affiliate survey 
To conduct a global company-internal survey it is required to obtain approval by the heads of 
all involved functions. As the counterfeit medicines topic affects multiple functions, the 
following functions are in scope of the survey and needed to be asked for approval: 
• Medical Affairs 
• Pharmacovigilance 
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• Quality Assurance 
• Legal 
• Marketing  
• Medical information 
With regard to the approval process the business case of the survey, including its purpose, 
background, the setup options and the functions in scope was compiled in the context of this 
thesis. 
With regard to the setup the company’s function of Business Services was approached to 
clarify the setup options and the procedure of the planned project. There are two possible 
options to conduct a web-based survey which are presented in the following table. Their 
advantages and disadvantages were evaluated and are included in the table with respect to 
the business case presentation. 
Survey Type Explanation Advantages Disadvantages 
Personalized • Fixed number of 
respondents (address list) 
• Every link to access the 
questionnaire is codified to 
only one respondent 
• Results are provided 
anonymized 
• Data privacy is guaranteed 
• Data is directly entered into 
a database (ext. server, 
consultant agency) 
• Response rate can be 
defined 
• Automatic reminder e-mails 
to all invitees can be set up 
and sent out during the 
field time 
• Extended chance of a high 
response rate 
• Limited number of 
respondents (target 
recipients) 
Anonymized • Links to the questionnaire 
are not codified 
• Invitation incl. the link can 
be forwarded by the invitee 
to further respondents 
• Number of respondents 
who receive an invitation is 
unknown 
• Data privacy is guaranteed  
• Data is directly entered into 
a database (ext. server, 
consultant agency) 
• Opportunity for the invitees 
to forward the invitation 
incl. the link to further 
respondents possibly 
involved in the topic 
• No limitations regarding the 
number of respondents 
• Evaluation of response rate 
not possible 
• No opportunity to send out 
reminder e-mails since not 
all recipients of the 
invitation are known 
• Higher risk of a low 
response rate 
Table 11: Advantages and disadvantages of the personalized and the anonymized survey type 
Based on the comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of the given options, the 
personalized survey was selected and presented as the preferred option in the approval 
process. 
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The Business Services function was also asked about the estimated duration of the survey 
procedure. The procedure requires the following steps to prepare and carry out the survey. 
First of all, an English and a German version of the questionnaire to be distributed has to be 
provided to the company’s works committee, located in Berlin and Leverkusen, for approval. 
The works committee checks the contents of the questionnaire and gives its approval if the 
questionnaire adheres to the works committee’s guidelines on data privacy regarding 
personal data. Then, the Business Services function programs the questionnaire, after which 
the contents are checked and its performance tested by the initiator of the survey. The 
invitations are prepared based on the respondents list which has to be compiled by the 
initiator and provided to the Business Services function. The field time describes the time 
period in which the questionnaire is online and can be accessed by the respondents, i.e. 
from the day of distribution of the invitations to the close-out of the survey. The responses 
are transferred into a database. In the last step, the Business Services function exports the 
data from the database and compiles the raw data in a Microsoft® Excel file which is then 
provided to the initiator for evaluation. In the following figure the described steps and their 
estimated duration are depicted. 
 
Figure 42: Procedure of the affiliate survey 
The information on the setup options and the procedure, received from the Business 
Services function, as well as all prepared information on the purpose and the background of 
the survey, including the functions in scope and the preferred setup option was compiled and 
a presentation created in the context of this dissertation. According to the approval process 
the presentation was held to the heads of all functions to be involved in the survey to ask for 
their approval and support. The approval has been received from all required functions, 
including the Head of Medical Affairs & Pharmacovigilance, Head of Pharmacovigilance 
Regions, Head of Product Supply Pharma, Head of Quality Assurance, Head of Global Anti-
Counterfeiting, Head of Counterfeit Protection Management and Head of Global Marketing 
Operations. 
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Acting as the initiator of the survey a questionnaire, comprising 20 questions with respect to 
all mentioned aspects of interest, was developed in English in the context of this dissertation. 
Its phrasing was reviewed by a native speaker to check the comprehensibility of the 
questions. The English and the German version of the questionnaire were provided to the 
company’s works committee for approval, which was permitted. The invitation e-mail for the 
web-based survey, the “landing page” of the questionnaire and the reminder e-mail were also 
phrased in English and were reviewed by a native speaker. Based on the functions in scope 
of the survey, a list of all affected employees was compiled, including their roles, names and 
e-mail addresses, to be provided to the responsible colleague of the Business Services 
function. The list served as the basis for the coding of the links to the digital version of the 
questionnaire. All prepared material was provided to the Business Services colleague, who 
programmed the digital questionnaire. Afterwards, the web-based survey was tested and 
checked for correctness. 
In order to achieve maximum participation in the planned survey an announcement of the 
survey was phrased, including its purpose, all functions in scope, all supportive function 
heads and the request to inform all affected employees about the planned survey and to 
encourage them to participate. This announcement was sent out to all function heads of the 
affected functions prior to the invitation. The survey invitation e-mails, including the 
personalized link to the web-based questionnaire, were sent out on October 30, 2012. After 
the end of the field time of the survey the Business Services function compiled the raw data, 
which was then evaluated in detail in the context of this thesis, as outlined in the following 
paragraphs.  
5.1.2 Survey results 
In addition to the employees of the mentioned functions in scope, the head of the local 
organization of each country was invited to the survey as he / she represents the main 
responsible person of the respective affiliate. The survey invitations were sent out to 272 
employees in 84 countries. It has to be mentioned that the number of invitees per country 
differs for the following reason: In some countries more than one of the roles in scope is 
assigned to one employee. Furthermore, the roles are not always allocated to only one 
country. One Pharmacovigilance Country Head (PVCH), for example, can be responsible for 
multiple countries. In this case the respective employee should answer the questionnaire 
with regard to his or her country of main responsibility (mostly the country of residence). Out 
of the 272 invitees 149 participated in the survey which makes a response rate of 55%. 
Regarding the countries, employees of 70 out of the 84 invited countries took part which 
makes a response rate of 83%. In the following chart the response rate of the countries is 
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displayed by regions. The results show that the participation in the survey and hence, the 
interest in the counterfeit topic is high (above 70%) across all regions. 
 
Figure 43: Response rate of countries 
Besides the major interest in the topic, which is represented by the high participation, the 
survey results also reveal a high quality regarding the received answers. The majority of the 
questionnaires were completely filled out, with the participants giving valuable feedback 
instead of selecting “unknown” for numerous questions. Thus, the results show that the 
questions were well understood. 
5.1.2.1 Question 1 
 
Figure 44: Question 1 of the affiliate survey, snap shot of the web-based questionnaire 
The majority (75%) of the 149 respondents estimate the problem of counterfeiting of 
medicines as increasing or constant in their country. Only 26% state that the problem is 
decreasing or even no issue in their country. The results reflect the facts - known from 
literature - that the counterfeit problem is huge and further expanding. 
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Figure 45: Assessment of the counterfeit medicines problem in the countries 
Regarding the results by regions it was expected that - in comparison across the regions – 
more respondents from the western countries would estimate the problem of counterfeit 
medicines as no issue in their country. The results confirmed this expectation. However, 
even in these regions the number of respondents who estimate the problem as increasing 
exceeds the number of respondents who have the opinion that their country is not affected 
by counterfeiting of medicinal products. According to the respondents the most affected 
region is the region of Latin America + the United States, where almost one half of the 
respondents from this region estimates the problem as increasing. 
 
Figure 46: Assessment of the CF problem by regions 
Furthermore, it is to mention that a variance in the responses across and even within 
countries was identified. The region showing the most heterogeneous responses across its 
countries is Europe II + Middle East & Africa. The dispersion of the different opinions does 
not present geographical patterns that would point to areas within the region where the 
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counterfeit problem is rather increasing and others where it is rather decreasing. The region 
with the most heterogeneous responses within its countries is Europe I + Canada. The 
heterogeneous responses within the countries could present a hint at a possible lack of 
communication between the different functions within a country. 
5.1.2.2 Question 2 
 
Figure 47: Question 2 of the affiliate survey, snap shot of the web-based questionnaire 
More than one half (58%) of the respondents are aware of counterfeits with respect to the 
company’s portfolio. In the regions Europe II + Middle East & Africa and Latin America + the 
United States the amount of respondents being aware of such counterfeits prevail. In Europe 
I + Canada and in Asia Pacific + Japan the numbers of respondents being aware and the 
ones being not aware of such counterfeit products are almost even. Again, an inconsistency 
of responses across and within the countries could be identified. The heterogeneous 
responses within the countries could again hint at a possible lack of communication between 
the local functions. 
 
Figure 48: Responses to question 2 
In the following bubble chart all responding countries (except the Netherlands and Cambodia 
from which no answers were received for this question) are displayed with respect to the 
consistency of the answers the respondents from the respective country gave. The used 
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country codes are in accordance with ISO 3166 and UN/LOCODE. [120]217 The 
heterogeneity of the responses across the countries of one region is also shown. Each 
bubble represents one country. The size of the bubbles corresponds with the number of 
respondents from the respective country. The color of the bubbles indicates if the answers of 
the respondents from the respective country are consistent (green) or not (red). Based on the 
position of the bubbles the answer of the respondents can be read out. The received 
answers mainly are homogenous within the countries, except within the countries of the 
region Europe I + Canada. There, in 65% of the responding countries the answers are 
inconsistent (considering the countries with more than one respondent). It is assumed that 
the awareness of counterfeit medicinal products depends on how much the respective 
respondent is involved in the topic. The respondents who are not involved in the topic would 
share the opinion that the western countries are not affected by counterfeiting of medicines. 
An enhanced communication between functions would establish clarity. Heterogeneity in the 
awareness of counterfeits of the company’s products across the responding countries can be 
identified for all regions. Again, no geographical patterns regarding the countries within one 
region were identified. 
 
Figure 49: Heterogeneity of responses within and across countries 
  
                                                          
217 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, "United Nations Code for Trade and Transport Locations 
(UN/LOCODE)," July 2013. [Online]. Available: http://www.unece.org/cefact/locode/service/location.html. 
[Accessed 3 January 2014]. 
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5.1.2.3 Question 3 
 
Figure 50: Question 3 of the affiliate survey, snap shot of the web-based questionnaire 
Question 3 is related to question 2. With regard to the affected products listed by the 
respondents, medicinal products for the indication of erectile dysfunction (ED) were named 
most often followed by pharmaceuticals for hormonal contraception (of any kind of 
application) and steroids (that can be misused for their anabolic affects or to treat side effects 
of anabolic drugs). The respondents also listed “over-the-counter” (OTC, non-prescription) 
medicines and pharmaceutical products of the animal health division, despite the question 
referred to “Pharma” products that only include prescription-only medicines (POM) for human 
use. So, these results reveal that counterfeiting of medicines is not only a multi-regional but 
also a multi-divisional issue. The results also show that the counterfeit medicines problem is 
not limited to live style drugs but that medicines indicated for live-threatening diseases are 
affected, as well. 
 
Figure 51: Affected products per indication group 
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5.1.2.4 Question 4 
 
Figure 52: Question 4 of the affiliate survey, snap shot of the web-based questionnaire 
More than three out of four (84%) of the respondents state that anti-counterfeiting is of 
importance in their local organization. This result reflects the major impact of the counterfeit 
medicines issue across the local affiliates. The respondents of the regions Europe II + Middle 
East & Africa and Latin America + the US clearly expressed that anti-counterfeiting is an 
important topic in their local organization. In Europe I + Canada 25% and in Asia Pacific + 
Japan 19% of the respondents do not share this opinion. With respect to the dispersion of 
the received answers, it is to say that the responses are mainly homogenous within the 
countries of all regions, except of region Europe I + CA. There, in 53% of the responding 
countries the answers are inconsistent (considering the countries with more than one 
respondent). This country-internal inconsistency in the respondents’ attitude is very likely 
based on the differences regarding the respondents’ knowledge and awareness of the issue 
in the countries of that region as already outlined in the results of questions 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 53: Anti-counterfeiting is a topic of importance in the local organization  
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5.1.2.5 Question 5 
 
Figure 54: Question 5 of the affiliate survey, snap shot of the web-based questionnaire 
In 76% of the responding countries a public anti-counterfeiting campaign was conducted at 
some point. This high result is not limited to one or two regions. The situation is similar 
across all regions. As it is displayed in figure 55 the values exceed 70% in all regions. 
However, it has to be mentioned that the high results are partly biased by the way the 
respondents understood the term “public campaign”. The details the respondents provided 
with respect to the campaigns reveal that the respondents defined the term “public 
campaign” rather broadly. Thus, the responses comprise several anti-counterfeiting activities 
that would rather meet the term “collaboration with and between authorities and associations” 
e.g. conferences and collaborative meetings between authorities, government, associations 
and pharmaceutical companies, presentations and trainings directed to pharmaceutical 
companies about ACF technologies (features) or about initiatives done by the authorities, 
information and alerting procedures between authorities and the pharmaceutical industry and 
investigative activities done by the police and the customs.  
However, the provided information also includes activities under the term “public campaigns”, 
i.e. activities directed at the population with the purpose to inform and educate them. These 
activities include providing information and warnings about the risks of counterfeit medicines 
via the internet (e.g. at authorities’ websites), via press and broadcast media (e.g. TV and 
radio) and via healthcare professionals (e.g. pharmacies). So, it can be concluded that a lot 
of activities to combat counterfeiting of medicinal products are done in the countries across 
all regions. But the population is only in some extent involved in these activities. 
 
Figure 55: Public ACF campaign conducted in the country 
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5.1.2.6 Question 6 
 
Figure 56: Question 6 of the affiliate survey, snap shot of the web-based questionnaire 
Question 6 is related to the question 5 and refers to the public campaigns. The evaluation of 
the responses to question 6 is based on the number of countries in which a campaign was 
performed by one of the stakeholders at choice. One country can relate to more than one 
stakeholder because of the multiple choice option. Most of the campaigns or activities (for 
details, see evaluation of question 5) were performed by health authorities. In 66% of the 
responding countries this stakeholder was selected. In 36% of the responding countries the 
campaigns were performed by pharmaceutical manufacturer associations, in 33% by other 
enforcement bodies, in 26% by customs and border surveillance, in 13% by HCPs and 
healthcare professional associations, in 4% by patient associations and in 13% by others 
(e.g. competitors and press). 
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Figure 57: Organizer of the public ACF campaign 
5.1.2.7 Question 7 
 
Figure 58: Question 7 of the affiliate survey, snap shot of the web-based questionnaire 
In 47% of all responding countries the local affiliate was involved in the campaigns or 
activities. The percentages displayed in figure 59 are based on the total number of 
responding countries in each region. If the percentages are considered based only on the 
number of countries where a public campaign actually has been done, the results are: EU I + 
CA (73%), EU II + MEA (56%), LA + US (70%) and AP + JP (50%). Hence, the participation 
and commitment of the local affiliates in anti-counterfeiting campaigns and activities is huge. 
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Figure 59: Local organization involved in the ACF campaign 
5.1.2.8 Question 8 
 
Figure 60: Question 8 of the affiliate survey, snap shot of the web-based questionnaire 
The percentages of the responses to question 8, displayed in figure 61, are based on the 
number of countries collaborating with the different stakeholders at choice. One country can 
relate to more than one stakeholder because of the multiple choice option. With respect to 
anti-counterfeiting matters the affiliates of 94% of all responding countries collaborate with 
health authorities, 59% collaborate with pharmaceutical manufacturer associations, 54% with 
other enforcement bodies, 46% with customs & border surveillance, 37% with HCPs and 
healthcare professional associations, 7% with patient associations and 17% with others (e.g. 
press). The results show that there is already a broad network established in the countries to 
face the problem of counterfeit medicinal products. Nevertheless, the collaboration with 
healthcare professionals and patient organizations with respect to the issue of counterfeit 
medicinal products still offers some room for expansion. 
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Figure 61: Stakeholders the local affiliates collaborate with 
5.1.2.9 Question 9 
 
Figure 62: Question 9 of the affiliate survey, snap shot of the web-based questionnaire 
In some countries pharmaceutical companies may not be allowed to publish counterfeit-
relevant information via the internet. However, as more and more people, especially patients 
use the internet to inform themselves about health-related matters, the internet should be 
used by pharmaceutical companies as a tool for reaching out to the population to provide 
helpful information and advice in the countries where it is legally permitted. Yet, only 20% of 
all responding countries state that they have a local anti-counterfeiting website established or 
at least some counterfeit-relevant information and warnings on their general local company 
website. The heterogeneous responses hint again to a lack of communication between the 
local functions since not every respondent was aware of the anti-counterfeiting website or 
counterfeit-relevant information even if it is established in the country. 
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Figure 63: Local ACF website established 
5.1.2.10 Question 10 
 
Figure 64: Question 10 of the affiliate survey, snap shot of the web-based questionnaire 
Question 10 is related to question 9 and refers to the ACF websites. Regarding the contents 
of the established local anti-counterfeiting websites the most relevant information is provided. 
Out of the 14 affiliates that have a local anti-counterfeiting website in place 71% say that the 
website contains general warnings with regard to the counterfeit problem, 64% state that 
information on how to distinguish counterfeits from original products is provided on their 
website and 57% of the affiliates have information on how to report suspected counterfeit 
incidents included on their local website. Less than one half responds that their website 
contains information about current counterfeit incidents or links to the company’s global anti-
counterfeiting website or to websites of other initiatives against counterfeiting of medicines. 
Only 29% state that their local websites include additional information, e.g. about public 
media campaigns or on results of studies or surveys conducted with respect to the 
counterfeit issue. 
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Figure 65: ACF website contents 
5.1.2.11 Question 11 
 
Figure 66: Question 11 of the affiliate survey, snap shot of the web-based questionnaire 
Making topic-specific, supportive means available to reporters eases the reporting of 
suspected counterfeit incidents as the reporter has an orientation at hands about what kind 
of information is required by the recipient (in this case the MAH). Therefore, the respondents 
were asked what means their local affiliate provides to reporters. 31% of the respondents 
state that a report form or a questionnaire is available in their country to be filled out by the 
reporter. Another 23% say that a complaint sample collection service is provided by their 
local affiliate to support the reporters in terms of sending in the complaint sample for 
investigation. And 13% of the respondents reveal that they have informative literature on how 
to report suspected counterfeit incidents to be provided to patients and healthcare 
professionals in place in their country. Only 4% of the respondents state that there is none of 
such means available to reporters in their country. So, the majority of the local affiliates 
provides one or multiple supportive means to the reporters. Further options to report a 
suspected counterfeit incident mentioned under “others” by two respondents are the use of 
the company hotline or e-mail contact. 
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Figure 67: Means provided to the reporter 
5.1.2.12 Question 12 
 
Figure 68: Question 12 of the affiliate survey, snap shot of the web-based questionnaire 
Question 12 is related to question 11. To ensure that the collection of all relevant data is as 
complete as possible during the first contact with a reporter, it is helpful to provide the 
responsible personnel with some topic-specific, supportive means. Hence, the respondents 
were asked to select the means which are in use in their local affiliate. Both, the complaint 
sample collection process and the follow-up process for suspected counterfeit incidents are 
selected by more than 30% of the respondents, each, being in use in their local affiliate. So, 
the responsible employees can refer to the established processes. 26% of the respondents 
state that a check-list on relevant information is provided to the responsible personnel in their 
local affiliate. And 23% of the respondents say that the responsible employees are provided 
with information on previously identified counterfeits in their country. Thereby, the employees 
can orient themselves by this information to ask respective questions regarding the complaint 
sample characteristics during the ad-hoc contact with a reporter. Again, only 4% of the 
respondents say that there is none of such means provided to the responsible personnel in 
their local organization. 
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Figure 69: Means provided to the responsible personnel 
5.1.2.13 Question 13 
 
Figure 70: Question 13 of the affiliate survey, snap shot of the web-based questionnaire 
The results of question 13 show very clearly that the responsible contact persons towards 
different stakeholders with respect to counterfeit-related matters are not limited to only one or 
just a few functions. Several and somehow rather different functions within the company are 
involved in the anti-counterfeiting topic towards multiple stakeholders. The variety of 
functions includes Medical Affairs and Medical Information, Pharmacovigilance, Quality 
Assurance, Legal and Regulatory, and even Marketing and Communications functions. 
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Hence, anti-counterfeiting is definitely a multifunctional topic. Therefore, all employees of the 
involved functions should be provided with topic-specific training to make sure they have the 
required knowledge to handle counterfeit-related matters properly. Furthermore, the 
respective functions should remain in communication with regard to current counterfeit 
incidents or anti-counterfeiting activities and the respective decisions which need to be 
made. 
 
Figure 71: Functions involved in counterfeit-related matters towards external stakeholders 
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5.1.2.14 Question 14 
 
Figure 72: Question 14 of the affiliate survey, snap shot of the web-based questionnaire 
Also with regard to the internal handling of counterfeit-related matters the variety of the 
involved functions is broad. Again, respective topic-specific knowledge is required to ensure 
the consistent processing of the counterfeit-related matters within and across the involved 
functions of the respective local organization. 
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Figure 73: Functions involved in the internal processing of counterfeit-related matters 
5.1.2.15 Question 15 
 
Figure 74: Question 15 of the affiliate survey, snap shot of the web-based questionnaire 
The evaluation of the responses to question 15 is based on the number of respondents who 
are familiar with all 7 of the given terms, with 4 to 6 of the given terms, with less than 4 terms 
and with none of the terms. The percentages of the number of respondents per group are 
calculated considering the total number of respondents (149) as 100%. Less than one half 
(44%) of all respondents are familiar with all of the given terms. Altogether, 81% of the 
respondents are familiar with at least 4 of the counterfeit-relevant terms. 14% of the 
respondents are familiar with less than 4 of the given terms and 5% do not know any of the 
terms. 
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Figure 75: Familiar counterfeit-related terms 
Comparing the regions, Latin America + the United States is the region with the best result of 
knowledge regarding the given counterfeit-related terms. 74% of the respondents of that 
region are familiar with all of the given terms and at the same time there are no respondents 
who know less than 4 or even none of the terms. In all other regions the percentage of 
respondents knowing less than 4 or even none of the given terms altogether is higher than 
20%. 
 
Figure 76: Familiar counterfeit-related terms by regions 
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5.1.2.16 Question 16 
 
Figure 77: Question 16 of the affiliate survey, snap shot of the web-based questionnaire 
When a suspected counterfeit incident or any other counterfeit-related matter is brought to 
the attention of an employee, he / she should know whom to contact or to whom to forward 
the received information or matter. Therefore, it is necessary to know the responsible 
colleagues. Less than one half of the respondents actually knew the responsible contact 
persons (and their role). With regard to a well-established collaboration between functions it 
should be ensured that the information about the responsible employees is communicated to 
all functions potentially involved in the topic. 
 
Figure 78: Responsible persons and roles known 
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5.1.2.17 Question 17 
 
Figure 79: Question 17 of the affiliate survey, snap shot of the web-based questionnaire 
Based on the number of functions which receive counterfeit-specific training in the affiliates, 
the responding countries are clustered in countries where all of the given functions are 
provided with such training, where at least 4 of the given functions receive such training, 
where less than 4 of the given functions receive counterfeit-specific training and countries 
where none of the given functions is provided with respective training. The percentages are 
calculated based on the total number of responding countries (70) as 100%. In only 14% of 
the responding countries all given functions are provided with counterfeit-specific training. In 
40% of the countries at least 4 of the functions receive such training. Less than 4 of the given 
functions are provided with counterfeit-specific training in 29% of the responding countries 
and in 17% of the countries no counterfeit-related training is provided, at all, to the given 
functions. 
 
Figure 80: Number of functions provided with CF-specific training 
The regional comparison reveals a huge need for counterfeit-relevant training, especially in 
the countries of Asia Pacific + Japan. In 38% of the countries from this region none of the 
given functions receive counterfeit-specific training. 
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Figure 81: Number of functions provided with CF-specific training by regions 
The function which is provided with counterfeit-specific training in most of the countries 
(95%) is the local pharmacovigilance function followed by the local complaint management, a 
Quality Assurance function, which receives counterfeit-related training in 69% of the 
responding countries, which provide such training. The two Marketing functions, sales 
representatives and product managers, are ranked third in the listing. The personnel 
insufficiently trained with respect to the counterfeit topic in many of the responding countries 
belong to Medical Affairs, Security and the customer service. The customer service 
employees, in particular, should at least receive a basic counterfeit-related training so that 
they are able to ask relevant questions during the ad-hoc contact with a reporter and know 
whom to contact with regard to counterfeit-related matters in the local organization. 
Functions Number of countries where functions 
receive counterfeit-specific training (total = 
58) 
Percentage of 
respondents 
Local pharmacovigilance 55 95% 
Local complaint management 40 69% 
Sales representatives 37 64% 
Products managers 37 64% 
Medical advisors 31 53% 
Medical scientific liaisons 23 40% 
Security 23 40% 
Customer service / hotline 21 36% 
Table 12: Ranking of functions which receive CF-specific training 
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5.1.2.18 Question 18 
 
Figure 82: Question 18 of the affiliate survey, snap shot of the web-based questionnaire 
The responses to question 18 are clustered based on the number of contents included in the 
counterfeit-specific training in the respective countries. The percentages are calculated 
based on the total number of responding countries where such a training is provided (58) as 
100%. The 12 responding countries where no counterfeit-related training is provided are 
excluded from the calculation. In 31% of the countries where counterfeit-related training is 
provided, the training contains all 6 of the listed suggestions of training contents, i.e. the 
trainings are broad. In 39% of the countries the counterfeit-specific training contains at least 
3 of the suggested training contents. In 30% of the countries less than 3 of the given 
contents are comprised in the provided training. 
 
Figure 83: Number of training contents 
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Figure 84: Number of training contents by regions 
In the majority (88%) of the countries where counterfeit-specific training is provided the 
training contains information about the responsible contact person(s) to whom counterfeit-
related matters should be forwarded. In more than one half of the countries information about 
the current counterfeit situation in general and in particular regarding the local situation is 
provided. This information refers also to the company’s product portfolio, if applicable. In 
some countries the topic-specific training even comprises detailed information on the 
characteristics of already identified counterfeit products and on overt anti-counterfeiting 
security features applied to the company’s products. 
Training contents Number of 
countries 
(total = 58) 
Percentage of 
respondents 
Whom to contact when a counterfeit- / product security-relevant 
information is received 
51 88% 
Current counterfeit situation in general / global 36 62% 
Current counterfeit situation in your country 36 62% 
Specific Bayer Pharma products with respect to protection against 
counterfeiting 
36 62% 
How to identify counterfeits of BPH products by means of known 
characteristics of previously identified counterfeits of BPH products 
34 59% 
Visible ACF security features applied on the BPH products in your country 28 48% 
Table 13: Ranking of CF-specific training contents 
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5.1.2.19 Question 19 
 
Figure 85: Question 19 of the affiliate survey, snap shot of the web-based questionnaire 
The responses to question 19 reveal that the responsibility of compiling and providing 
counterfeit-specific training material is not limited to one and the same function in the 
different affiliates. Still, there is a distinct tendency to the Quality Assurance function to take 
care of the required topic-specific trainings and training materials. 46% of the 110 
respondents who stated that counterfeit-relevant training is provided in their country say that 
the responsible function for the respective training is the Quality Assurance function. The 
remaining 54% of the respondents named 5 other functions as responsible for this task or 
said that they do not know which function is responsible. 
 
Figure 86: Functions responsible for CF-specific training 
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5.1.2.20 Question 20 
 
Figure 87: Question 20 of the affiliate survey, snap shot of the web-based questionnaire 
For the central functions it is valuable to know how to support the personnel of the local 
affiliates. For that reason, the respondents were asked to select supportive means which 
they would be interested in. 
All in all, the result evaluation reveals that the majority of the respondents is very interested 
in support to be received from the central functions with respect to the counterfeit topic. In 
total, 73% of the respondents selected more than half of the supportive means as “of 
interest”. Even 29% of the respondents selected all of the supportive means as “of interest”. 
 
Figure 88: Number of supportive means of interest 
Across the regions the picture is similar. In all regions the majority shows great interest in 
support with respect to the counterfeit topic. 
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Figure 89: Number of supportive means of interest by regions 
Regarding the rate of the selected supportive means the counterfeit-specific training material 
was selected by 87% of the respondents and is therefore on rank 1 of the most required 
supportive means followed by best practice material and information about overt (visible) 
ACF security features with 74% of the respondents, each. 
Supportive means Number of 
respondents 
(total = 149) 
Percentage of 
respondents 
Counterfeit-specific training material 130 87% 
Best practice material 110 74% 
Information on overt (visible) ACF security features 110 74% 
BHC strategy on counterfeit protection 103 69% 
News on internal ACF activities in other countries / regions 96 64% 
Counterfeit-specific questionnaires / check-lists for use in call centers 85 57% 
Global or regional news on external ACF initiatives 83 56% 
Table 14: Ranking of supportive means with respect to the counterfeit topic 
5.1.3 Response actions 
In the context of this dissertation the survey results were compiled in a presentation and 
were presented to the heads of the different functions that were involved in the survey. The 
results were also presented to the company’s Global Anti-counterfeiting Working Group and 
the Global Product Security Working Group which are in charge to initiate required response 
actions according to the identified needs of the local affiliates. 
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5.2 Country-specific interviews 
The results of the affiliate survey reveal that the interest in and the impact of the counterfeit 
medicines topic is very high in many of the responding countries. Also the willingness to 
discuss the topic and to contribute to further anti-counterfeiting activities is rather high. The 
experiences gained during the preparation and the conduct of the product-specific education 
campaign revealed the necessity of considering country-specific circumstances when 
planning a public education campaign. In this context, the importance of collaborating and 
net-working between several involved functions additionally became clear. For that reason, a 
follow-up activity with respect to the affiliate survey was planned, in the context of this thesis, 
to gain more detailed information regarding country-specific circumstances of e.g. the licit 
use of media with respect to health-related topics. In addition, experiences and personal 
assessment of the local employees regarding anti-counterfeiting measures should be 
collected. Hence, another questionnaire comprising 12 questions regarding 7 topics was 
developed, within the frame of this dissertation, to be discussed in interviews with the local 
employees of 10 selected affiliates. The conduct of the interviews is explained below. 
5.2.1 Contents and conduct of the survey follow-up interviews 
The 10 selected countries - representative for all regions - that showed huge commitment in 
the affiliate survey are: 
Region Countries 
Europe I + Canada Germany, United Kingdom 
Europe II + Middle East & Africa Kenya, Israel 
Asia Pacific + Japan Australia, Korea, Japan 
Latin America + United States Brazil, Colombia, USA 
Table 15: Participant countries of the interviews 
All respondents of the selected countries who had been invited to the affiliate survey were 
invited again to the interviews. Yet this time, every invitee of the respective affiliates was 
allowed to forward the invitation to further employees within his / her affiliate who, from the 
invitee’s point of view, should also participate in the interview. For each country a telephone 
conference (TC) of 1h duration was scheduled and the questionnaire was sent out in form of 
a Microsoft® Word file to the participants one week prior to the TC meeting for better 
preparation. In the context of this thesis all questions were discussed during the interviews, 
which were conducted in English and the interview results were evaluated in detail, as 
presented in the following paragraphs.  
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5.2.2 Interview results 
5.2.2.1 Topic 1: Media and tools to reach out to the public 
Q #1: Which media is considered suitable to publish health-related matters in your country? 
Reaching out to the public, especially to patients and healthcare professionals, in order to 
raise awareness of health-related issues including the risks that counterfeit medicines pose 
to patients’ health and safety requires the use of suitable media to approach the public of 
different countries effectively. The majority of the interviewed respondents consider a 
combination of different kinds of media as most effective. Print media, including newspapers, 
professional journals, brochures and posters is considered to be the most reliable and 
therefore the most suitable media with respect to health-related issues. The preferred 
distribution points of brochures and posters are pharmacies, hospitals and international travel 
points e.g. airports according to the respondents. In 80% of the responding countries the 
internet is also seen as a suitable media to publish health-related information. In this context, 
the respondents favor the use of websites rather than social media. Moreover, the option to 
collaborate with search engine providers was mentioned to refer to specific websites (in this 
case the topic-specific information / warning website) after the input of defined search terms. 
In 50% of the countries the respondents rated broadcast media, including TV and radio, as 
appropriate to provide respective information. However, it was also mentioned that this kind 
of media is very cost-intensive, which is an aspect that should be considered when selecting 
media for an education campaign. 
 
Figure 90: Media considered suitable to reach out to the public with regard to health-related issues 
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Q #2: What are the national regulatory restrictions with respect to the publishing of health-
related matters in your country? 
If health-related issues shall be published in a country, national regulations have to be 
followed. It is required to know if the health-related information can be provided with 
reference to medicinal products, in particular to prescription-only medicines (POM), and if 
yes, to whom. In most of the countries only general (non-product-specific) information with 
respect to health-related matters is permitted to be communicated to patients. In the 
countries, where pharmaceutical companies are allowed to publish POM-specific information, 
it must be communicated to healthcare professionals only. However, some respondents e.g. 
from Australia assumed that their health authorities might give permission to pharmaceutical 
companies to publish also POM-specific information if it is communicated in the context of 
warning patients against counterfeits of the respective medicinal product and referring to the 
anti-counterfeiting security features applied to it. In the minority of the responding countries 
pharmaceutical companies have permission to publish POM-specific information to patients, 
under limitations. In most of the countries the information to be published has to be in 
accordance with the competent authorities. Therefore, the respective information has to be 
communicated to the competent authorities and their approval received before the 
information can be published. In some countries the pharmaceutical companies are not 
allowed to communicate POM-specific information directly to patients but they are permitted 
to provide such information via the internet (via the company website), so that patients can 
access it, if they want to. 
 
Figure 91: Regulatory restrictions with respect to the publishing of health-related matters 
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Q #3: Are patient assistant programs / patient support programs considered suitable to reach 
out to patients in order to inform them about the risks of counterfeit medicinal products and 
would that be permitted? 
The respondents of 5 countries considered PAPs as an appropriate way to approach patients 
in order to educate them about the risks counterfeit medicines pose and to inform them about 
specific product characteristics that serve as identification features for the respective product. 
However, the condition mentioned by the respondents is that the respective PAP refers to a 
medicinal product for which counterfeits are actually already known or which are at high risk 
to be counterfeited. Otherwise, the patients of the PAP would be alarmed unnecessarily. The 
countries which argument against the use of PAP for the education of patients about the 
counterfeit issue share the opinion that patients of PAPs are not the main target group for the 
education about counterfeit medicines and that only a limited number of patients would be 
reached. In some countries there are no PAPs in use hence, such programs are no possible 
access point to educate patients, there. 
 
Figure 92: PAP / PSP considered appropriate to reach out to patients 
5.2.2.2 Topic 2: Patient perception 
Q #4: In your view, would the population in your country be interested in / appreciate to be 
provided with counterfeit-relevant information and what kind of approach would you consider 
suitable? 
The respondents of only one country considered the communication of counterfeit-relevant 
information as counterproductive. In this country the presence of counterfeit medicinal 
products is extremely minor and the purchase of medicines via the internet is prohibited. 
Therefore, the risk for patients to purchase counterfeit drugs is assessed to be rather small. It 
is assumed that the warnings about counterfeit medicines would rather be misperceived as 
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an indication for the existence of counterfeit medicines in the national market leading to 
mistrust in the medicinal products. 
The majority of the respondents assumed that the population in their country would 
appreciate to be provided with information about counterfeit medicines and how to protect 
themselves against these. Nevertheless, the respondents stated that the patients’ perception 
very much depends on how the relevant information is provided to them. In most of the 
countries the respondents assumed that the population would perceive an anti-counterfeiting 
education campaign carried out under the name of a pharmaceutical company as a means of 
personal promotion. Thus, the conduct of an ACF education campaign under the name of a 
“neutral” entity, e.g. a health authority (or at least an association of several pharmaceutical 
companies) would be preferred and is considered to be more effective. 
 
Figure 93: Assumed patient perception regarding ACF education campaigns 
5.2.2.3 Topic 3: Patient purchase behavior 
Q #5: To what extend do patients in your country purchase medicinal products via the 
internet? What do you estimate? 
The half of the responding countries, where the purchase rate of medicines via the internet is 
rather high, is almost completely limited to high developed countries. The respondents of 
these countries stated that the purchase of medicines via the internet is mainly related to 
OTC medicines and despite the rather high online purchase rate the “traditional” distribution 
way is still used more often. The other half of the responding countries mentioned several 
reasons for the low online purchase rate with respect to medicines, including the total 
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regulatory restriction of purchasing medicinal products via the internet, the limited access to 
the internet and the resentment of the population to purchase medicinal products online. 
 
Figure 94: Assumed purchase behavior of medicines via the internet 
5.2.2.4 Topic 4: Communication strategy 
Q #6: What kind of approach with regard to a public anti-counterfeiting education campaign 
would you consider as more effective in your country? 
In each case, the respondents had to select the more effective option out of 4 pairs of 
approaches or select both options in case they are considered equally effective. Regarding 
the first pair, the result is very clear. In 100% of the responding countries the option of an 
education campaign conducted under the name of a neutral organization (a health authority 
or an association) was selected as more effective than an education campaign conducted 
under the name of one pharmaceutical company. Even if an education campaign run under 
the name of a pharmaceutical company would not be ineffective in some countries (see 
results of question 4), the neutral approach is still considered more effective in all of the 
responding countries. The respondents of 50% of the interviewed counties considered a 
generalized (i.e. non-product-specific) campaign as more effective than a product-specific 
campaign. This opinion is also related to the fact that the national legislation in many 
countries does not permit a product-specific education campaign. The respondents of the 
remaining half of the countries considered the product-specific education campaign as more 
effective or regarded both options as equally effective. If an anti-counterfeiting education 
campaign should refer to security features or other specific characteristics, which should be 
used to distinguish between the genuine and the counterfeit product, it is mandatory to refer 
to specific products unless the characteristics or security features are applied to all products 
of a company’s portfolio (or all medicinal products in a country). Regarding the media, the 
majority of the respondents (70% of the responding countries) considered the use of multiple 
50%
50%
0 2 4 6 8 10
Rather
low
Rather
high
Number of countries
Assumed purchase behavior of medicines via the internet 
                                             CHAPTER FIVE – REVIEW OF INTERNAL ANTI-COUNTERFEITING PROCEDURES 
 
145 
 
media as more effective than using only one media. In the view of the respondents a broader 
spectrum of people can be reached by using different kinds of media. In 30% of the countries 
both options are seen as equally effective. The fourth and last pair to decide about refers to 
the time frame of an anti-counterfeiting education campaign. The respondents stated that the 
timely manner in which such a campaign should be conducted very much depends on the 
media in use. As in most of the countries the use of different media is considered more 
effective and the internet is one of the suitable media in 80% of the countries (see results of 
question 1), the respondents of 80% of the countries would prefer to provide the counterfeit-
related information continuously on the local website. In 20% of the countries both options 
are considered equally effective also depending on the used media. Counterfeit-related 
information and warnings published via print and broadcast media would be preferred to be 
provided in a short-term way and the respective information published via the internet 
(websites) would be preferred to be provided and updated continuously. 
 
Figure 95: Approach options with regard to ACF education campaigns 
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5.2.2.5 Topic 5: Collaboration with and support by external stakeholders 
Q #7: How was the collaboration with external stakeholders with regard to the counterfeit 
issue established? 
The respondents from each country were allowed to give multiple answers, if applicable. So, 
in the majority of the countries (70%) the contact between the local affiliate and the local 
external stakeholders regarding the counterfeit medicines topic was established during topic-
specific meetings, conferences and information days. In 50% of the responding countries a 
contact person was already known due to an established collaboration regarding other 
matters. In this case the contact person was approached directly (e.g. via phone or e-mail) 
with respect to counterfeit-related matters. In 30% of the countries the respondents said that 
the company or the external stakeholder was approached using the official contact (hotline) 
asking for the responsible person with respect to the counterfeit medicines topic. In 30% of 
the countries the local affiliate is member of the local pharmaceutical manufacturers 
association which established contact with other external stakeholders. 
 
Figure 96: Contact with external stakeholders with regard to the counterfeit issue 
Q #8: Do your local authorities and associations consider anti-counterfeiting as an important 
issue and offer support? 
The attitude of the local authorities and associations towards the counterfeit medicines issue 
and the resulting support that can be expected from them are of interest for a pharmaceutical 
company that plans to carry out anti-counterfeiting activities and wants to collaborate with the 
respective stakeholders. In more than half of the responding countries the local authorities 
and associations consider counterfeiting of medicinal products as a major issue and are 
willing to offer support in countermeasures. The countries where the topic is of interest but 
3
3
5
7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Via intermediary entities
Official contact (hotline)
Direct contact (person)
Via meetings, conferences,
information days
Number of countries
Contact with external stakeholders with regard to anti-
counterfeiting
                                             CHAPTER FIVE – REVIEW OF INTERNAL ANTI-COUNTERFEITING PROCEDURES 
 
147 
 
the resulting support in terms of anti-counterfeiting activities is rather limited and the 
countries where the support by authorities and associations is little, since the counterfeit 
topic is assumed to be a minor issue, count 20% each. 
 
Figure 97: Support by local authorities and associations with regard to anti-counterfeiting 
Q #9: Do local authorities (or associations) provide information about legal / licit online 
pharmacies to the public? 
Such information is only provided in Germany (by the DIMDI) and in the USA (by the NABP). 
Japan and the UK stated that such a service is under discussion but not yet established. In 
the remaining 60% of the responding countries such information is not provided or it is not 
applicable as the purchase of medicinal products via the internet is not permitted. 
 
Figure 98: Local (health) authorities or associations provide a list about licit online pharmacies 
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5.2.2.6 Topic 6: Local processes 
Q #10: How is the main responsibility regarding anti-counterfeiting handled in your local 
organization? 
60% of the responding countries state that the responsibility with respect to the counterfeit 
topic is assigned to several functions which collaborate. However, none of the involved 
functions is in a leading position. In 40% of the responding countries also multiple functions 
are involved in the topic and have different tasks assigned but there is one function that is in 
a leading position and coordinates the different tasks. 
 
Figure 99: Responsibility regarding anti-counterfeiting 
Q #11: How would you assess the collaboration between these functions with respect to anti-
counterfeiting matters? 
More than one half of the responding countries assess the inter-functional collaboration as 
rather good. 40% of the responding countries state that there is still room for improvement 
since the collaboration between some of the involved functions is very good. However, often 
not all affected functions, involved in the counterfeit topic, are involved in the collaboration or 
some functions elude themselves from the collaboration. 
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Figure 100: Assessment of the inter-functional collaboration 
5.2.2.7 Topic 7: Net-working 
Q #12: What would you consider as desirable / required to enhance net-working between 
functions and across countries? 
To explore what the employees of the different local organizations would like to have 
implemented to enhance the net-working regarding the counterfeit topic, the respondents 
were asked to make suggestions and to address their remarks. The respective desirable 
measures can be differentiated into 4 subject areas as shown in the figure below. The 
respondents would value very much to be provided with a company-internal website or tool 
where the most relevant information regarding the counterfeit topic is available for every 
company employee, including the company’s global anti-counterfeiting concept, affected 
products of the company’s portfolio and overt anti-counterfeiting security features that are 
applied to the company’s products. Moreover, anti-counterfeiting activities initiated by the 
company, the related experiences and results would be highly appreciated information. In 
addition, information on anti-counterfeiting initiatives, organized by external entities but in 
which the company is involved, could be given. Furthermore, the company-internal dialogue 
about anti-counterfeiting measures and activities between functions, especially across 
countries, would be appreciated to be enhanced to a routine basis to keep all involved 
functions updated and broadly informed. Thereby, feedback from the local organizations 
could be given to the central functions on a routine basis. The regular conduct of topic-
specific trainings would strengthen the responsible employees’ confidence in handling their 
tasks and all their required procedures. Consequently, the local affiliates would highly 
appreciate to be provided with respective topic-specific training and informative literature to 
support their local personnel. 
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Figure 101: Overview on desirable measures to enhance net-working with regard to the counterfeit topic 
5.3 Training and communication concept 
Based on the information, gained within the frame of the affiliate survey and the interviews, 
the following training and communication concept was developed the context of this 
dissertation and is recommended to meet the identified internal education needs. A 
company-internal topic-specific communication platform should be established to enhance 
the net-working and the exchange of information with respect to the counterfeit topic between 
the central and the local functions and also the affiliates among themselves. By means of 
such a tool topic-specific information about basic counterfeit-relevant facts, established 
concepts and procedures, responsible contact persons and implemented or planned anti-
counterfeiting activities should be provided to all affected functions within the company. 
According to the status of confidentiality of the provided information restricted access rights 
have to be created so that confidential information can only be accessed by authorized 
personnel. For instance, a Microsoft® SharePoint can be a suitable tool for this purpose. The 
tool should also be used to allocate topic-specific training materials for the access by 
employees who are involved in the counterfeit topic. The training materials should be 
segmented into modules in order to provide the required information according to the 
employees’ responsibilities and tasks with respect to the counterfeit topic, e.g. a basic 
module, an advanced module and an expert module. According to the module type the 
contents range from basic information over detailed information to confidential information. 
The basic module should at least contain general information about the problem of 
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counterfeit medicines and the risks they pose to patients, the company’s policy regarding the 
topic and responsible contact persons who can be approached in case of questions or for 
support. The advanced module should comprise more detailed information regarding the 
company’s anti-counterfeiting concept, procedures, activities, counterfeit-specific terms and 
definitions and supportive material, e.g. for counterfeit-relevant data handling. One example 
for such supportive material was developed in the context of the thesis and is presented in 
figure 102. The expert module should contain product-specific information, including anti-
counterfeiting security features which are applied to the products as far as confidentiality 
permits. 
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Figure 102: Decision tree on the counterfeit incidents classification 
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CHAPTER SIX - CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Conclusion and recommendations 
Counterfeit products present a huge problem due to their great number on the market all 
over the world. In contrast to counterfeit luxury goods, which mainly harm the economy, 
counterfeit medicinal products pose a serious risk to health and safety. As indicated in this 
dissertation these products can cause serious or even fatal health outcomes. In fact, the 
flooding of the market with counterfeit drugs increased over the previous decade. For this 
reason, the combat against counterfeit medicines should be of particular interest by the 
stakeholders of the health sector to safeguard patients’ welfare. 
Concerning the issue of counterfeit medicinal products existing statutory provisions are 
presented in this dissertation with a special focus on the obligations of the pharmaceutical 
industry. The objective of this thesis is to reveal what kind of anti-counterfeiting measures 
can be and should be adopted by the pharmaceutical industry exceeding the legal 
provisions. In this context, special focus is laid on the opportunities and limitations of such 
anti-counterfeiting measures. Thereby, three measures were examined and presented in 
detail, which are: Monitoring, education and procedural review of anti-counterfeiting activities.  
Monitoring 
A marketing authorization holder is obliged to verify the quality, safety and efficacy of its 
products in order to protect patient safety, e.g. by means of pharmacovigilance activities as 
described in this dissertation. Today, it is no longer sufficient for a marketing authorization 
holder to implement control and surveillance measures in order to exclude and prevent 
potential risks only with respect to its genuine medicinal products. Instead, the MAH is also 
required to take action with regard to counterfeits of its genuine products. 
One of the anti-counterfeiting measures analyzed in particular within the frame of this thesis 
is data monitoring and evaluation. A marketing authorization holder is obliged to collect, 
process and evaluate counterfeit incident reports (as well as adverse event reports) and to 
report the respective cases to the competent authorities, as per local regulations. The 
collected data represents the basis for further counterfeit evaluation and root cause analysis. 
Moreover, the confirmed counterfeit incidents provide information on the company’s affected 
products and the affected countries, so that appropriate anti-counterfeiting activities can be 
initiated based on this information. Counterfeit medicines are often difficult to detect due to 
their visual similarity to the genuine products. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that a 
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marketing authorization holder receives reports about adverse events that are actually not 
related to the MAH’s original medicinal products, but rather to their counterfeits. For that 
reason, monitoring and evaluation of suspected counterfeit incident reports is not sufficient. 
The results of the performed data analysis show that more options with respect to data 
monitoring should be taken into consideration.  
The company’s adverse event data was investigated to ascertain if it could serve as a basis 
for an extended monitoring with respect to potential counterfeit signals. Based on the 
assumed correlation between the number of reported adverse events and a counterfeit 
presence on the respective market, the adverse event data and the counterfeit incident data 
of 6 example products was analyzed with regard to a potential correlation.  
The results show that with respect to 3 example products a correlation between particularly 
defined adverse event data and counterfeit incident data could be identified. Hence, peaks in 
the number of adverse event reports can hint at a potential counterfeit presence on the 
market. Such peaks should be monitored and evaluated considering this aspect. As 
discussed in the respective chapter (chapter three), the criteria for data used as the 
monitoring basis must be product-specific and should be monitored country-specifically over 
a broad time period to narrow influencing factors, as much as possible. The consideration of 
potential influencing factors, which cannot be excluded by the use of specific data criteria, 
should always be included in the result assessment for validity. Such factors are mainly of 
the kind that has an impact on the reporting behavior of patients, healthcare professionals 
and authorities in the different countries. 
The results of the data analysis show that counterfeit monitoring activities can be extended 
using adverse event data to identify potential signals of a possible counterfeit presence. 
Hence, more valuable data is available to be used as a basis for further investigations to 
detect counterfeit products on the market. Therefore, the extended monitoring can contribute 
to minimize the risk of an undetected counterfeit presence causing harm to patients and 
negatively influencing the benefit-risk profile of the original medicinal products.  
Education 
The suspected counterfeit incident data, investigated in this dissertation, moreover show an 
underreporting in many regions and countries, which possibly points to a need of education 
and awareness regarding patients and healthcare professionals. Their reporting behavior, 
with respect to suspected counterfeit incidents, very much depends on their awareness of 
counterfeit medicines. For that reason, an education campaign pilot project with the purpose 
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to raise awareness of the counterfeit issue was initiated within the frame of this thesis. The 
campaign was planned and carried out in a product-specific way in one country. Thereby, its 
perception by and effect on the target group and its applicability to serve as an example for 
further education campaigns were examined. 
As highlighted in the thesis, measures with the purpose to raise awareness of the issue of 
counterfeit medicines require much effort regarding their preparation and organization. 
However, as revealed in this dissertation, they can be tremendously effective and thus, are 
worth the effort. The different options of conducting measures with the purpose to raise 
awareness should be considered very carefully and probably should be based on preceding 
activities. The points to be considered regarding the preparation and implementation of such 
awareness-raising measures and possible preceding activities are explained in detail in the 
respective chapter (chapter four). 
The results of the conducted pilot project show that a product-specific education campaign 
performed under the name of its MAH using different kinds of media is a very effective 
measure to raise awareness. Using both, the internet to provide counterfeit-relevant 
information on the company’s websites and print media, including posters and brochures 
being distributed via selected drug distribution points, e.g. hospitals and pharmacies, located 
all over the country, guarantees a broad outreach to patients in a rather short period of time. 
Thus, patients are provided with valuable information to be able to better protect themselves 
against the risks posed by counterfeit medicines, which is a great contribution to the 
protection of their safety. 
Another important aspect regarding the realization of such an anti-counterfeiting measure is 
the collaboration between multiple stakeholders, including several central and local, internal 
functions of the respective marketing authorization holder and external stakeholders, e.g. 
health authorities. The experiences gained during the education campaign pilot project 
revealed that it is imperative to involve multiple functions of different areas within a 
pharmaceutical company to successfully initiate and implement such a project. The following 
figure, created in the context of this thesis, presents an overview of functions within a 
pharmaceutical company which should be involved in such an anti-counterfeiting project. 
Moreover, it presents external stakeholders which can and possibly have to be involved 
when a marketing authorization holder plans to carry out a public education campaign or 
other ACF activities. 
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Figure 103: Collaboration between several stakeholders on ACF activities 
The initiated pilot project is only one option to conduct a public education campaign with 
regard to the problem of counterfeit medicines. The variety of means and conduct strategies 
is huge. The results of the interviews, conducted with 10 selected countries, show for 
example that a neutral education campaign, which provides general information about the 
risks of counterfeit medicines, is also considered a successful option to raise awareness 
among the public. Preparing and implementing a public education campaign, the MAH 
always has to take national circumstances into account and should adapt the campaign 
accordingly to make sure the campaign does not conflict with national legislation. However, 
all available options with regard to suitable media and potential collaborative stakeholders 
should be considered in order to carry out a campaign of maximum success.  
The education campaign, initiated in the context of this thesis, revealed that education about 
the risks counterfeit medicines pose to patients’ health and how to minimize the risk of 
exposure to counterfeit medicines helps patients to protect themselves against the threat. 
Hence, it is highly recommended that the pharmaceutical industry adopts measures to 
contribute to the education of the public about the counterfeit medicines problem. 
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Review of anti-counterfeiting activities and procedures 
All over the world, many different functions within a global pharmaceutical company are 
involved in the topic of anti-counterfeiting. To guarantee consistent procedures according to 
the company’s anti-counterfeiting concept the different functions have to be provided with 
required information about the counterfeit topic, as well as anti-counterfeiting activities and 
procedures. Therefore, a global survey including all relevant functions of the local affiliates 
was initiated and carried out within the frame of this thesis to review the current state of 
implemented anti-counterfeiting activities and procedures and the required topic-specific 
expertise. Afterwards, the affiliates of 10 countries were selected as interview partners to 
gain further and more detailed information. 
The results of the conducted global company-internal affiliate survey and the interviews 
demonstrate the huge interest of the affiliates in the counterfeit topic as a whole. The results 
also confirm the necessity of a broad internal collaboration and the net-working between 
multiple functions of different areas within a global pharmaceutical company and the 
importance of the collaboration with external stakeholders with respect to the counterfeit 
topic. Furthermore, the results reveal a need for improvement regarding the counterfeit-
specific knowledge and consequently the counterfeit-specific training of the employees of 
multiple functions. Thus, a coordinated support with regard to counterfeit-relevant company-
internal education and training would meet the employees’ needs and thereby lead to a more 
consist and confident handling of counterfeit-relevant data and procedures. A respective 
training and communication concept was developed within the frame of this dissertation and 
is presented in chapter five. 
The general procedure that is recommended in the context of this thesis provides that the 
pharmaceutical company’s central functions, involved in the counterfeit topic, should develop 
an anti-counterfeiting concept which is applicable for the whole company. In addition, an 
overview of anti-counterfeiting measures, which are already implemented in some countries 
or which the central functions would support, should be provided as an orientation for all 
affiliates of the company. The local affiliates which decide or are asked by the central 
functions to implement one or more of the suggested measures would check if the measures 
comply with their national legislation or if any adaptations are required. This would be 
discussed with the central functions. Furthermore, the overview should include examples of 
the successful collaboration of company-internal functions and external stakeholders. The 
overview should describe how the collaboration was established in order to encourage 
further local affiliates to likewise establish or extend the collaboration with local external 
stakeholders (e.g. health authorities, customs, police or associations). In doing so, the 
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exchange of information and the mutual support with regard to anti-counterfeiting activities 
between the pharmaceutical industry and the external stakeholders can be extended. 
In conclusion, this dissertation presents multiple measures to combat counterfeiting of 
medicines including data monitoring and evaluation, collaboration with authorities, 
investigative, legal and technological measures, awareness-raising and the review of anti-
counterfeiting activities and procedures within a pharmaceutical company. The presented 
measures should serve as an orientation for the pharmaceutical industry on what can be 
done in order to counteract the counterfeiting of medicinal products. Three of these 
measures have been analyzed and are presented in more detail using practical examples. 
Thereby, important aspects to be considered with regard to anti-counterfeiting activities and 
procedures were revealed to serve also as an orientation for the implementation of such 
measures. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the available anti-counterfeiting measures and 
their importance is outlined in the dissertation.  
The insights of this thesis show that an enhanced awareness of the counterfeit issue and the 
related risks among the public can contribute to the reduction of incidents where patients 
experience adverse events from counterfeit medicines. Moreover, it can lead to an extended 
cognition and reporting of potential counterfeit medicinal products leading to an increase in 
valuable counterfeit-related data. This information, in turn, can be used for the targeted 
implementation of investigative and legal measures against counterfeiters. In order to take 
action in anti-counterfeiting pharmaceutical companies should implement an anti-
counterfeiting concept, if not yet established. The concept including all implemented anti-
counterfeiting activities and procedures should be reviewed considering the presented 
aspects and adapted accordingly, if required. Furthermore, they should foster the 
collaboration with external stakeholders with respect to the counterfeit issue. Thereby, the 
smooth operation and the efficacy of all internal anti-counterfeiting procedures and external 
anti-counterfeiting activities are optimized to achieve maximum effects. 
By means of this thesis pharmaceutical companies shall be encouraged to adopt anti-
counterfeiting measures. It is very unlikely that the problem of counterfeiting medicinal 
products will ever be solved completely. Thus, it is imperative that the pharmaceutical 
industry actively contributes to the combat against counterfeit medicines by adopting 
appropriate anti-counterfeiting measures in order to protect patient safety and to safeguard 
patients’ welfare. 
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7.3 Annexes 
Annex 1: Education campaign regarding Nexavar® in China; hand-out page 1 – English 
 
Figure 104: Education campaign hand-out, page 1 - English 
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Annex 2: Education campaign regarding Nexavar in China; hand-out page 2 – English 
 
Figure 105: Education campaign hand-out, page 2 - English 
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Annex 3: Education campaign regarding Nexavar in China; poster – English 
 
Figure 106: Education campaign poster - English 
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Annex 4: Questionnaire, including landing page, developed for the global affiliate survey 
which presented the framework for the digital questionnaire 
Welcome to the Survey  
“Anti-Counterfeiting and Product Security” 
(BHC Pharma) 
 
 
Please answer the following 20 multiple choice questions.  
The survey should not take more than 15 minutes of your time. Your responses are anonymous and 
will be kept strictly confidential. They will not be used for any purpose other than the compilation of 
the survey results. 
 
The term “counterfeit” is being used in the questionnaire as a synonym for all counterfeit, falsified 
medicine, and product security-related issues, including imitation, adulteration (tampering), mix-
up of genuine and counterfeit product, smuggling, theft, fraudulent generics, and manipulation. 
 
Your participation is highly appreciated. 
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Please enter your  
Country:  _drop down_ 
 
1) In your view, counterfeiting of pharmaceutical products in your country is: 
   
□ Increasing □ Decreasing □ Constant   □ No issue 
 
2) Are you aware of counterfeits of Bayer Healthcare Pharma products in your country? 
 
□ Yes  □ No 
 
3) If yes, which products?  Please list below. 
 
Free text 
 
4) Is anti-counterfeiting of importance in your local organization? 
 
□ Yes   □ No 
 
5) Has there ever been a public campaign to combat counterfeit medicinal products in your 
country? 
  
□ Yes  □ No 
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6) If yes, who performed it? (multiple selections possible) 
 
□ Health Authority 
□ Customs / Border Surveillance 
□ Other enforcement body (e.g. Police) 
□ Paaent Associaaon 
□ Pharmaceuacal Manufacturer Associaaon 
□ Healthcare Professionals (HCP) / HCP Association 
□ Others: 
 Free text 
Please provide details / references, if possible: 
Free text 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7) Has your local organization ever been involved in such a campaign? 
 
□ Yes   □ No 
 
8) With whom does your local organization interact in anti-counterfeiting matters?  
(multiple selection possible) 
 
□ Health Authority 
□ Customs / Border Surveillance 
□ Other enforcement body (e.g. Police) 
□ Paaent Associaaon 
□ Pharmaceuacal Manufacturer Associaaon 
□ Healthcare Professionals (HCP) / HCP Association 
□ Others (Please provide details): 
Free text 
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9) Does your local organization have a website or a section on your website established that 
contains counterfeit-specific information for patients and healthcare professionals? 
 
□ Yes   □ No 
 
10) If yes, it includes (multiple selection possible): 
□ General counterfeit warnings      
□ Link to Bayer Beware of Counterfeits website    
http://www.bayerhealthcare.com/scripts/pages/en/commitment/beware_of_counterfeits/index.php 
□ Link to websites of local initiatives     
□ Informaaon on actual counterfeit incidents    
□ Informaaon how to disanguish between genuine and counterfeit  
□ Information on how to report suspected counterfeits   
□ Others: 
Free text 
Please provide the link to your local anti-counterfeit webpage:  
      Free text 
 
11) Which of the following counterfeit-specific tools does your local organization have in use to 
retrieve / follow-up on all counterfeit-relevant information and material from a reporter (e.g. 
complaint sample, batch no., product source, related ADR etc.)? 
 
Tools provided to the reporter:   
□ Report form / questionnaire 
□ Patient / HCP information material on how / what to report 
□ Complaint sample collection service (e.g. free return envelope) 
□ None   
□ Unknown 
□ Others: 
Free text       
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12) Tools used by your local personnel during ad-hoc contact with the reporter:   
 
□ Check-list on relevant information 
□ Informaaon on previously idenafied counterfeits in the country (e.g. product, lot no.) 
□ Complaint sample collection (e.g. from the patient)       
□ Follow-up process for suspected counterfeit reports 
□ None   
□ Unknown  
□ Others: 
Free text 
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13) Which function / role within your local organization is actively involved in counterfeit-related 
matters towards the following external stakeholders? (multiple selection possible) 
 
 
Health 
Authority Customs 
Other 
Enforceme
nt Body 
Public 
Media / 
Press 
Associatio
ns 
Not 
Applicable 
/ None 
CDH (Country Division 
Head) □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Medical Affairs / CMD 
(Country Medical Director)
  □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Pharmacovigilance / 
PVCH (Pharmacovigilance 
Country Head) □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Quality Affairs / LQR  
(Local Quality 
Representativ)  □ □ □ □ □ □ 
LSC  
(Local Security Coordinator)
  □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Legal / LACM  
(Local Anti-Counterfeiting 
Manager) □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Security / LSR  
(Local Security 
Representative) □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Communication □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Regulatory Affairs / 
LRAM 
(Local Regulatory Affairs 
Manager) □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Business / Marketing □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Customer Service □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Medical Information □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Others: 
Freetext □ □ □ □ □ □ 
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14) Which of the following functions / responsible persons within your local organization are 
responsible for internal processing of counterfeit-related matters? (multiple selection possible) 
 
 
Counterfeit 
Reports 
Theft 
Reports 
Agency 
Support  
(e.g. 
Information 
Material, 
Raids) 
Media 
Support 
(e.g. Press 
Statements) 
Patient / 
HCP 
Education 
Not 
Applicable 
/ None 
CDH (Country Division 
Head) □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Medical Affairs / CMD 
(Country Medical Director)
  □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Pharmacovigilance / 
PVCH  
(Pharmacovigilance 
Country Head) □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Quality Affairs / LQR  
(Local Quality 
Representativ)  □ □ □ □ □ □ 
LSC  
(Local Security 
Coordinator)  □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Legal / LACM  
(Local Anti-Counterfeiting 
Manager) □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Security / LSR  
(Local Security 
Representative) □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Communication □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Regulatory Affairs / 
LRAM 
(Local Regulatory Affairs 
Manager) □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Business / Marketing □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Customer Service □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Medical Information □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Others: 
Freetext □ □ □ □ □ □ 
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15) Are you familiar with the following terms and their meaning / definition in the context of 
counterfeit and product security-related issues? 
 
 Yes No Not sure 
Imitation □ □ □ 
Mix-up of genuine / counterfeit □ □ □ 
Adulteration (Tampering) □ □ □ 
Smuggling  □ □ □ 
Theft  □ □ □ 
Fraudulent generic □ □ □ 
Manipulation   □ □ □ 
 
16) Do you have the following responsible persons appointed and communicated in your country?  
 
 Yes No Unknown 
LACM (Local Anti-Counterfeiting Manager)  □ □ □ 
LSR (Local Security Representative)  □ □ □ 
LSC (Local Security Coordinator) □ □ □ 
 
17) Are any of the following functions provided with counterfeit-specific training? 
 
 Yes No Unknown 
Customer Service / Hotline □ □ □ 
Sales Representatives □ □ □ 
Medical Scientific Liaisons □ □ □ 
Medical Advisors □ □ □ 
Local Pharmacovigilance □ □ □ 
Local Complaint Management □ □ □ 
Product Managers (Marketing) □ □ □ 
Security □ □ □ 
 
If you answered none of the above with “Yes” then please move on to question #20. 
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18) Does the training contain the following? (multiple selection possible) 
 
□ Current counterfeit situaaon in general / global 
□ Current counterfeit situation in your country 
□ Specific Bayer Pharma products with respect to counterfeit protecaon 
□ Visible ana-counterfeiting security features applied on the Bayer Pharma products in          
your country 
□ How to idenafy counterfeit Bayer Pharma products by means of known characteristics   
   of previously identified counterfeit Bayer Pharma products 
□ Whom to contact when a counterfeit / product security-relevant information is received 
□ Others: 
Free text 
 
19) Which responsible function or role provides counterfeit-related training and compiles the 
training material?  
Function / Role:  Free text       □ Unknown 
 
20) Which of the following support with regard to counterfeit protection of Bayer Pharma products 
would be of interest to you / your local organization? (multiple selection possible) 
 
 □ Counterfeit-specific questionnaires / check-lists for use in Call Centers 
 □ Counterfeit-specific training material 
 □ Best Pracace material (e.g. tools) 
□ Informaaon about overt (visible) anti-counterfeiting security features applied on the Bayer 
Pharma products in your country 
□ Bayer Pharma strategy on counterfeit protecaon 
□ News on internal anti-counterfeiting activities in other countries / regions 
□ Global or regional news on external anti-counterfeiting initiatives e.g. WHO, FDA, 2D 
matrix code, etc. 
□ Others: 
Free text 
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Annex 5: Questionnaire developed for the interviews 
Interview Questions: The questions are only related to the circumstances in your country. 
1) MEDIA AND TOOLS 
There are many conceivable tools used in the communication with patients e.g. the internet including 
websites and social media; public media including newspaper publications, radio and TV and information 
media including posters and brochures.  
1.1 Which media would you consider suitable to publish health-related matters? 
 
Free text 
1.2 What are the national regulatory restrictions with respect to the publishing of health-related 
matters? 
 
Free text 
1.3 Would you consider Patient Assistant Programs (PAPs) or Patient Support Programs (PSPs) as suitable 
to reach out to patients in order to inform them about the risks of counterfeit medicinal products and 
would that be permitted? 
 
Free text 
2) PATIENT PERCEPTION 
Anti-counterfeiting activities could be perceived positively as a company responsibility in order to protect 
patient safety and build trust in the company’s product portfolio. On the other hand, they could be 
misperceived as an indication of counterfeit existence leading to mistrust in the company’s product 
portfolio. 
2.1 In your view, would the population in your country be interested in / appreciate to be provided with 
counterfeit-relevant information and what kind of approach would you consider suitable? 
 
Free text 
3) PATIENT PURCHASE BEHAVIOR 
3.1 To what extend do patients in your country purchase medicinal products via the internet? What do 
you estimate? 
 
Free text 
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4) COMMUNICATION STRATEGY 
A targeted communication concept is one of the key elements in anti-counterfeiting. In order to be 
effective the strategy has to be adapted according to local needs (e.g. consumer behavior, regulatory 
restrictions). 
4.1 What kind of approach with regard to a public anti-counterfeiting education campaign would you 
consider as more effective in your country? 
(With regard to the given 4 pairs please mark the approach you consider “more effective” with an “x” 
or select “both equal” if you consider them equally effective) 
 
 
More effective Both equally 
effective 
a1) company-driven 
initiative is conducted under the name of the enforcing company / companies   
a2) independent / neutral 
initiative in collaboration with e.g. associations under the name of the respective 
association 
 
b1) product-specific 
initiative is related to one product or a product group   
b2) generalized 
not product-specific  
c1) using multiple media 
one initiative comprises the use of multiple media   
c2) using only one media 
one initiative relates to the use of only one media  
d1) routinely and steadily 
activities are carried out  continuously over a longer period of time    
d2) short-term and pulses 
activities are carried out in a short repeated manner  
5) COLLABORATION 
Collaboration with external stakeholders is another key element in an effective ACF strategy and the 
survey results revealed that many affiliates maintain a broad collaboration with external parties. 
5.1 How was contact with the external stakeholders with regard to the counterfeit issue established in 
your organization? 
(please mark the applicable row(s) with an “x”) 
 
 Please select 
(multiple selection possible) 
meetings, conferences, information day 
 
direct contact via e-mail or phone 
(contact person was known / publicly accessible)  
official contact via e-mail or phone 
(general institution contact address)  
via intermediary entities 
(e.g. associations)  
5.2 Do your local authorities and associations consider anti-counterfeiting as an important issue and offer 
support? 
 
Free text 
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5.3 Do local authorities (or associations) provide information about legal / licit online pharmacies to the 
public? 
 
Free text 
6) LOCAL PROCESSES 
6.1 How is the main responsibility regarding anti-counterfeiting handled in your local organization? 
 
Free text 
6.2 How would you assess the collaboration between these functions with respect to anti-counterfeiting 
matters? 
 
Free text 
7) NETWORKING 
Based on the ACF survey results a great need for knowledge-sharing and networking was identified. 
7.1 What would you consider as desirable / required to enhance net-working between functions and 
across countries? 
 
Free text 
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